साधारण
बाइन्डिंग



Digitized with financial assistance from the
Mr. Sangi
on 12 April, 2019

THE NATION'S AWAKENING

THE NATION'S AWAKENING

ESSAYS TOWARDS A BRITISH POLICY

BY

SPENSER WILKINSON

AUTHOR OF 'THE GREAT ALTERNATIVE'

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

27741 ac

'Naught shall make us rue,
If England to itself do rest but true.'

RR-n-20

Westminster
ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE AND CO.
2 WHITEHALL GARDENS, S.W.
1896

00027741

TO MY FATHER

PREFACE

THE following essays have been written in the hope that they may help to quicken among my countrymen the perception that for the maintenance of the British Empire a policy is required, and that in the present condition of the world it is not enough to strengthen the navy and to put the command of the army into competent hands, but that Great Britain must be prepared to use her forces for the assertion of her rights.

With this object I have in the first place passed in review the policies of all the greater European Powers, doing my best in each case to look from the point of view not of our own country but of the nation whose aims are under consideration. I have next examined how the conditions thus disclosed affect the maintenance of British interests, and have tried to show the nature and the purport in the present situation of two rival policies, that of alli

ance and that of isolation resting upon an all-powerful navy. I have then discussed the arrangements under which are carried on those branches of government upon the action of which depends the successful assertion of British rights in peace and war; and in conclusion have touched upon the spirit in which the British Empire is regarded by those who think it worth defending.

All the chapters, except the second and eighth of the first book, and the third and fourth of the second book, have appeared as articles contributed to the *Morning Post* between February 17th and April 23rd, and it is a pleasure to thank the proprietor of that newspaper for his kind permission to reprint them.

In a volume published two years ago, entitled *The Great Alternative*, I pleaded for the adoption of a national policy based upon a comprehensive view of the conditions of the modern world, but I refrained from proposing a specific course, holding it more important to stimulate inquiry into our position than to press a particular conclusion. The events of the last two years have in my mind confirmed the judgment that the deliberate choice of

a policy is incumbent upon the nation. In this volume I have taken a step further, and, while still urging as my main contention that a comprehensive view and a decision based upon it are indispensable, I have given reasons for thinking that at present the better decision would lead to co-operation with other Powers rather than to isolation.

169 Oakley Street, Chelsea,
May 14, 1896.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

OUR PAST APATHY

	PAGE
The sense of surprise which has accompanied recent events	1
Proves that the British public was not awake to the conditions of the World	2
Our information good	2
Our interests wide	3
Our political sense active	3
The sense of security with which foreign affairs are regarded	
Difference between British conception, Politics, and foreign conception, Policy	4
Patriotism. Abroad, on the surface; in England, latent	5
Cause of this condition	6
The security created by a once victorious navy	6
Absence of a sense of duty apart from party	7
The idea of the nation lost	7
Illustrations from the debates on the franchise	8
From the absence of history from the board schools	8
Intention to survey the origin of the crisis	9
To take stock of the aims of the Powers	9
And to ascertain the true course of British policy	9

BOOK I

THE AIMS OF THE GREAT POWERS

I.—THE POLICY OF FRANCE

We must take the French point of view	13
Interaction between domestic growth and foreign policy	14

PAGE

Henry IV. represented the nation as against the parties, and as against the Spanish Monarchy 14
Louis XIV. had to choose between a maritime and a Continental policy 15
He chose the latter 15
Consequent coalition against him and exhaustion of France 16
All his successors follow his example . . . 17
The present Republic faces the same dilemma . . 19
Since 1870, the way being barred in Europe, France has created a new Colonial Empire 20
Probability that she may turn her back upon Europe, make alliance with the Continental Powers and confront England on the sea 22

II.—THE OLD GERMANY

The Mediæval Emperors sacrificed their power in Germany to the dream of a World Empire 23
Weakness of the Empire under Maximilian 24
Charles V. sacrificed Germany to his Dynastic policy . 24
Consequent disunion of Germany, and rise of Austrian Monarchy 24
The rise of Prussia 25
Nature of Prussian opposition to Austria 25
Rivalry with Austria accentuated under Frederick the Great 26
Extra-German purposes of Austria 27
Purely German purposes of Prussia 27
Austro-Prussian rivalry 28
Explains the early victories of the French Revolution . 28
Its disastrous effects in 1815 29
Effects of the French Revolution upon the domestic growth of Germany 31
The rights of man and the system of absolutism . . 31
Spread of French ideas 32
Reaction in France 33
Arouses in Germany patriotism and liberalism . . 34
Both disappointed at Vienna 34
Failure of liberalism in 1848 35

PAGE
Accession of William I.; Bismarck 35
Determination to assert Prussia 35
Danish war 36
War of 1866 37
Its consequences 37
Despair of France 38
War of 1870 38
The new Empire 38

III.—THE NEW GERMANY

What is the policy of the New Germany? . . . 39
First, to shut out French influence 40
Secondly, to be reconciled with the now non-German Austria 41
Thirdly, to be reconciled with France . . . 41
Danger to England from this policy 42
Bismarck's view, that policy should not be sentimental . 43
His sympathy for England 44
Germany's aims:
First, to keep her territory intact . . . 44
Second, to preserve peace 44
Germany's possible wars 45
With Austria no quarrel 45
France convinced of Germany's firmness . . . 45
With Russia no real quarrel 46
Object to promote compromise between Russia and Austria 47
German policy towards England 48
Commercial competition 48
Colonial competition 49
German irritation at England's having no policy . . 49

IV.—GERMAN POLICY TOWARDS FRANCE

Connection between Germany's relations with her several neighbours 51
Policy should not be sentimental but should reckon with sentiment 52
Bismarck's greatness 52
National sentiment 53
Germany had to reckon with it in France . . . 54

PAGE

German policy to strengthen herself and to isolate France . 54
Three periods :
1870 to 1878. Germany relies upon Russia . . 55
1878 to 1895. Germany relies upon the Triple Alliance 55
1895 onwards. Germany approaches Russia without abandoning Triple Alliance 55
Value of Bismarck's speeches 55
His speech of January 1887 56
Reviewing his policy since 1870 56
He aimed at reconciliation with Austria . . . 57
Avoidance of quarrel with Russia 57
Reconciliation between the two 58
Reconciliation with France 59
Bismarck at that time not sanguine 60
Distinction between Austrian and Specific German interests 61

V.—GERMAN POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Bismarck's speech of February 3rd, 1888 . . . 62
Purpose of Russian concentration of troops . . . 62
To be ready for an Eastern crisis 63
German relations with Russia 63
1870. Black Sea Treaty 65
1875. Gortschakoff's theory that Russia had saved France . 65
Bismarck on Congress of Berlin 66
On Triple Alliance 67
On nature of treaties 67
Substance of treaty with Austria 68
Bismarck on Bulgaria 69
He contradicts the protocol 69
Will have no war for Bulgaria 70

VI.—THE EFFECTS OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Bismarck's great object to prevent a Franco-Russian coalition against Germany 71
Ready to make great sacrifices to Russia in order to avert it 72
Accession of William II. 72

PAGE
His difference with Bismarck 72
He renews Triple Alliance 72
Consequent Franco-Russian understanding . . . 72
Emperor reverts to Bismarck's policy 73
And approaches Russia once more 73
Signs of this policy 73
The agreement in the Far East 73
The restoration of Russian influence in Bulgaria . . 74
And in Turkey 74
Review of results of German policy 74
Triple Alliance renders attack on Germany improbable . 75
Makes for European peace 75
Consequence that European Powers go outside Europe . 76
Italy: her policy since 1870 76
Aims at maritime defence 77
At independence of French influence . . . 77
Italian defence is defence against France . . . 78
Revealed by seizure of Tunis which brought Italy into Triple Alliance 78
Doubt whether Germany can help Austria against Russia or Italy in Mediterranean 79
Consequent appeal to England 80
Lord Salisbury's former assurances 80
Doubts as to whether they still hold good . . . 80

VII.—THE DRIFT OF RUSSIAN POLICY

Frontier at the accession of Catherine . . . 82
Subsequent expansion 83
First in Europe 83
Secondly in Central Asia 84
Thirdly in the Far East 84
Expansion alternately towards West and East . . 85
But continuous pressure upon Turkey 85
Russian expansion inevitable, but not justified except from Russian point of view 85
Russian advance in Europe 86
Dangerous to European States 87
How it affects British interests 87
Question of rights applied to Black Sea and Baltic . . 88

PAGE
Question of Bosporus and Dardanelles examined . . . 88
Importance of Constantinople 90
British interest in the Straits 91
Austrian interest 91
Russia's right to reach the sea examined 92
Case of Alexandretta 92
Of Persian Gulf 93
Of Pacific 93
Real object to create naval arsenals 94
A purpose hostile to England 94
Russian design to encroach upon China 94
British interest to resist this, and to support China and Japan against Russia 95

VIII.—THE PRESENT SITUATION

A retrospect 97
European movement during the nineteenth century culminating in the union of Germany and of Italy . 97
British movement of Imperial expansion 98
Great Britain at peace and without a rival outside of Europe 98
Results of European movement 99
A division into two camps 100
Germany's desire for a British alliance 100
Indifference of British Governments to Empire during the period of expansion 101
Simultaneous development of industry and communication by sea 102
Consequent entrance of the other Powers as rivals into the Colonial field 102
The danger to Great Britain from a Continental combination 103
The attitude of the Continental powers depends partly upon that of Great Britain 106

BOOK II

THE DEFENCE OF BRITISH INTERESTS

I.—THE NEED FOR A POLICY

A common-sense survey of the kind of attacks to be resisted 111

PAGE
We have to defend territory interests and rights . . 111
Attack on territory means war 111
And all Powers go to war with reluctance . . . 112
Interest and rights can be assailed without war . . 112
Illustrations:
The Newfoundland shore 112
Spirit it reveals in both parties 113
There must be force behind right . . . 113
Raiatea and the New Hebrides 114
British interests 114
Madagascar 115
Siam 115
Surrenders to Germany 116
Cameroons 117
Zanzibar 117
Heligoland 118
Threats in Egypt pocketed 118
Interests and rights violated by Russia . . 118
The Far East 118
Central Asia 118
The Black Sea 119
Batoum 119
Bulgaria 119
These cases illustrate what British policy should not be . . 119
It should watch over our national interests 119
Firmness displayed in minor disputes . . . 120

II.—A POLICY PROPOSED

No British interest in European disputes . . . 122
But it does not follow that England should leave Europe alone for it is only the European Powers and the United States that can assail British interests . . . 122
Quarrel with United States improbable though not impossible as Mr. Olney's despatch shows . . . 123
American policy may change either by asserting sovereignty in America or by renouncing non-interference in the Old World 123
Great Britain's primary interests 124

PAGE
Defence is either war or negotiation 124
War would be European and maritime . . . 124
Three designs hostile to British interests . . . 125
French 125
German 125
Russian 125
Cannot all be resisted at once by war . . . 125
Danger of co-operation between those three Powers . . 126
British policy to keep them apart 126
And resist one or two at a time 126
And if possible to make a counter-combination . . 126
Germany's suspicions of British policy . . . 126
Danger of a fresh grouping in Europe leading to isolation of England and consequently either to war or to surrender 127
Opportunity for a British statesman 127
Review of our disputes 127
With Germany not vital 127
Statement by Baron Marschall 128
With France, principal issue is Egypt where we must make France accept the situation 128
With Russia, opposition permanent and irreconcilable . 128
Policy therefore to agree with Germany, if possible with France also, and to resist Russia . . . 129
Proposed system of treaties 129
(1) Great Britain, China, and Japan . . . 129
(2) Great Britain and Germany 129
(3) Great Britain and Austria 130
(4) Great Britain and Italy 130
Object to restrain Russia without war and possibly to detach France from her and eventually to settle the Eastern question 131

III.—THE OBJECTIONS TO AN ALLIANCE WITH RUSSIA OR WITH FRANCE AND TO A POLICY OF ISOLATION

The conditions of demonstration in regard to a policy : . 132
It must be shown to be effective and practicable . 132
Other courses must be shown to be without these qualities 133
And the policy proposed must be shown to be just . 133

PAGE
The proposal for an understanding with Russia . . 133
Rests upon an erroneous view of the effect of treaties . 134
And assumes that Russia will be bound by a promise not to do what it is her interest to do 134
Case of the Black Sea 134
Of Central Asia 135
And of the Far East 135
Russia's weak point: the Far East 135
Great Britain ought there to resist her . . . 136
In the Black Sea Russia can be resisted only by a combination 136
Agreement with Russia possible only by sacrifice of British interests 137
A good understanding with France 137
Desirable in itself 137
No great question pending except Egypt and the Mediterranean 138
French policy not yet committed to the new course . . . 139
Great Britain should anticipate and prevent the change, and convince France that the question of Egypt is settled 140
Concession in Egypt or in Mediterranean will not lead to an understanding, but firmness in those matters may do so 141
Alliance with Russia or with France under present conditions inconsistent with the object of British policy, the preservation of the Empire 141
Alleged unpopularity of Alliances 142
The Policy of Isolation 143
Two Cases:
Isolation coupled with inaction leads to the surrender of British interests 143
Isolation in action involves vast armaments, and therefore the postponement of the defence of our interests until those armaments are completed 146
The true policy is prompt action, which will bring the necessary alliances along with it. 149

IV.—JUSTIFICATION OF THE POLICY PROPOSED

PAGE
Its effectiveness 152
British interests threatened:
In the Far East 152
In the Black Sea 153
And in the Mediterranean 153
Their isolated defence by Great Britain alone impracticable . 153
The system of Treaties proposed renders their defence practicable at each point 154
Its practicability depends upon the attitude of Germany . 155
Bismarck's view of the value of a British Alliance . . 155
Confirmed by the manner in which Germany has pursued her Colonial policy 156
The Continental embarrassments of Germany . . 157
Her difficulties in supporting Austria and Italy . . 157
Will be relieved by the accession of Great Britain to the system 158
Preliminary conditions 158
No sacrifice of British interests and no loophole for an unnecessary war 158
Absence of real conflict between German and British interests 159
Basis must be the existing order 159
British trade interests must be protected against political assault 160
The status of South Africa 160
Interest of Germany and of England in each other's preservation 161
Safeguards against misuse of the alliance . . . 161
German action required only in extreme case . . 162
A general consideration of Germany's position leads to the view that she will co-operate with, rather than oppose, Great Britain 163
Alliance with China and Japan to be an independent treaty 164
The defence of the North-west Frontier must in any case be undertaken by Great Britain alone . . . 165
Justice of the policy 166
It is non-aggressive 166

PAGE
And does not injure the interests of France . . . 167
Advantage to Great Britain of a period of security . . 168

BOOK III

THE ORGANISATION OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE DEFENCE OF BRITISH INTERESTS

I.—DIPLOMACY

Worldwide extent of British interests . . . 171
Necessity for method, principles, organisation . . 172
Theory of foreign policy 172
Must come from history 172
Ranke 173
Seeley 173
Dual nature of British past action 174
A navy and alliances 174
Explanation of British unpopularity 174
The Maritime and Colonial monopoly 175
Continental Powers think they fought our battles for nothing 176
Serious war can be only with a great Power . . . 176
Will be fought in European waters 177
Yet we build battleships to go through the Suez Canal . 177
Machinery of Diplomacy. 178
Diplomatic service and Foreign Office . . . 178
Improvement in the method depends upon the Secretary of State 180
Failure in initiative 180
Illustrated by Venezuelan dispute 180

II.—INITIATIVE, CONTINUITY, COMPREHENSIVENESS

Distinction between diplomacy and policy . . . 183
Want of initiative 183
Siam 184
South Africa 185
Want of continuity 186
Usually attributed to oscillation between the parties . 186
Treaty of Utrecht and Treaty of Paris of 1672 . . . 186

PAGE

British interests sacrificed 186
Emperor and Frederick the Great thrown over . . 186
Newfoundland shore 186
Cuba 187
Manilla 187
And Pondicherry abandoned 187
These changes due to Court intrigue . . . 187
Continuity in regard to war 187
Results of war too often lost in the peace . . 187
Crimean War 187
Neglect to look before you leap 188
Egypt in 1882 188
Gordon 188
Armenia 189
Procrastination 189
Want of comprehensiveness 189
A badly constructed mind 189
Does not group questions together 190
Illustrated by negotiations with France . . . 190
And with Germany 191
Further illustration from case of *Armenia* . . . *192*

III.—THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Comprehensiveness and continuity may be had by organisation 196
The Foreign Office should have, for each Power, a sub-department 196
Which should make an annual report 197
Setting forth all pending questions 197
The sub-department should be acquainted with every transaction 197
Group of sub-departments 197
And annual report by its head 197
Cross classification 198
Annual report by permanent chief of the office . . 198
The proposals hypothetical as we do not know the facts . 199
Probable that no annual reports are written 199
And no memoranda such as those of Richelieu, etc. . . 200

PAGE
Far-reaching consequences of the system proposed . . 201
Question of expense 201
The system will promote initiative 202
And a consultation of the Cabinet in good time . . 202
Which is necessary in order to facilitate naval and military preparation 204
And to keep it in touch with policy 205
Explanation of the word sub-department . . . 206
Joint responsibility absurd 207
Organisation implies individual responsibility . . 207

IV.—THE PRIME MINISTER

The cabinet system 209
Distribution of responsibility and authority . . . 211
The Prime Minister should be Foreign Secretary . . 213
For:—
(1) Foreign relations are the essence of the nation's business. They involve the protection of all its work 213
(2) The Foreign Secretary can best judge of the standard of preparation for war . . . 214
(3) The Prime Minister can best harmonise the defensive services and should therefore be Foreign Minister 214
(4) The Prime Minister can best deal with the Treasury 215
Oneness of national life 215
Requires a comprehensive view, including home and foreign affairs which react upon one another 216
Reaction illustrated from British policy during the Napoleonic war and the subsequent extreme neglect of foreign affairs 216
How to avoid these oscillations 219
A Prime Minister possessed with the idea of the nation . 219
The danger that the right man may be found too late . 221
Pitt's turning his back upon Europe 221
Foreign policy should never be conducted in the dark . 222

V.—THE PROBLEM OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

PAGE
The ideal cabinet in action 224
Its attitude towards legislation and towards Imperial unity . 224
It will take stock of possible quarrels and of means of defence 225
The stale confidence-trick 226
The requirements of Imperial defence :—
(1) Army for India and Canada 227
(2) Navy to command the sea 227
(Force of navy a matter of observation and calculation)
(3) Naval force to protect trade 228
(4) Docks, arsenals, coaling stations, harbours . . 228
(5) Military garrison for them 229
(6) An army for an offensive counterstroke . . 229
(7) The doubtful point, the military defence of Great Britain 230
Two schools 230
Each of which exaggerates its views . . 230
Extreme army view 230
Extreme navy view 234
Common-sense view 234
Ideal cabinet would settle this dispute . . . 234
Present uncertainty 234
It extends to other matters 235
For example :
North-west frontier 235
Short Service 235
Danger of partisan discussion 235
The single eye 236
Difficulty caused by a Government committing itself to a detail without having taken a general view . . 236
Illustration from Mr. Stanhope's barracks . . . 236

VI.—THE CABINET AND THE ARMY AND NAVY

The Cabinet not omniscient 238
It reflects the public temper 238
But preparations for war must correspond not to temper but to facts 238

PAGE

Government should not go to war without knowing what it wants, and how to get it 239
Must defeat the enemy's forces, and then constrain his Government 239
A judgment of the means requires special training and knowledge 240
Involves co-operation between Admiral, General, and Statesman 240
And all three must think together 241
In war professional leaders necessary 241
They must have authority 241
Unity of direction in the navy 242
The Board of Admiralty 242
A Committee cannot carry on war 242
Though a single commander must rely on a subordinate on the spot 243
The Admiralty during the last great war . . . 243
It has since been entirely changed 243
All modern navies have unity of direction . . . 243
The First Sea Lord should be recognised as strategical director 244
Objections to titles of Commander-in-Chief and Lord High Admiral 244
Effect of the proposed change upon the Cabinet . . 244
The standard of preparation must be the joint work of the Cabinet and the two commanders . . . 245
Review of possible wars:
(1) England alone against one Power 245
(2) Against two Powers 246
(3) Against larger combination 246
(4) England in alliance 246
General preparations must cover all these cases . . 247
All except (3) met by Regulars and Auxiliaries . . 247
Distinction between general and special preparations . 248
For special preparations Commander-in-Chief always summoned 248
First Sea Lord should also be summoned 248
Both should be consulted with regard to general preparations, *i.e.* with regard to estimates 249

PAGE

Objection to the full recognition of this function of the commanders, that it lowers the status of the cabinet ministers 249
The objection obscures the true function of the cabinet ministers . . . . . .
The First Lord should become the equal of the Secretary of State . . . . . .

VII.—THE SPIRIT OF MODERN ORGANISATION

Distinction between a machine and an organisation . .
Illustrated from the example of armies . . .
Function of general direction . . . . .
The head of an office should be the intellectual leader of his staff . . . . . .
The analogy of science . . . . . .
Need for a theory of practice as a guide in the direction of the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Foreign Office .
The theory must be based on history . . .
Each of the offices should have its own department for the history and the theory of its own work . . .
This requirement the outcome of practical experience .
Peculiar position of the head of the Foreign Office . .
Who must be not necessarily a professional diplomatist, but a statesman . . . . . .
The practical difficulty of statesmanship . . .
That it requires a comprehensive view . . .
Which will be obtained only from a grasp of the national purpose . . . . . .

BOOK IV

THE IDEA OF THE NATION

I.—THE FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH POWER

A national faith must be founded in reason . . . 267
Which sets out from the belief that in the end right will prevail 267
Two aspects of human life ; the will and the community . 268

PAGE

Appearing in history as the freedom of the individual and the independence of the state 269
The process of history is the development of independence and community, both for the individual and for the state 269
And the goal is the community of mankind 270
The one-sidedness of the professional study of war . . 271
The principle of war alike by land and by sea is first to disarm the enemy 271
It implies that an insular state will find its defence in the command of the sea 271
... is the key of British history 272
... mplement of this law is that of the balance of power . 273
... h explains why Great Britain has always had alliances 273
... r given by a victorious navy of military action upon foreign coasts 274
... put into England's hands the balance of Europe . 275
... responsibility inseparable from this power carries with it a duty of national self-education . . . 276

II.—THE MEANING OF EMPIRE

The world-wide power which accompanies the possession of a victorious navy 278
... British Empire the outcome of such power . . 278
... tification of that power 279
... at Britain's work upon the land 280
... quality of her colonisation 280
... e future of Canada, Australia, and South Africa . . 280
... he mission of Great Britain in India 281
... hat of a trustee or guardian 281
... overnment for the benefit of the governed . . . 283
... he far-off goal of our labours 283
The defence of India 284
History of the word Empire 284
Its modern significance 285
Best illustrated by the British work in Egypt . . 285
The task not confined to the British race 286
The spirit of monopoly intolerable either in ourselves or in others 287

PAGE

Significance of the world's peace from the point of view of empire 288
Recapitulation of the four laws of British history . . 289

III.—THE EDUCATION OF THE BRITISH RACE

The burden of empire inseparable from our national independence. 292
Compels us to be at once just and strong . . . 292
Magnitude at the present time of this obligation . . . 293
Which by our representative system is laid not upon a class but upon the whole nation . . . 294
A representative statesman must be the outcome of a awakening of national thought in regard to the duties of Empire 295
The Queen's reign has prepared the ground for such a movement 295
Retrospect of the progress made social and political . . 295
Our lives marred by lack of unity 298
The want will be supplied by the conception of a purpose . 299
Which is given us by the Empire 299
The law of service imposes upon the British race the responsibility for the choice between political decay and a future grander than the past 300
Influence of this responsibility upon the education of the new generation 301
The conception of a national purpose must lead to the unity of the Empire 302
To the elevation of the British character . . . 302
And to the fulfilment of Britain's mission in the service of mankind. 302

THE NATION'S AWAKENING

INTRODUCTION

OUR PAST APATHY

THE winter of 1895-6 has been for Great Britain a period of surprises. First of all came the American President's message on the subject of the dispute with Venezuela and its endorsement by the representative chambers and by the press of the United States, revealing that the Americans were either very angry with us without apparent reason, or were in some unaccountable way filled with envy, hatred, and malice. Next came the series of startling events in South Africa, which showed that one great area in the Empire is far from united and far from enjoying the blessings of peace. The German Emperor's telegram to President Krüger, and the comments of the German press upon the events in South Africa, revealed in Germany also a prejudice against us which could not be accounted for by anything that had been done upon this side of the North Sea. Lastly, the report that the Sultan of Turkey had placed his Empire under Russian protection gave a shock to the

expectations or to the established ideas of many persons in this country. The first effect of all this was to bring war *in sight*, and to make Englishmen think seriously of the means of national and of imperial defence. That is undoubtedly one salutary lesson of the crisis, but it is by no means either the only lesson or the most valuable one which is to be learned. The serious fact, the fact which should be most taken to heart, is that we were surprised. Great events, leading to great changes in international relations, are not caused by the accidents which seem to occasion them. They are invariably the result of preceding conditions, and the fact that the British public was surprised is positive proof that the British public had not been aware of what was going on in the world. The Americans, the Germans, and most of the observers outside Great Britain were astonished, not that the events happened, but that we were surprised by them. We have had our eyes shut, and it is high time that we opened them very wide, and determined in the future not to shut them again.

Yet we might suppose ourselves to be well informed. We have, in some respects, the best press in the world. Our principal newspapers *spend money freely*; large sums are constantly paid for *news*, leading articles are written by able men, by men of good education, and, in very many cases, by men of high character. The tone in which, during the trying weeks of December and January, the principal news-

papers discussed, what was happening has been thought both at home and abroad to be creditable to British self-respect. The weak point of our people in comparison with the people in most other countries can hardly be a lack of current information. The great difference is, perhaps, in the way in which we look at the world. Each of us has his individual point of view, or a series of points of view, according to the different sides of his own life. The business man regards the globe as the sphere in which he is to make money, the man of leisure as affording room for travel, the reader as the scene of adventures, for, as a nation, we are not readers of history. When we think of ourselves as citizens we think of ourselves as Conservatives or Unionists or Liberals or Home Rulers. It is a question of how we vote at elections, of which set of meetings we attend, and when we have once taken our groove we are prone to remain in it.

Perhaps the most marked feature of our national character is the indifference, almost stolidity, with which we are accustomed to regard events in other countries. During the lifetime of men now in middle age, there have been four great wars—the Civil War in America, the war between Austria and Prussia, the Franco-German War, and the Russo-Turkish War. To Englishmen they were all interesting in much the same way as a novel is interesting. They afforded a certain amount of not altogether dis-

agreeable excitement, but they did not interest us in the sense of affecting the course of our lives. We are accustomed to the idea that our lives will run on to the end just as they are, and that we and our children shall go on for all time buying and selling, reading and writing, drawing our salaries and paying our income-tax, our rent, and our quarter's bills. We feel in our homely island like people well housed on a great rock high above the sea looking out on a storm. It is a fine sight, there is not the slightest danger, and we enjoy the spectacle. In the other countries this feeling of being a secure spectator is lacking. The Americans, the Germans, the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the French, the Italians, the Danes, the Turks, the Russians, the Roumanians, and the Servians have all had experience of war. In all these countries, at least in all those which are on the European Continent, the conception of politics is not so much at home as among us. The idea of policy is to them much more familiar. Politics to us means little more than the relation between parties, between two parties, even between three or four; but in other countries policy means the relations between States. To us, politics means a struggle, never quite friendly, and seldom utterly hostile, between parties among ourselves. In every other European country policy denotes a conflict, not always acute, but never in abeyance, between the nation and the other nations that are in contact with

it; and the really surprising phenomenon, the phenomenon which puzzles the foreign observer of Great Britain, is the absence from our minds of the conception of policy which is so familiar to them.

The moment you cross the Channel and enter at all into the minds of the people whom you meet you find the conception of a nation as a sort of magnified person living in a constant rivalry, often latent, but never ceasing, with a number of other magnified persons. The German, the Frenchman, the Italian, thinks of himself firstly, secondly, and thirdly as a German, a Frenchman, or an Italian, as the case may be; and a long way afterwards as a member of some party organisation. To an Englishman his being an Englishman is so much a matter of course that he is hardly ever aware of it, and thinks of himself first in his professional or business capacity, then as a Liberal or a Conservative, and then in any number of minor capacities, but his being an Englishman is stowed so far down at the bottom of his consciousness that it requires some very serious event to bring it near to the surface.

For thirty years we have watched the progress of events abroad without ever discovering that they deeply affected us. We have looked at what has gone on in other countries merely from the point of view of our everyday political consciousness, that is, with the sympathies natural to a Liberal or a Conservative. France, being a Republic, has been

supposed to have a natural attraction for Liberal feeling, while Germany, where parliamentary institutions have hardly attained the stage of respectability, is to the same extent under the ban of the orthodox Radical teaching, and of course the sympathies of a good Conservative are bound to be on the opposite side to those of an orthodox Radical. Recent events have suddenly reminded us that we are Englishmen, and brought to the surface our too long latent consciousness that we also are a nation, and that possibly the movements going on in the world may directly and profoundly concern us.

It may be well to inquire how it has come about that our national consciousness has been so long buried, that, although every one of us is completely equipped with a large assortment of the best political principles, qualifying him to vote with a good conscience for his own party at any election, we most of us have no definite theory at all as to how the nation should cast its vote on a division between the Great Powers. In a crisis such as is undoubtedly upon us there is no clear, general agreement as to what the national policy ought to be. The reason of this peculiar state of things lies in our insularity. For three centuries we have been safe on our rock, not because the sea flowed round us, but because the British navy commanded the sea. If any foreign army set sail to land on our shores with hostile intent, the British fleet interfered, usually at some

very early stage of the undertaking. From the time of Hawke and Nelson it has been thoroughly well understood that any military force adventuring itself on the sea for the purpose of attacking Great Britain ran the risk of being drowned by the sinking of its ships at no great distance from the point of embarkation. This knowledge impressed upon Continental Powers has been so effectual that we have come to think that it was the sea itself which protected us—a great mistake, for the sea is a far easier path of invasion than the land. We can send an army to Egypt in a fortnight, but in a fortnight we could not send the same force a quarter of the distance by land even if the inhabitants of the country through which it had to pass were willing to give it every assistance. So secure have we been through the power of our fleets that we have come to forget altogether the international struggle for existence, have come to believe that we alone of all nations were exempt from it, and that we were a sort of chosen people specially set apart for eternal peace and prosperity. The British conception of the whole duty of man from 1855 until 1895 has been to tell the truth, to keep the Ten Commandments, and to vote for the party—whichever party it might be.

All of us have been brought up with a certain sense of duty. We have a domestic duty, a professional duty, and a political duty; but of a national duty, as distinct from services to the party, there has

been little idea. That this is the case will be evident to any one who considers the two great legislative changes of our time. What were the arguments that were used by either side during the debates upon the extension of the franchise? Did they reveal any conception of the object of endowing a man with a vote beyond that of making him a Liberal or a Conservative, of giving him an interest in keeping down the taxes, or in redistributing them on to other people's shoulders? No doubt it was held that an interest in politics, that is in Liberalism, or in Conservatism, would educate the man, though it was perhaps not made clear how his honesty, or his truthfulness, or his taste for doing his work well would be increased by his voting with one side or the other. In the last analysis the only valid reason for giving a man a vote is the belief that as a voter he will help the nation, will contribute to its doing its work in the world. If he is to do that he must have some idea of what the nation is and of what its work is. He must learn that it is one community among many, engaged in rivalry, or perhaps it would be better to say in emulation with the others. It may be said that the debates on the franchise were not the proper occasion for expounding the meaning of the nation and its work in the world, but after the extensions of the suffrage came the education code and the school boards. The one thing which the board schools have never taught and do not teach is the natural history of the nation

and its true place in the world. They give the outlines of what is called English history—that is, the rise and development of the two great parties, but they utterly ignore the history of Europe, without which the meaning of the British nation is utterly unintelligible, and without which an Englishman, a Scotsman, or an Irishman cannot possibly comprehend his position as a citizen of the Empire, nor form any other conception of his duty in regard to the national policy than to do what he is told by the Government of the day—that is, by the political party for the time being in office.

The present time offers a good opportunity to fill up to some extent the gap in our national training. This may be done by the attempt to survey the recent crisis and the present situation from the point of view of the nation and of the Empire, to take stock of the aims of the several Powers, and to ascertain what must be the course to be pursued by Great Britain in order to avoid an unnecessary war and to maintain, peacefully if it may be, but if necessary by the use of force, the just rights of Great Britain and the unity of the British Empire.

BOOK I

THE AIMS OF THE GREAT POWERS

BOOK I

THE AIMS OF THE GREAT POWERS

I

THE POLICY OF FRANCE

A SURVEY of the great Powers of the world cannot better begin than with France. In order that we may walk upon sure ground, we must, in the first instance, entirely dismiss from our minds the question, What ought to be the policy of our own country in regard to France? We must rather put ourselves in the position of Frenchmen, and ask ourselves how an enlightened and large-minded Frenchman must necessarily regard the present position, the prospects, and the aims of his own country.

A Frenchman, like an Englishman, is rooted in the past. He is, to a great extent, made up of tradition—a great and glorious tradition, itself the necessary consequence of the geographical situation of his country, and of the historical process by which the French nation has come to be what it is.

The history of France most brilliantly illustrates what is, after all, an essential point in the history of every nation—the intimate connection, the never-ceasing action and reaction, between internal or domestic growth and foreign policy. It has been well said that the French nation is the creation of the French monarchy; and the historian has no difficulty in carrying back his exposition of this view to the election of the first Capet. But we may pass over the mediæval epoch and the territorial formation of France, and may begin with the beginnings of modern France, at the close of the sixteenth century.

Henri IV. owed his crown and his greatness not to his Protestantism, nor to his abjuration, not to his bravery, nor to his gallantry, but to the fact that he was the representative of the nation. 'Si je refuse d'abjurer, demain il n'y aura plus de France.' His enemies, the League, relied upon the assistance of Spain, and it was upon the resistance of the King to the Spanish Monarchy that the modern greatness of France was founded. The feudal independence of the nobles against which the monarchy had to contend during the greater part of the seventeenth century was invariably supported by the Spanish Government; and the centralised absolutism which was perfected by Louis XIV. represented not less truly than the acquisition of Franche Comté the triumph of the national cause over the foreigner.

Louis XIV., in the period of his early greatness, the period of Colbert, was the leader of a united people, ready for great enterprises, as every people is in the first flush of a thoroughly aroused national consciousness. Two policies lay before him, the one continental, the other maritime. It was open to him, on the one hand, to follow up the opportunities which had been created by Richelieu in the Treaty of Westphalia, and to seek to establish, by territorial expansion towards the Rhine, and by prudent intervention in Germany in opposition to the House of Habsburg, the primacy of France in European affairs. It was open to him also to attempt to turn the energies of France towards the sea, and, by judiciously taking advantage of the rivalry between Great Britain and the Netherlands, to obtain for France the command of the sea, and to found a vast Colonial Empire.

Looking back with the knowledge of the consequences of his action, it is easy to think that he hardly realised the nature of the choice presented to him. It is natural to suppose, as some French historians have done, that he made a wrong choice. Princes, especially when they are young, generous, and ambitious, and when they find themselves the representatives of a fresh and strong national feeling, are apt to be in a hurry. None but the greatest statesmen are content to labour for posterity, and to lay their foundations so broad and so solid, to calculate so profoundly upon the inevitable working of natural

causes—chief among which must ever be reckoned the temper, the sentiments, and the passions of mankind—that they can afford to leave their work half done in the faith that time will infallibly complete it. Louis XIV. saw in the Netherlands an easy prey, a sure and immediate conquest. He miscalculated their strength and the jealousy of the other Powers. The ultimate result of his design upon the Netherlands was to throw them into the arms of Great Britain, to create a great European combination against himself; and, by consolidating the maritime power of England, to render impossible for more than two centuries the dream which some of his advisers cherished of a colonial world under the protection of France.

It is easy to see now that the wisest course would have been to have steadily assisted the Dutch, until the British navy had been destroyed, and to have postponed the quarrel with Holland until such time as the struggle for the command of the sea could be reduced to a duel between France and the Netherlands. In that case, the military superiority of France ought to have been able to turn the scale against the Dutch. It was, perhaps, to the hastiness of his ambition that the failures of Louis XIV. were due. The attainment of any one of his purposes, either the advance of his border towards the Netherlands or towards the Rhine, or the attainment of naval superiority over Great Britain, was a sufficient object for one reign;

the development of them all at once raised up against him more enemies than he could reasonably hope to defeat. The consequence was that in his reign the energies of France were greatly overstrained, the administrative machine was overwrought, and the centralised monarchy which, at his accession, was perhaps the most popular institution in the country, became during the next two reigns the object of criticism, of suspicion, and of aversion. The premature revelation by Louis XIV. of his two-fold design, his attempt to grasp with one hand the ascendency in Europe, and with the other the supremacy at sea, led to the co-operation in opposition to France of Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the German Powers; and this combination, with slight variation, continued throughout the eighteenth century.

The Revolution, it is important to observe, makes no change whatever in the objects of French foreign policy. Alike under Henri IV., under Louis XIV., under the Convention, under the Directory, and under the Empire, the purpose of France is always the same, the extension of her territory and of her influence in Europe, the acquisition of a Colonial Empire, and the destruction of the British navy. These are the natural and intelligible purposes of any and every French government. The pretexts vary with the circumstances of the time. Richelieu, though he is the director of a Catholic State, takes up the cause of the Protestants in Germany,

assuredly not from sympathy with Protestantism, but merely as a means for perpetuating division and therefore the influence of France in Germany. His alliance with the Protestants corresponds with Napoleon's Federation of the Rhine, which aimed at precisely the same end. The Revolution repeated the hasty action of Louis XIV. by declaring war at the same time against the German Powers and against Great Britain; and Napoleon, the heir of the Revolution, discovered, like the Grand Monarque, whose policy he at one time seemed destined to fulfil, that the conquest of Europe is not possible without the command of the sea, and that the destruction of the British navy is a task of such magnitude as to require the undivided and concentrated energies of the state which undertakes it. The failure of the French design in the hands of Napoleon was even greater than its failure in the hands of his predecessors; for while his attack upon the British maritime power ended in the destruction of all the fleets in the world except that of Great Britain, and thus in an immeasurable strengthening of the enemy whom he designed to overthrow, his attempt to divide and to dominate over Germany led, two generations after his fall, to the consolidation of the German States into the modern Empire, and to the loss of those frontier provinces, the seizure of which by Louis XIV. had aroused the bitter and lasting hostility of the German nation.

The Third Republic is the continuer of the policy of Napoleon, as Napoleon himself was the inheritor of that of Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV. Louis XIV., in his antagonism to Germany, sought the alliance and assistance of the Sultan of Turkey, at that time the Great Power in Eastern Europe. The Third Republic in the same way seeks the assistance of Russia, the successor of the Turkish Monarchy, not, indeed, in geographical situation, but in political influence, as the strong Power of the East. The present Republic, too, has a twofold aim in the conduct of its policy. The old tradition of influence upon the Continent is represented partly in the watchword, 'The Recovery of Alsace and Lorraine,' and partly in the hostility to that united Italy whose national existence is an obstacle alike to the establishment of French influence on the south of the Alps and to the acquisition of French supremacy in the Mediterranean. The other tradition, of maritime and colonial ambition, is represented in our own day not merely by the reconstruction and development of the French navy, but by the enormous expansion of the French Colonial Empire which has marked the last fifteen years.

The acquisition of Algeria in 1830 was the modest beginning of the new colonial expansion of France. It was an experiment cautiously undertaken. The country was occupied, and assurances were given to Great Britain, whose opposition would have been

fatal, that the occupation was to be merely temporary until the establishment of order. The prosecution of the design was interrupted by the fall of the Orleanist Monarchy, and the Colonial experiment of Napoleon III., the invasion of Mexico, was shipwrecked upon the Monroe Doctrine. The founder of the modern French Colonial system is M. Jules Ferry, who was responsible for the conquest of Tonkin, and for the occupation of Tunis. The occupation of Tunis was accompanied by promises of evacuation as soon as order should be restored; but M. Ferry himself, before he died, was careful to explain to his countrymen that these promises were never intended to be kept, were merely a blind for the benefit of England and Italy, and that an occupation or protectorate was deliberately chosen as the form of conquest least liable to awaken too soon the jealous susceptibility of other Powers. M. Ferry fell a sacrifice to the temporary unpopularity of these colonial expeditions at a time when the public mind in France was solely occupied with renewing the army and restoring the national defences in view of the possible reopening of the conflict with Germany.

Five-and-twenty years have now elapsed since the Treaty of Frankfort. France finds herself comparatively prosperous, and her influence, if not paramount in Europe, as it had been once or twice in the past, is at least considerable. Her politicians and her people have alike ceased to feel that the

recovery of Alsace and Lorraine is an urgent matter; no Frenchman, it is true, could be expected to declare that he acquiesces in the loss of those provinces; yet the time has passed when any Frenchman thinks it necessary to abandon other enterprises, or to suspend the current business of the nation, in order to reconquer what was lost in 1870. Meanwhile, the new Colonial Empire has developed. France has acquired, not without large sacrifices both of men and of money, not only Tonkin, but a part of Siam, forming with Cochin-China, Cambodia, and Annam a not inconsiderable Oriental Empire. Madagascar has been conquered, and on the map at least the tricolour now floats over the whole of north-western Africa, from the shores of Algeria and Tunis to the Gold Coast and the Atlantic, with the exception of the Empire of Morocco and a few *enclaves* formed by small British Colonies, imbedded, so to speak, in the mass of French territory which surrounds them. This African Empire is constantly expanding. It reaches to Lake Chad, and French explorers are anxious to connect it with a second French Empire that has grown up to the north of the Congo. The dream of many Frenchmen at the present day is to extend this African Empire by the acquisition of Egypt until France shall become possessor of the whole of Africa north of the Congo from the Atlantic to the Red Sea.

A French statesman of to-day is confronted by the

same choice which offered itself to Louis XIV. He must, perforce, ask himself whether the future career of France is to be sought upon the European Continent or in the growth of her maritime interests and the expansion of her territory beyond the sea. Considerations of sentiment and tradition point, no doubt, towards the frontier. But the German Empire is a strong Power. An attack upon it undertaken by France alone can have little prospect of success at any period which a judicious statesman will anticipate in his calculations. The assistance of a powerful ally like Russia no doubt improves the prospects of France for such a war, but the acquisition of an ally to France is pretty certain, as is shown by the diplomatic history of the last fifteen years, to bring allies on to the German side. Every year that passes away tends gradually to mitigate the asperity of the recollections of the last war, and common sense suggests that in any consideration of the future policy of France the possibility should always be borne in mind that the Frenchmen of our own generation may at any moment come to the conclusion that the old tradition of a double objective is effete, and that for the twentieth century the true policy of France lies in the acceptance of the land frontier which she now possesses, in the concentration of her energies upon the waters of the Mediterranean and of the ocean, and in the extension of her already great Colonial Empire.

II

THE OLD GERMANY

THE history of Germany from the ninth century to the nineteenth is a record of failures to attain to national unity and strength. Charles the Great having made himself supreme in the Western Europe of his time, naturally enough thought himself the successor of Augustus, and sought the consecration of that Church with which Constantine had identified the empire. The consequence was that in the subsequent tripartite division of his realms his German kindred inherited a doctrine of over-lordship which developed into the mediæval theory of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation. This famous title represented a worthy ambition, a purpose noble, but unhappily unattainable. Saxon, Franconian, and Hohenstauffen in turn were doomed to sacrifice the substance of their power in Germany to the effort to realise the dream of the over-lordship of the world, and to find in their struggle for secular primacy an invincible enemy in the spiritual primacy of the successors of St. Peter.

When the first Habsburg was elected to the Imperial

dignity his actual power was little more than that of one of the multitude of territorial princes, whose position as direct vassals of the Emperor had been developed during the weakness of the Imperial authority into an independence hardly veiled by the language of legal tradition. The title of Emperor, indeed, was held in universal respect, but the Emperor's commands were backed up, as a rule, by little more force than that which the Emperor for the time being could exert as the hereditary sovereign of one or two provinces.

Maximilian was dimly conscious of being the representative of a nation; but tradition held him to the conception of Roman Emperor rather than to that of German King; he was unable to assert his sovereignty over his more than half-emancipated feudal subordinates; and when, in a later generation, in consequence of his matrimonial system, the Imperial crown passed to a Prince who was King of Spain, and successor to the still remaining fragment of Burgundy, as well as Duke of Austria, the policy of the Empire became dynastic and anti-national.

To Charles v. the Imperial crown was an instrument for the aggrandisement of himself and his house. The German nation had accepted the Reformation, while its Emperor was the most Catholic king. The interests or family ambitions of most of the German princes, no less than the deep convictions of the inhabitants of most of the free cities, were bound up with the

cause of Protestantism, yet the office of Emperor was officially and traditionally that of the one representative of the nation. Out of this confusion and opposition of causes arose the religious conflict that paralysed and devastated Germany from the middle of the sixteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century. When the Thirty Years' War ended, all the great causes had been lost. Protestantism had been obliterated in South Germany, Austria, and Bohemia. The Emperor, though his title remained, was henceforth nothing more than the head of an Austrian monarchy. The nation had disappeared; a part of its heritage had been incorporated with France, and the Empire had become a system of States theoretically owing allegiance to the Emperor, but in practice independent, and for the most part only too willing to accept the powerful protection of the French King against their own nominal suzerain.

At this period begins the rise of Prussia. The Prussian Monarchy, like the Austrian, was at the first a family affair, the difference being that the dominions of the Hohenzollerns were either German or thoroughly Germanised, while the Habsburgs, as Kings of Hungary, had great and to them indispensable interests lying outside the pale of German life. The policy of the House of Austria was to prevent any other German house becoming so powerful as to be a rival, and it necessarily implied the attempt to prevent the expansion of Prussia. From the Great

Elector onwards the Hohenzollerns were able, in the main, not merely to be the leaders of the opposition in Germany, but in assuming that position to make themselves the representatives of German interests against the dynastic purpose, never merely German, of the House of Austria.

The perennial antagonism between Prussia and Austria is the clue to the whole history of Germany during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the great struggle against Louis XIV. the Empire was the ally of Great Britain and Holland, and at this time Prussia was, as a rule, the loyal supporter of the Emperors, but upon the failure and death of Louis XIV. the House of Austria reverted to the policy of domineering over Prussia, with the result that Frederick the Great inherited as his mission the assertion of Prussia against Austria. So great was the resentment of Maria Theresa after the Prussian conquest of Silesia that she became the ally of France in the French attempt to acquire, in opposition to the British Colonists, the basins of the Mississippi and the Ohio, merely because she hoped, with French assistance, to humiliate the King of Prussia. Thus, in the Seven Years' War, the alliance was no longer between England, the Netherlands, and Austria against France, but between England and Prussia against France and Austria. The paramount object of Austrian policy was the destruction of the Prussian Monarchy,

and for this purpose the alliance not merely of France but of Russia was sought.

The Austrian purpose was once more to make a reality of that authority over Germany which tradition coupled with the title of Emperor; but there was a second purpose not quite consistent with the first. As Kings of Hungary the Emperors had long been engaged in defence against the Turks, and with the decline of Turkey defence became synonymous with the wish to extend the possessions of the House of Habsburg towards the Black Sea and the Ægean. The anarchy of Poland could not fail to attract the territorial ambitions of the Austrian house, of which the Catholic tradition and the Imperial title carried with them also the desire to exercise a dominant influence upon the affairs of Italy. Thus, authority in Germany was to the Habsburgs not an end in itself. It was to be an instrument for the exercise of authority and for the extension of dynastic power in Italy, Turkey, and Poland.

To Prussia the paramount object in the middle of the eighteenth century was self-preservation. The restoration of the Imperial authority over Germany meant her destruction; for except as a German State she had no existence. She was, therefore, compelled to become the champion of purely German interests, as against that part of the interests of the House of Habsburg which were non-German.

The French Revolution startled the world at a

time when the rivalry between Austria and Prussia was coming to a head. Each side was anxious to prevent the aggrandisement of the other, and to secure its own aggrandisement at the expense of Poland; and each side was eager to obtain, also at the expense of Poland, the assistance of Russia for its own projects. The part taken by Austria and Prussia in the earlier wars against the Revolution represented to each of them a subordinate interest; each desired that the other should be occupied in the French wars, and thus diverted from the main issue which lay, or was supposed by both parties at the time to lie, in Poland. The undisciplined and ill-directed armies of the French Republic were able, between 1792 and 1795, greatly to extend the borders of France; but the failure of the Austrian and Prussian arms in the West appeared, at the time, in Berlin and Vienna, to be of comparatively little importance; for the territory lost, though German, belonged neither to Austria nor to Prussia, each of which received between 1792 and 1795 its not inconsiderable share of Poland. Prussia thereupon retired from the war with France, considering that peace was the greatest of Prussian interests, and that the neutrality of Hanover would protect her and give her leisure to assimilate her new Polish province, which, it should be remembered, extended beyond the Vistula, and included the city of Warsaw. Prussia maintained her neutrality, notwithstanding the French seizure of

Hanover, until the Austrian power had been broken at Ulm and Austerlitz. Then came her inevitable turn. Her army was dispersed at Jena and Auerstädt, and the assistance of Russia in the following year did not save her from dismemberment and almost complete annexation.

Throughout the subsequent struggle with France confidence between Prussia and Austria was never restored. The desperate attempt of Austria in 1809 to retrieve her fortunes found Prussia helpless, irresolute, and distrustful; and even after the destruction of Napoleon's army in the Russian campaign, it was only the bitter hatred engendered in the population by the French brutality of the previous five years which compelled the Government to pass from the side of Napoleon to that of the Emperor of Russia. During the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 the jealousy between Austria and Prussia continued unabated, to break out afresh at the Congress of Vienna, which resettled the map of Europe.

At the time of the Congress there were three German parties. The Austrian Government was anxious to keep Germany divided, with a view to exercising, from Vienna, the control over its destinies. The minor Princes, who had mostly been partisans of Napoleon, were eager to be restored to their thrones, and quite ready, in order to regain them, to comply with the wishes of Austria. The Prussian patriots longed for the abolition of the

small principalities, whose Governments had sided with the foreigner, and for such a territorial reconstruction of Prussia as should give her a position corresponding to the magnificent efforts which she had made during the then recent campaigns. The King of Prussia had no conception of a nation, and was on the side of 'sovereigns and statesmen.' The divisions between the representatives of Germany and the imbecility of the Prussian Government gave the decision to the non-German Powers. The Russian Emperor had an interest in keeping Germany divided and Prussia weak, as well as in maintaining the German princelets, many of whom were his relatives. The representatives of France took advantage of the discord between the Germans to try and retain for their own country as much territory as possible, and the British statesmen, Wellington and Castlereagh, in utter ignorance of German affairs, were seduced by the politeness of the Austrians, the astuteness of Talleyrand, and the plausibility of the theory of legitimism to throw overboard the Prussians for the benefit of France, Austria, and Russia. Thus Germany emerged from the great war hopelessly divided, with an entirely impossible scheme of federal government, that gave to Austria the lion's share of influence, and left Prussia with a territory made up of two widely separated patches, having an independent Saxony a few marches to the south of Berlin, and a Grand Duchy of Warsaw as an *annexe*

of Russia extending to within a few marches of the Oder.

The French Revolution exerted upon the internal affairs of Germany, upon the growth of institutions and upon the spirit of the people, an influence not less profound than that of its policy of conquest upon the territorial arrangement of the States comprised within the old Empire. The power of an idea consists in the fact that it is contagious and cannot be suppressed. Such a power was represented by the watchword of the French Revolution, 'The rights of man.' It is of course but half the truth, for rights, in their very nature, are inseparable from duties. But the movement of human thought is almost always an oscillation between extremes. Society cannot exist without leading, which implies following; without order, which implies law; and without government, which implies authority. Every society, therefore, naturally and necessarily evolves these forms, and the effort of their creation, their utility when established, is so great that the form once settled is apt to remain, irrespective of the purpose which it originally served. The institutions of France, perfected under the intense pressure of the conflicts of the seventeenth century, were cast in an iron mould; in the eighteenth century they were felt as a constraint. The individual discovered that he was immolated for the benefit of a system, and that the system gave him little in return. No

society can be maintained without constant sacrifice from the individuals that compose it, but the sacrifice must be justified by benefits of which the individuals are conscious. When this ceases to be the case, when duties are imposed without corresponding rights, a reaction ensues, the importance of the commonwealth and of the duties upon which it rests is forgotten, and individual liberty appears to be the highest good. 'L'homme est né libre, et partout il est dans les fers,' wrote Rousseau in the beginning of his 'Contrat Social' (1762), which appealed directly to the majority of Frenchmen as the inspired utterance of a new gospel.

The idea of individual liberty, in a continent which was everywhere encased in the cumbrous mail of the feudal system, had all the explosive force of dynamite and all the infectiousness of the plague. The resistance which it aroused from Governments was due, not to a desire to meddle with the domestic affairs of France, but to the danger which threatened the institutions, of which they were the representatives, from their own subjects. The work of the Constituent Assembly evoked the sympathies of the larger part of the population in every country in Europe in proportion as the people were intelligent enough to apprehend what was taking place, and the seed then sown was destined to grow with irrepressible energy until all the institutions, at least of Western Europe, had been transformed; but this

was a gradual process, and the first effects were of a different character.

The destruction of government in France had been followed by a great reaction. Government is always indispensable, and after a clean sweep had been made of the old institutions the first thing needed was to make new ones, which required all the more absolute authority because they were new. Napoleon was joyfully accepted because he represented order and the power to enforce it. But Napoleon inherited the traditional foreign policy of France, the policy of the Convention, and the wars it had created; wielding the prodigious force of a nation aroused and united, he could sweep over Europe like a hurricane. In his success, however, the peoples conquered saw, and rightly saw, not the spread of the doctrines propounded by the Constituent Assembly, but the forcible expansion of a hostile nation.

Thus, in Germany, where the doctrines of the Constituent Assembly, or, as they were afterwards called, of Liberalism, had obtained a firm hold, they were, for the time, obliterated in that rousing of the national spirit which was the necessary consequence of the French conquest. The Germans learned to know themselves as Germans first, and only in the second place as Liberals. After peace was restored, when the Germans came to take stock of their new situation, they found themselves absolutely disappointed under both heads. The Congress

of Vienna had denied them national unity, and the multitude of their Sovereigns great and small were agreed in nothing except the assertion that the rights given to themselves by the Congress were divine, while the people had duties without rights. During the long peace which necessarily followed the exhaustion of the great war, the need for national union ceased to be self-evident, while the stupid misgovernment of the German Princes, without exception, very strongly impressed upon the people everywhere the necessity for political liberty.

The French Revolution of 1848 was the signal for the outbreak of the revolution in Germany. The German uprising was, in the main, of the most peaceful character, for it was the spontaneous act of almost the whole population. The Governments being powerless against a universal movement gave way for the time, and a National Parliament proceeded to deliberate upon the framework of a new Constitution; but while the Parliament wasted its time in theoretical debate, the Austrian Government suppressed, by military force, its own revolution, which was paralysed by the jealousies of the various nations of which Austria was composed. Thereupon the German Princes took heart, and appealed to Austria to preserve them. The Prussian Government hesitated between frankly accepting the Liberal creed, and thereby securing the unity of Germany under Prussian guidance, and the alternative course of using her

army, at the moment when Austria was helpless, to establish her own authority in Germany in spite of the popular theories. The consequence was that Austria emerged from the troubles in a far stronger position than before, and that Prussia, when she, too late, realised the situation and sought to assert herself, found herself confronted not only by Austria, but by Russia, and had to accept the humiliation of unconditional surrender to the terms dictated by those two adversaries.

The breakdown of 1848 discredited Liberalism in Germany: the National Parliament had failed to produce either national unity or political liberty. Prussia having hesitated at the critical moment had equally disappointed the hopes of the patriots. But a new epoch began in 1858 with the appointment of Prince William as Regent of that country. He had learned the lesson that a sound policy can spring only from a government that knows its mind, and that stands to its purpose. He had seen what humiliation had sprung from the doctrine that the greatest of Prussian interests was peace, and he was determined to uphold what he believed to be the rights of Prussia. As Prince Regent he doubled the size and perfected the organisation of the army. In 1861 he succeeded to the throne. 'The world must know,' he said at his accession, 'that Prussia is everywhere ready to defend the right. A firm, consistent, and if it must be an energetic policy,

coupled with prudence, must procure for Prussia the political authority and the influence which cannot be obtained by material force alone.' In 1862 Bismarck was appointed chief minister of Prussia. He was determined to assert the position of Prussia in Germany, which he considered to be that of an equal with Austria. In 1850 he had declared that Prussia ought not to permit anything whatever to be done in Germany without her concurrence, and that the policy of Germany should be directed by Austria and Prussia in concert. Austria, however, had no idea of such a concert, thinking that she alone ought to govern Germany, and her first purpose was to humiliate, and if possible to abolish, Prussia. Bismarck distinctly warned the Austrian Government that such a policy would drive Prussia to take up the part in Germany which had been played in Italy by the King of Sardinia.

Bismarck had not only learnt the lesson of German history, that a divided Germany counted for nothing in Europe, but he had accurately gauged the policy of all the other European powers, and saw that it was possible so to conduct the relations of Prussia with them as to isolate Austria in the inevitable conflict. With infinite skill he took advantage of the difficulties in Schleswig-Holstein. All Germany was convinced that Holstein certainly, and Schleswig probably, were the rightful heritage of the German nation, but all Germany was equally convinced that

the rightful sovereign was the Prince of Augustenburg. Bismarck induced Austria to join with Prussia in expelling the Danes from these provinces, the expulsion of the Danes being desired by the whole of Germany, but he kept in the background the question of the sovereignty, and cleverly used it to force the hand of Austria at the time when Austria's relations with the Kingdom of Italy were strained to the uttermost. The war of 1866 was intentionally brought about by Bismarck in order to make an end for ever of the dual control in Germany. Prussia had to risk her existence, but the risk was justified by the event. Austria was excluded from Germany, and the German nation, except the hereditary provinces of Austria, was united under the influence of Prussia.

The union of Germany was the death-blow to the predominance of France on the Continent, and in order not to awaken too abruptly the French perception of this fact, it was veiled under the forms of federation and alliance. Hanover, which lay between the two parts of Prussia, and which had so mismanaged its policy as to be conquered with the loss of its entire army within the first week of the war, was annexed; but Saxony and the other German States were left independent. North Germany received a federal government in which Prussia was to have the directing voice, but the South German States were simply left at liberty to make treaties if they wished with the new Confederation.

The treaties, of course, were promptly signed, for the Germans very quickly understood the meaning of what had happened. However much they disliked the ruthless logic of the Prussian system, they saw that Prussia had in fact created the German State, the great German power which it had been the policy of Austria never to allow to come into being.

France understood the situation too late, and the war of 1870 was the despairing attempt of the French Government to restore the old division of Germany, and with it the former influence of France. The French Ministry counted upon South German antipathy for Prussia, and in their haste took no count of the fact, of which they were informed, that the South German armies had been by treaty placed at the disposal of the Prussian King. German feeling had never at any time acquiesced in the retention by France of Strasburg, the seizure of which by treachery and in peace had always been considered in Germany as the greatest crime of Louis XIV., so that the recovery of the old imperial cities of Strasburg and Metz was regarded throughout Germany as the symbol of the revival of the German nation and of the renewal of the German Empire. The title of Emperor is the dearest tradition of German history, and its revival in 1871 gave to the new order of things a peculiar consecration hardly intelligible to any one not familiar with the sentiment of German life.

III

THE NEW GERMANY

THE great European event of this century is the reconstruction of Germany, the formation in the centre of Europe of an united German State with an area as large as that of France, and with a population considerably larger than that either of France or of Austria. The foundation of the German Empire has completely transformed the international relations of Europe, and it is perhaps the most serious reproach that can be made against the British statesmen of our day that they have failed to grasp the whole purport of this change. Neither Mr. Gladstone nor Lord Rosebery nor Lord Salisbury appears to have appreciated the fact that the Europe with which they have had to deal since 1870 is a totally different thing from the Europe which they knew before, the Europe described by the historians, whose profession compels them to lag behind the times.

Our business is to ascertain the policy of the German Empire, the great aims which its Government sets up for itself, and the means by which they are to be compassed. In this search we can receive

no direct help from history; for, as we have seen, the history of Germany, from the Reformation to our own day, is a record of divisions and dissensions, and of a series of efforts to put an end to them, efforts which for centuries were doomed to failure and disappointment. Nor will it avail us much to enter into the feelings of German writers and thinkers, or into the spirit of German literature. The whole political tradition of Germany, so far as it reflects itself in the consciousness of the Germans of to-day, is an aspiration for national unity. An examination of it will give us little help towards answering the question, what will be the object of the nation now that unity has been attained?

Three features of the past as it presents itself to the German of to-day are worth notice. The great rift in Germany consequent upon the Reformation, the terrible struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries between the Reformation and the counter-Reformation, gave the opportunity for that interference in German affairs by means of which Richelieu and his successors established the peculiar preponderance of France upon the European Continent. The first purpose of the united nation was therefore bound to be to build a strong wall for the purpose of shutting out French influence, French policy, and French ambition from the national domain. Secondly, the division of Germany since the Peace of Westphalia was caused by the rivalry

between Austria and Prussia. Prussia was a German State whose future lay entirely in Germany. Austria had the bulk of her territory outside of Germany; the greater part of her population were Hungarians and Slavs, and her interests were almost as much concerned with the future of Turkey as with the future of Germany. There was not room in Germany for both Austria and Prussia, and the process by which national unity was obtained consisted in the expulsion of Austria. The non-German interests of Austria rendered her an unsafe director for German affairs, but once she was turned out of the house and established on the basis of her own non-German interests there was no cause of quarrel remaining between the two Powers. These two trains of thought will be found in every German mind. There is a third, which is, perhaps, only in process of forming itself, but which, as it is not less true, must be equally carefully considered. If Austria, after being turned out of Germany, has accepted the position, and if the statesmen on the Danube now look down stream to the East, instead of up stream to the West, may not the statesmen at Paris in time learn to turn their eyes towards the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, instead of looking across the Rhine into a country in which they have no conceivable right to meddle? This idea, if followed up, carries us a long way. For two centuries the resistance of Germany to French interference has provided

England with an ally—either Austria or Prussia, or both, as the case might be—by whose help the insular State has acquired maritime supremacy in the world. So soon as France is content to be France and to acquiesce in Germany being Germany, England's *rôle* of holding the balance between them is played out. She must rely either upon her own resources or must seek, in some other rivalry than that between France and Germany, the occasion for establishing or maintaining her naval predominance.

So much for the suggestions which come indirectly from a consideration of the past history of Germany. The actual aims of German policy must be sought from a consideration of the necessities of Germany's situation and of the history of the last twenty-five years. The first aim of every nation is to preserve its national existence and its independence, by which is meant, not merely resistance to conquest, but the determination to have its own way in its own affairs, and, as far as may be, in the affairs of the world in general. In the days of their political nonentity the Germans were not only the best-schooled and the best-read people in Europe, but the most receptive of the ideas and the literature of other nations. Nowhere was a foreigner received with so much sympathy. The first lesson which Bismarck has tried to inculcate into his countrymen is that national policy ought not to be influenced by considerations of personal or literary sympathy. This is undoubtedly

sound doctrine; and it may be interesting to quote in this connection some of Bismarck's own expressions. In 1857 Bismarck was writing to his friend Gerlach, with a view to convince him that, however much a Prussian might dislike the Bonapartist tradition, it might be very good policy for Prussia to ally herself with France in view of the inevitable conflict with Austria. 'France,' he wrote, 'counts to me—without regard to the person who for the time being is its ruler—only as a piece, but a piece I cannot do without, on the political chess-board. In this game of chess my business is to serve only my own King and my own country. I cannot think it right, in the conduct of foreign affairs, that I, or any other servant of my country, should give play to the sympathies or antipathies I may happen to feel for foreign Powers or foreign personages. Such a course contains the germ of disloyalty towards one's king and country. . . . To subordinate the interest of one's country to one's own feeling of love or hatred towards foreigners is more than the King himself has a right to do.' In a later letter, referring to the discussions of the period preceding the Crimean War, Bismarck said—'To the question whether I was on the side of Russia or of the Western Powers I have always replied that I am a Prussian, and my ideal for any man entrusted with responsibility in regard to foreign affairs is that he must have no prejudices, that his decisions must be quite independent of his impressions of dislike or

partiality for foreign States and their rulers. As regards foreign countries, I have never in my life felt sympathy for any of them except for England and its inhabitants, and to this day I am subject to fits of this partiality; but the English will not have our love, and, so soon as I am convinced that such a course is commanded by a sound and deliberate policy, I would as soon see our troops fire upon the English as upon the French, the Russians, or the Austrians.'

In discussing the policy of Germany we must, therefore, put on one side all questions of sympathy, and consider merely the advantage of Germany. The first aim of Germany is naturally to keep her territory intact. The second aim is, if possible, to preserve peace. It is customary for politicians and statesmen in every country to say that their first object is peace, but no statesmen means this to be taken literally, for, if he did, he would be a traitor. No honest man can say that for the sake of peace he would sacrifice a part of the national territory or would lower the national flag; or, indeed, that for the sake of peace he is ready to abandon any purpose which his countrymen cherish as vital. But there is no purpose which a wise statesman would not prefer to gain without war, for war, in all circumstances, involves incalculable suffering, and is at the best after all to a great extent a game of chance. For Germany only four wars are conceivable, for there are only four Great

Powers to which the frontier of Germany is accessible.

With Austria Germany no longer has any cause of serious quarrel. The defeat of 1866 was very bitter for the statesmen of the Austrian House, and possibly, had the French been successful in the earlier part of the war of 1870, Austria might have attempted to retrieve what had been lost; but the bitter feelings of 1866 have long passed away, and though there may again be misunderstandings between Vienna and Berlin, there is no such conflict of interests as makes it possible to foresee a serious dispute likely to lead to a breach of the peace.

The attitude of France towards Germany corresponds closely to that of Austria between 1866 and 1870. The historical tradition of France received a great shock from the rise of a Power stronger than herself in that Germany of which she had so long been the arbiter. The attack upon Germany was the expression of the determination to maintain her influence and the divisions of Germany upon which it was based. The French, if successful, undoubtedly intended to annex German territory, and no one whose view of affairs is unbiased will sympathise with the French view that French territory ought to have been considered peculiarly sacred. During the ten years that followed the Treaty of Frankfort, the one idea of every Frenchman was to re-open the question of the frontier. But time has had its effect, and

German policy has nowhere been stronger or more prudent than in the management of Germany's relations with France since the year 1871. Every legitimate complaint of the French Government has been promptly and courteously met. Anything like a hostile attitude has been received with unmistakable firmness. The result has been better than superficial observers imagine. The recovery of Alsace and Lorraine is, indeed, an object consecrated in every Frenchman's heart, and it is the fashion to refer to the subject with a sort of religious deference. *Revanche* occupies in the scheme of French policy a sort of royal position, but it is a queen that reigns yet does not govern. The sacred purpose is always mentioned first and with bated breath, but it is quite understood that its execution is deferred indefinitely, and that meanwhile practical policy is concerned with other matters. It has become a respected fiction. In her actual policy France has turned completely round, and she no longer faces towards the east, but towards the west; though it remains a well-understood convention that in all public and official utterances the theory that France still faces towards the east is to be maintained.

With Russia Germany has no quarrel. Germany has no territory that Russia seriously covets; Russia none that Germany wants. The aims of Russia lead her towards the south and towards the east, that is, away from Germany. No doubt there has long been

an antipathy between Germans and Russians, but this is one of those sentimental dislikes which, as we have seen, are banished from the political *calculus* of German statesmen; moreover, it is counterbalanced, if not outweighed, by the intimate ties which since 1813 have united the Prussian and the Russian reigning houses. Russia has a larger population and a larger territory than Germany, but is far behind in the march of civilisation. At present Germany is the stronger Power of the two, except, perhaps, in respect of the extreme limit of passive resistance to invasion, which in Russia stands further back than in any other European State. Possibly a considerable expansion of Russia would make her so formidable as to become dangerous to Germany, but that is a somewhat speculative matter. Russia is the rival of Austria in the competition for the heritage of Turkey. Germany's part in this rivalry has been for many years that of a mediator friendly to both sides: and if during the latter part of the reign of Alexander II., and throughout that of Alexander III., the relations between Germany and Russia were strained, it was because Russia expected more from Germany than friendly mediation; she expected the Court of Berlin to take her side against that of Vienna. The policy of Germany in reference to Turkey is to promote compromise between Russia and Austria, and so to postpone as long as may be the disagreeable necessity of having to choose between one side and the other.

Even if Austria and Russia should come to blows over the question of the Straits, it is conceivable that Germany might preserve her neutrality, on the plea that she has less direct interest in the matter than any other Great Power.

The fourth Great Power to which the frontier of Germany is accessible is Great Britain, for as the first maritime and naval Power, Great Britain may be considered the next neighbour of every State that borders the sea. Germany covets no portion of the United Kingdom, Great Britain no German territory. The English and the German peoples are connected by a long-standing tradition; there has never been war between Great Britain and the Protestant States of Germany except during the brief period when Prussia was forced by Napoleon to side with him against this country. If it had not been for the help of the British navy, of British armies, and British subsidies, it is possible that the greater part of Prussia might still be a French province. A multitude of Germans live happily in England, and many English find themselves at home in Germany. Intermarriages between inhabitants of the two countries are common. If sympathy were the right basis of policy, Germany and England would be in close accord. That this is not the case is due to two causes.

The Germans are the keen rivals of the English in manufactures and trade, and the Germans are in this department the aggressors. They found Great Britain

in possession of the markets of the world, and they have forced their way in as competitors. The German Government, since the foundation of the Empire, has specially exerted itself to promote German trade in this competition, in which British Governments, as a rule, have thought it their function not to interfere. This commercial attack has taken many forms, one of which is the Colonial policy of the German Government.

A second and even more potent cause of estrangement between the two Powers arises from an aspect of German policy which has yet to be considered. We have seen that German statesmen regard international affairs as a game of chess, in which each Power is a piece. But British statesmen for thirty years have rejected this view, and have considered Great Britain as out of the game. Accordingly, Great Britain is a piece upon which none of the players can count. Every other Power has a policy, has a purpose at which it aims and acts rationally to attain. Great Britain has no policy, and the game of the other Powers, especially of Germany, is thereby embarrassed. The proof of this statement will be abundantly given when these essays reach that part of the subject. For the present, it will be enough to illustrate from the case of Germany what is meant by a policy. It has been shown that Germany of herself has no quarrel with Austria, France, or Russia; that Austria and Russia have no direct quarrel with

Germany; and that the quarrel between France and Germany is one-sided and mainly sentimental. Germany, however, in her effort to maintain her hard-won national unity and the integrity of her territory, has not to deal merely with France, Austria, Russia, and the other Powers as so many isolated pieces; they are connected in a thousand ways, and Germany's task is not merely to treat with each of them alone, but with all of them together and at the same time. It is in the connection between her relations with all the other Powers that the policy of a country consists. This element of connection between the various threads of international relations completely alters the aspect of affairs, and the picture here drawn of German relations, though true at every point, requires to be supplemented by an historical review, an examination of the means to which in fact Germany has had to have recourse in order to maintain her position without war. That review I propose to attempt, and to show how it has come about, in spite of the moderation of Germany, that she was compelled to form the Triple Alliance, and why for many years past the Continental Powers have been divided into two camps.

IV

GERMAN POLICY TOWARDS FRANCE

In the last chapter passages were quoted from Bismarck's correspondence, to show that he adopts the sound maxim that the policy of a nation ought not to be guided by sentiment, feeling, or passion, but by a steady consideration of its interests. A review of the interests of Germany, considered in relation to those of the Great Powers, showed that, sentiment apart, Germany has no interest such as need bring her into collision with either France, Austria, or Russia; and that, sentiment apart, none of these Powers has good ground to quarrel with Germany. At the same time, it was pointed out that this unsentimental analysis of separate interests did not suffice to give a true account of German policy. We must now endeavour to discover the element, the absence of which made that review unsatisfactory, and for that purpose must trace the connection between Germany's relations with her several neighbours.

The passions, and especially the ignoble passions —hatred, jealousy, and revenge—are always bad

advisers; but passion is too large a part of human life to be wisely left out of the calculation. In every business it is prudent to take account of the temper of those with whom you have to deal; and great statesmen are so rare, national feelings and international jealousies are so strong, that it is a fatal error not to reckon in the management of policy with sympathies, antipathies, and impulses. Bismarck himself is a man of strong passions, from the excess of which arise his weaknesses and his mistakes. His great merit has been that they have never obscured his perception of the facts of the world, or caused him to relax his grip of his great aims, and of the means by which their attainment was practicable. Political action, indeed, like all serious action, is always accompanied by feeling; and the belief that a statesman is a calculating machine without a heart is untrue and absurd. The great statesman awakens and is supported by the noble emotions of his countrymen, and represents in this way the conscience and the consciousness of his own nation. It does not follow that his action appeals at the time to the conscience of other nations—it is, indeed, evident that where two nations are in conflict this cannot be the case; but in the long-run, when the dispute is over and has passed into history, sound conduct wins the approval of all parties. Measured by this test, it is most likely that in future Bismarck will rank as one of the greatest statesmen of the world. His policy

which led to the war of 1866 aroused at the time the bitterest feelings not only in Austria, but in most of Germany outside of Prussia, yet within a few months it had gained the approval of Germany, and in a few years even of defeated Austria. And it is by no means impossible that the present generation will see the French accepting with gratitude the new direction given to their policy by the events of 1870.

Every nation has something more than material interests; it is a spiritual community with a firm hold on the hearts of its members. Why are we proud of being Englishmen, and why do we love England? Hardly because England is a business centre, or because we have votes, or because if we steal we shall be condemned by a jury in open court instead of by a judge without a jury. England represents to us far more than that—the grand tradition of centuries of freedom, of a community that has always gone its own way and has never submitted to interference from outside, or to the dictation of any Power on earth. It is the consciousness of this that makes an Englishman hold his head up because he is an Englishman. But we must not forget that other nations have a similar feeling for their own country, and we ought to measure, by imagining it applied in our own case, the bitterness which to any nation of the first rank is involved in the word defeat. This is one of the sentimental considerations

which must not be left out of account. From 1871 onwards, Germany had to reckon with this factor in the policy of France. Germany had no further quarrel with the French, and possibly enough in the long-run France had nothing to gain from a renewal of the conflict, but it was not likely, at any rate for many years, that the French would take this view.

The object of Germany was, therefore, in the first place, to strengthen herself so as to be able, in case the French should resume the attack, to defend herself effectually. This was accomplished by strenuous, unremitting attention to the efficiency of the army, supplemented by the creation of a navy which, though its material resources are limited by considerations of economy, is second to none in the character and attainments of its officers and the quality of its crews.

But in the second place, it was evidently desirable, if possible, to prevent a new war from breaking out. This has been for twenty-five years the chief purpose of German policy, and it may be worth while attempting to show how it has been attained. The purpose has all the time been the same, but the means adopted have varied with the varying temper of the other Powers. The right course was evidently so to manage as never to give France the prospect of bringing about a war in which Germany should be alone, still less a war in which France should have an ally and Germany none.

Since 1870 there have been, broadly speaking, three

periods of German policy. During the first, which lasted from 1870 to 1878, Germany relied chiefly for the prevention of war upon her good relations with Russia. The second period, from 1878 until 1895, is that of the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy. From 1895 begins a new period, in which Germany appears to be attempting to gain a broader basis for the avoidance of war, by restoring her good relations with Russia, and using them as a lever to remove altogether the bitterness against herself which has so long caused her to be on her guard against the possible action of France.

As our object is as far as possible to understand German policy from the German point of view, we cannot do better than take a German guide to the subject, so far as such guidance is available. By far the best account of German policy during the last twenty-five years, is contained in the speeches delivered to the Reichstag from time to time by Prince Bismarck himself. A political speech of course takes its tone and colour from the debate in the course of which it is delivered, and a Foreign Minister speaking in a parliamentary assembly is not always able to say all that is in his mind; but that which he does not say in one speech he is sure to say, after a time, in another; and Bismarck's speeches, read in connection, give a truer and fuller account of the aims of Germany, and of the means by which they are pursued, than is accessible for the contemporary history

of any other European State. One of the marks of Bismarck's greatness, is that he usually says just what he means, and means just what he says, subject only to the reserves necessarily imposed upon a Minister of Foreign Affairs, reserves which, however, apply only to the particular situation which was the occasion of the particular speech, but which are practically removed by a comparison of the speeches made at different periods. It is hardly too much to say that if British Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs had studied Bismarck's speeches, the misunderstandings which have arisen between Germany and England would either have been altogether prevented or would long ago have been removed. For our present purpose it will be necessary to translate from the ex-Chancellor's most famous utterances the passages in which the main lines of German policy are most clearly laid down. In January 1887 the debates on a new Army Bill gave Bismarck the occasion to recapitulate the main lines of his policy since 1870 :—

'After the Treaty of Frankfort, our first need was to preserve peace as long as possible, and to make use of it to consolidate the German Empire. This was no easy task. Even in the Reichstag at that time it was made a reproach to us that the result of our policy—because we had had the courage to fight for Germany's unity—had been to create a situation in which the next war was probably near at hand. Our critics at that time spoke of the five, four, or even three years which might pass before the next war. Gentlemen, we have succeeded, though not without having to resist strong counter-currents, in preserving peace for sixteen years. We recognised that our first task was as far as possible to pro-

pitiate those States with which we had been at war. As far as Austria is concerned, we have been quite successful. The intention and the necessity of obtaining this result dominated our negotiations for peace at Nickolsburg in the year 1866, and since then we have never abandoned the endeavour to recover the support of Austria, which, until 1866, we had nominally and by the letter of the law, but which we now really and fully possess. With Austria we stand in sure and confidential relation, such as —in spite of written treaties—never existed either in the German Confederation or earlier in the Holy Roman Empire. We have come to an understanding in mutual confidence and mutual goodwill with regard to all the questions which for centuries have been at issue between us.

'Reconciliation with Austria, however, was not the only goal towards which our policy of peace was directed. We remembered that the friendship of the three Great Eastern Powers of Europe, although it perhaps had disagreeable consequences for public opinion and for other States, yet preserved the peace of Europe for more than thirty years, in an epoch during which sprung up the sources that have fructified and fertilised the prosperity, the economical progress, the whole scientific, technical, and economical development of Europe. Those sources lie in the period in which the much-abused Holy Alliance preserved the peace. . . . Well, I do not know whether we shall succeed in again maintaining peace for the same length of time, that is, for more than thirty years. Our exertions with that object are sincere, but above all we require for that purpose a strong army, an army strong enough to ensure our own independence without any ally. Considering the effect of the earlier friendship between the three Great Eastern Monarchies, we have regarded it as our task, not merely to seek reconciliation with our former opponent, but also to re-establish the friendship between the present three Empires. Our own relations with Russia presented no difficulty; our friendship for Russia suffered no interruption during the time of our wars, and stands to-day beyond all doubt. We expect from Russia no attack, no hostile policy.'

Then follows a passage in which Bismarck refers to the sympathy expressed in the German Press

with Bulgaria, and to the suggestions which were made in many German papers that the German Government ought to champion the cause of Bulgaria against Russia. The Chancellor continued:—

'Well, gentlemen, when I read all this, my first feeling was one of amusement. I could hardly help laughing at this crusade in the press, this expectation that we should run to Bulgaria and seek "far away in Turkey," as our grandfathers used to say, the quarrels which we cannot find at home. Why, I should have deserved to have been tried for high treason if I could have thought for a moment of committing such a stupid folly, and the matter gave me little trouble at the time—were we not our own masters, to do or to leave undone what we pleased? But I was distressed to find such an expenditure of pathos in the German press with a view, if possible, to drag us into war with Russia. When I first read these declamations, I could not help thinking of the scene in *Hamlet* where the player declaims and sheds tears over the fate of Hecuba, real tears, and Hamlet calls himself a rogue or uses some similar unparliamentary expression and exclaims: "What is Hecuba to me?" That passage at once occurred to me. What do these declamations mean? What is Bulgaria to us? It is to us a matter of entire indifference who governs in Bulgaria and what becomes of Bulgaria at all. I repeat that here to-day. I repeat everything that I implied before by the much misused phrase about the bones of the Pomeranian grenadier; the whole Eastern Question is for us not a question of war. We shall not for the Eastern Question let any one throw his lasso round our neck in order to embroil us with Russia. The friendship of Russia is much more important for us than that of Bulgaria and of the Bulgarophils that we have with us in our own country. . . . The difficulty of our task lies not in keeping the peace with Austria, or in keeping the peace with Russia, but in keeping the peace between Austria and Russia. Between those two Powers there are really rival and competitive interests which make it harder for our friends to keep the peace between themselves than it is for us to keep the peace with each of them. Our task is, as far as we can, to remove this difficulty

and to be in both Cabinets the advocate of peace against the incitements of political writers or of Parliaments. . .-. Of course, we run the risk of being considered Russian in Austria, and still more in Hungary, and of being considered Austrian in Russia. That we must put up with. If we succeed in keeping peace for ourselves and for Europe we shall be glad to put up with it.

'Not less sincere and arduous have been our exertions since the war with France to bring about a reconciliation with that country. Whether they have been quite so fortunate as in the East I do not know. . . . Between us and France the work of pacification is difficult, because there is a long historical process between the two countries, a process of drawing the boundary line, which has been doubtful and disputed since the era when France attained to the completion of her internal unity and of her monarchical power. The question of the German frontier was raised, if we want to look at it in the purely historical and pragmatic connection, by the seizure of the three bishoprics, Metz, Toul, and Verdun. That is a forgotten fact which I mention only because of the historical connection. We have no intention of reconquering either Toul or Verdun, and Metz, of course, we possess. Since that era there has hardly been a generation in Germany which has not been compelled to draw its sword against France. And is this epoch of the struggle for the frontier with the French nation now, to-day, definitely closed, or is it not? Neither you nor I can know. I can only express my supposition that it is not closed. The whole French character and the whole nature of the border would have to be changed.

'We on our side have done everything to bring the French to forget what has happened. France has had our support and our assistance in every wish except in such as might be directed towards a longer or shorter stretch of Rhine frontier. To that we cannot agree either in Alsace or lower down, but in other matters we have honestly tried to meet the wishes of France and to content her as best we could. We on our side have not only no reason to attack France, but most assuredly no such intention. The idea of making a war because, perhaps, it will later be inevitable, and may later come upon us under less favourable circumstances, has always been far from me, and I have always opposed it. In 1867 I was against the proposal to take up the Luxemburg question

in order to bring on war with France. Luxemburg was certainly not worth a war with France. Our undoubted right to garrison the place was not worth a war. At that time the point was whether we should not after all be compelled later to go to war, and I said, That is, perhaps, possible, but I cannot be so sure of it. I cannot see the cards in the hands of Providence so well as to know that in advance. My advice will never be to go to war because perhaps later war will be inevitable. It is quite possible, under God's will, that if the war comes on later the circumstances may be more favourable for us, and indeed this was the case in regard to France. We fought in 1870 with more favourable results than we should have done in 1867. Yet it might have been just as well possible, if the Emperor Napoleon had died sooner, that we might have been spared that war altogether.

'I go into all this only to justify my conviction, and to convince others in other countries, that we shall never attack France. If the French will keep peace with us until we attack them, if we were sure of that, then peace would be secured for ever.'

Bismarck's opinion on the possibility of a reconciliation between France and Germany is the reverse of sanguine, and scarcely appears to justify the view I have taken that such a reconciliation is a possibility of the near future. The important point is, however, that German policy has consistently aimed at a reconciliation, while Bismarck's doubts with regard to its success were expressed nine years ago, and in a speech of which the object was to secure a vote for an increased Army without increasing the difficulties which even then subsisted between Germany and Russia. Those difficulties were the point upon which in this speech Bismarck was necessarily reserved. They will be explained in the next chapter.

The rest of the speech is mainly occupied in ex-

plaining that the instability of Governments in France and the tone of public opinion there made it impossible for a German Government to assume that an attack from France was out of the question. One passage, however, is worth quoting, because it throws light upon Bismarck's view of alliances and upon Germany's attitude towards Austria and towards the Eastern Question:—

'Our relations with Austria are based upon the consciousness of each side that the full existence of the other as a Great Power is a necessity for itself in the interest of the balance of power in Europe. But they do not rest upon the basis, which has occasionally been set forth in the Hungarian Parliament, that one of the two nations can place itself and its whole power and policy completely at the service of the other. That is quite impossible. There are specific Austrian interests for which we cannot risk our existence. There are specific German interests for which Austria cannot risk her existence. Austria has the interest that Germany should be preserved as a full and strong Great Power. Germany has the same interest in regard to Austria, but we cannot appropriate one another's special interests. We have never demanded from Austria, and have no claim to demand, that she should mix herself in our quarrels with France. If we have difficulties with England in Colonial matters, or if we get into disputes with Spain about beggarly trifles like the Caroline Islands, we have never made any claims upon Austria based upon our friendly relations. In so far as it is a question of the existence of each of us as a full, free, and strong Great Power, in so far we represent common interests, but what interests Austria has in Constantinople Austria alone knows. We have none.

V

GERMAN POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

On the 3rd of February, 1888, Prince Bismarck published the text of the treaty with Austria, until then secret, which formed the beginning and the basis of what has since been known as the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy. On the 6th of February, in a speech in the Reichstag, the Chancellor explained the origin of that treaty, and took occasion to review the relations between Germany and Russia. Public opinion in Germany and elsewhere had been much disturbed by the gradual movement of the bulk of the Russian army from the interior of the country towards the western frontier, a movement which, in Austria at least, had been regarded by the Government with great anxiety, for the Austrian Government during 1887 had made very great exertions by way of preparation for a possible campaign.

'I am unable,' said the Chancellor after reviewing the rumours upon this subject, 'to give an authentic explanation of the motives of this Russian concentration, but still, as I have been for a whole

generation familiar not only with foreign affairs, but also with Russian policy, I have my own ideas on the subject; they lead me to assume that the Russian Cabinet has the conviction—a conviction that is probably well-founded—that in the next European crisis which may occur the voice of Russia will count for more in the diplomatic areopagus of Europe the stronger she is on her European frontier, the farther west her armies stand. Either as an ally or as an opponent Russia will be quicker on the spot the nearer her main force, or at any rate a strong army, stands to her western border. . . . I am therefore not compelled to conclude from a Russian concentration in the western provinces that there is any intention to surprise or to attack us. I assume that Russia is waiting for a new oriental crisis, and means when it comes to be in a position to back up Russian wishes with the full weight of an army posted, not at some far distant point like Kasan, but nearer to the west. . . .

'The most probable crisis that can occur is, of course, one in the East. If it occurs we are not interested in it in the first line. We are perfectly in a position, without failing in any engagement, in any duty, to wait till the Powers most nearly concerned in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Levant have decided upon their course, and have agreed with Russia or gone to war with her. We are not primarily called with regard to the Eastern Question either to one course or to the other. Any Great Power which, outside of its own sphere of interests, tries to exert a pressure and an influence upon the policy of other countries, and endeavours to guide affairs, is undertaking risks outside the region entrusted to it by God, and is pursuing a policy of power, and not a policy of interest. It is speculating for prestige. We shall not do that. If an oriental crisis occurs we shall wait before deciding our course until the Powers more nearly interested have chosen theirs. . . .

'In the days of the Holy Alliance—I am reminded of an old American song which I learned from my friend Motley when he was alive, and which began, "In good old colonial times when we lived under a King," for, indeed, those were patriarchal times—we had a number of balustrades to which we could cling, and a number of dykes which protected us from the wild European floods. There was the German Confederation, and the real protection and complement of the German Confederation, to serve

which the Confederation was made, was the Holy Alliance. We had Russia and Austria to lean upon, and, above all things, we had the guarantee of our own timidity; we never expressed an opinion until the others had spoken. We have lost all that; we have to help ourselves. The Holy Alliance was shipwrecked in the Crimean War—not by our fault. The German Confederation has been destroyed by us, because the life we led in it was tolerable in the long-run neither for us nor for the people of Germany. The Holy Alliance and the German Confederation have departed this life. Accordingly, after the dissolution of the German Confederation, after the war of 1866, the Prussia or North Germany of that day would have been isolated if we had been compelled to assume that no one would pardon us for our new successes—the great successes that we had gained. No Power is ever pleased with the successes of its neighbour.

'But our relations with Russia were not disturbed by the results of 1866. In 1866 the remembrance of the policy of Count Buol, of the policy of Austria during the Crimean War, was too fresh in Russia to admit of the idea of helping the Austrian Monarchy against Prussian attack, of renewing the campaign which the Emperor Nicholas had made in behalf of Austria in 1849. For us the most natural support to lean upon was still that of Russia, which took its origin in the policy of the Emperor Alexander I. To him Prussia really owed gratitude. In 1813 he might just as well have turned round at the frontier of Poland and made peace. He might have let Prussia drop. At that time we owed our restoration to our old footing mainly to the goodwill of Alexander I., or, if you like to be sceptical, say to the policy of Russia, which needed Prussia. This gratitude dominated the reign of Frederick William III. The credit balance which Russia had in the Prussian account was exhausted by the friendship, I might almost say the servility, of Prussia during the whole reign of the Emperor Nicholas, and was extinguished at Olmütz. At Olmütz the Emperor Nicholas did not take Prussia's side, did not protect us from disagreeable experiences and from certain humiliations; indeed, the Emperor Nicholas had altogether on the whole a predilection for Austria rather than for Prussia. The idea that we owed Russia any gratitude during his reign is a historical legend....

'However, we did not during the Crimean War show any spite

against Russia on account of Olmütz. We came out of the Crimean War as friends of Russia. Our partisanship for Austria during the Italian war was not to the taste of the Russian Cabinet, but it had no injurious effect. Our war in 1866 was looked upon with a certain satisfaction. The Russians wished the Austrians joy of what happened to them. In the year 1870, in our French war, we had at least the satisfaction, at the same time that we defended ourselves and victoriously resisted the attack, of being able to do service to our Russian friends in the Black Sea. The liberation of the Black Sea by the contracting Powers would have been by no means probable if the victorious German troops had not been in the neighbourhood of Paris. Accordingly the war of 1870 left behind it no ill-feeling between us and Russia.

'I cite these facts in order to lay before you the genesis of the Treaty with Austria which was published a few days ago, and in order to defend the policy of his Majesty against the reproach that it has increased the possibilities of war for the German Empire by the addition of those in which Austria might be involved without any fault of Germany's. I will therefore proceed to tell you how it came about that our traditional relations with Russia, which I myself have always cherished with a certain preference, took such a form as to induce us to conclude the treaty which was published the day before yesterday.

'The first years after the French war were passed in the best understanding. In 1875 appeared for the first time an inclination on the part of my Russian colleague, Prince Gortschakoff, to take more pains to gain popularity in France than with us, and to avail himself of certain artificial conjunctions in order by a telegram to make the world believe that in 1875 we had had some remote idea of attacking France, and that it was the merit of Prince Gortschakoff to have saved France from this danger. This was the first estrangement that arose between us, and led me to speak my mind pretty freely to my former friend, afterwards my colleague.

'At that time and afterwards we clung to the task of preserving peace between the three Empires; of continuing the relations which had begun by the visit of the Emperors of Russia and of Austria to Berlin in 1872, and by the return visits which followed. We succeeded; but in 1876, before the Turkish war, attempts

were made to compel us to choose between Russia and Austria, a choice which we refused. Our refusal had the consequence that Russia addressed herself directly to Vienna, and that an agreement was made between Austria and Russia concerning the eventualities of an oriental crisis, which secured for Austria in that event the occupation of Bosnia, etc. Then came the war, and we were well content that the storm passed farther south than it at first seemed inclined to do. . . . During the Congress I may say I conceived my part, so far as I could without injuring the interests of the nation or of friendly Powers, pretty much as though I had been the fourth Russian plenipotentiary, indeed I may almost say the third, for I can hardly count Prince Gortschakoff as the plenipotentiary of the Russian policy of that time as it was understood by its real representative, Count Schouvaloff. . . . In short, I behaved at the Congress so that when it was over I thought: If I had not long been in possession of the highest Russian order with diamonds, I should certainly get it now. I felt that I had rendered a service for a foreign Power such as a Minister not its own can seldom render.

'What, then, was my astonishment and disappointment when by degrees a kind of Press Association in St. Petersburg began to attack the policy of Germany, and my intentions in particular. These attacks increased during the following year to the extent of a strong demand that we should bring pressure to bear upon Austria in regard to matters where we could not in this way attack the rights of Austria. To this pressure I could not lend my hand, for if we estranged Austria we should, unless we were prepared to be completely isolated in Europe, have fallen into dependence upon Russia. Would such a dependence have been tolerable? I had thought at an earlier period that it might be, for I said to myself: We have no conflicting interests; there is no reason why Russia should ever terminate her friendship for us. At any rate, I had refrained from contradicting my Russian colleagues when they expressed themselves in that sense. The proceedings in regard to the Congress undeceived me by showing me that even the complete loan of our policy for a certain time to Russia did not protect us from disputes with Russia brought about against our will and against our endeavours. This dispute about instructions which we had given or not given to our

representatives during the negotiations in the south increased to the degree of threats, absolute threats of war made by the most competent authority. That is the origin of our treaty with Austria. We were driven by those threats to make that choice between our two friends which I had for so many years avoided. I then negotiated the treaty of which the text is before you. . . .

'I think it was impossible not to have made this treaty; if we had not made it we should be obliged to make it now. It has the best quality of an international treaty, that is, it is the expression of permanent interests of both sides, on that of Austria as on our own. No Great Power can in the long-run cling to the wording of any treaty in contradiction to the interests of its own people. It is sooner or later compelled to say: "Times have changed, we cannot keep to that"; and must justify this announcement as well as it can to its own people and to the other contracting Power. But no Great Power can think it right to lead its own people to destruction by the letter of a treaty signed under other circumstances. There is nothing of that kind in these treaties. Not only the treaty we have signed with Austria, but similar treaties which exist between us and other Governments, especially agreements which we have with Italy, are only the expression of community in the efforts and in the dangers which the Powers have to make and to meet. Italy, as well as Germany, has been in the position of having to win, by fighting against Austria, the right to consolidate her national existence. Both countries now live at peace with Austria, and share with her the same effort to avert dangers which threaten them, to preserve in common the peace which is as dear to the one as to the other, and to protect against attack that internal development to which they wish to devote themselves. These endeavours, and at the same time the common confidence that the treaties will be kept, and that by the treaties no one Power becomes more dependent upon the other than is consistent with its own interests—all these considerations combine to make these treaties firm, capable of being kept, and permanent.'

Nothing is more characteristic of the careless way in which too many writers and speakers discuss ques-

tions of policy than the vague language which is often used in describing the Triple Alliance, of which there seems to be an impression that it was, or is, a defensive and offensive alliance between the Powers which are parties to it. None of the treaties which make up that Alliance have been published, except the original one between Germany and Austria, to which Bismarck is referring in the speech from which I am translating. The text of that treaty contains two articles. The first article deals with the case that either Germany or Austria should be attacked by Russia. In that case each party is pledged to assist the other with all its forces. The second article deals with the case that either of the contracting Powers should be attacked by a Power other than Russia. In that case the ally is merely pledged to remain neutral. If, however, during such a war Russia should in any way intervene in favour of the outside assailant, the ally is then bound to interfere with all its forces against Russia. It has too commonly been supposed that the Triple Alliance binds Germany to go to war against Russia in case Russia should attack Turkey, diplomatically or otherwise, and such a Russian advance should be resisted by Austria. Yet nothing is clearer than that Germany has taken upon herself no such pledge. The Austro-German treaty was drawn up in the form I have described expressly in order to make it clear that no such pledge was given. If any one doubts this—and no

one can doubt it who has followed the history of the relations between Austria and Russia during the Crimean War and the correspondence of Bismarck at that time—let him read what Bismarck said in a later portion of the speech from which I have already given extracts:—

'We have tried,' said the Chancellor, 'to restore the old intimate relations with Russia, but we are not going to run after any one. But that does not prevent us from observing, indeed it is an additional stimulus to us to observe with redoubled exactitude, those treaty rights which Russia has by our concurrence obtained. Among those treaty rights are some that are not recognised by all our friends. I mean the rights which we acquired for Russia in regard to Bulgaria at the Congress of Berlin, and which remained unquestioned until 1885. There is no question in my mind, and I was one of those who helped to prepare and joined in signing the decisions of the Congress, that at that time we were all of opinion that the predominant influence in Bulgaria was to fall to Russia, after she, on her part, had renounced Eastern Roumelia.'

This statement of Bismarck's is hardly accurate, for the protocol of the Congress of Berlin contains the record of the explicit assurance given by Count Schouvaloff to the English plenipotentiary that Bulgaria was not to be considered an *annexe* of Russia. Bismarck's statement of 1888 must be taken as showing how very far he was in 1888 ready to go in order to maintain or to restore the good relations between Germany and Russia. But whatever may be thought of his historical accuracy on that occasion, he made it quite clear that the German Empire was not to be drawn into a war undertaken

by Austria for the prevention of Russia's advance through Bulgaria towards the Bosporus. For he went on to say:—

'Bulgaria, the tiny land between the Danube and the Balkans, is assuredly no object of sufficient magnitude that for its sake Europe, from Moscow to the Pyrenees and from the North Sea to Palermo, should be plunged into a war of which no man can foresee the issue. At the end of such a war people would hardly know what they had been fighting about.'



VI

THE EFFECTS OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

We have now followed the policy of Germany since 1870 through its two first phases. The object from the beginning was to preserve the national independence, the national unity, and the national territory without the necessity of another great war: and it has been possible to show, in Bismarck's words, how this object was attained. Germany, perfectly reconciled with Austria, was also on good terms with Russia, and so long as these relations were maintained she had nothing to fear from French resentment. But the primary aim of Russian policy was to secure a Russian control of the Black Sea and its gates, and when the great exertions of the war against Turkey in 1877 seemed to have been rendered fruitless by the Treaty of Berlin the anger of Russia was directed, not merely against Austria and England, her antagonists at the Congress, but against Germany, the mediating Power. Accordingly Bismarck, whilst seeking by every means in his

power to avoid giving Russia any possible ground of quarrel, and to convince Russian statesmen that no such ground existed, proceeded to strengthen Germany's position by a Treaty with Austria, subsequently expanded into the Triple Alliance, which gave him some kind of guarantee against the possibility of an attack made upon Germany by Russia and France in combination. This has always been the danger to avert which Bismarck has most exerted himself. He regarded the action of France as an incalculable quantity, and, therefore, he was ready to go as far as was consistent with self-respect in the direction of conciliating Russia.

The accession of William II. rendered Bismarck's task peculiarly difficult, for the new Emperor, in the first years of his reign, took a somewhat different view of his relations with Austria and Russia. He believed himself bound to support Austria, beyond the letter of the treaty, in resistance to the extension of Russian influence in the direction of Constantinople. In the winter of 1889-90 this difference of opinion between the Emperor and the Chancellor reached the point at which co-operation became impossible, and Bismarck was dismissed. The Emperor soon afterwards, against the opinion of Bismarck, renewed the Triple Alliance. The result was what Bismarck had foreseen—the rise of what was, in the first instance, little more than a sympathy between the policies of France and of Russia, of which the first

outward and visible sign was the visit paid by the French fleet to Cronstadt in July 1891. Thus, the determination of Germany to support Austria, not merely in the maintenance of her existence as a Great Power, but in her long-standing opposition to Russian aims with reference to Turkey, coupled with the necessary determination of Germany to retain the territory she had recovered from France, led to the division of Continental Europe into two groups of allies known as the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance. This was the result which Bismarck had been most anxious to prevent. Five years of experience of this disagreeable situation appear to have convinced the German Emperor that Bismarck was right, and to have brought him back to the Bismarckian policy. Accordingly in 1895 we see the German Government, without breaking with the Triple Alliance (of which the purpose, so far as we know, has never been other than purely defensive), exerting itself to restore the old understanding with Russia, and thereby to mitigate the still surviving animosity of the French.

The first sign of this recurrence to the old course was the support given by Germany to the Russian policy in the Far East, when Germany joined in the Russian protest against the acquisition by Japan of the territory ceded to her by China at the close of the war. That France was also a party to that protest is a proof of the profound insight of that

German statesman who, even in retirement, has lived to see the triumph of his policy. The second result of the return to Bismarck's policy is seen in the recent development of events in the nearer East. The removal of German support to Austria's opposition to Russia, and the consequent inevitable withdrawal of that opposition, has enabled Russia to assert once more her paramount influence in Bulgaria, and to defeat the British Ministries that have espoused the cause of the unfortunate Armenians without considering the means by which that cause could be promoted. The isolated action of England cannot be effective in Turkey, and it was the negation of statesmanship to hold out any hope of assistance to the Armenians, or to those who sympathised with them, unless and until the Government had assured itself that a sufficient number of the Continental Powers were agreed both as to the object and the means of intervention. The history of a hundred and fifty years has abundantly proved that, while Europe united is the absolute master of Turkey, the Sultan can always afford to be indifferent to the wishes of one half of Europe if they are opposed by the other half. In the present instance, the wishes of the British Government were shared by no other European Power, and, therefore, could not be realised.

We are now in a position to review the results of German policy, so far as they affect the Continent of

Europe. The union of Germany under Prussian guidance has made her the strongest military state in Europe. She has no desire for territorial expansion, and no reasonable cause of quarrel exists between her and Austria or Italy. Accordingly there is no room in Europe left for a policy of adventure on the part of any Power. No Government will go to war with a great and and well-armed nation like Germany unless directly attacked, which in this case is in the highest degree improbable, or unless the object to be gained by the war is one of vital importance to the nation, and one which there is great probability of obtaining. These conditions do not exist. The interest of self-preservation binds the central Powers together so strongly that neither France nor Russia has the slightest chance in a single-handed attack against them, that France and Russia in combination have no reasonable probability of gaining the upper hand, and therefore that both France and Russia are obliged to ask themselves whether, after all, they have any such quarrel with Germany as makes it worth their while to attack her. Each of them alike is bound to come to the conclusion that such an attack cannot lead to any result such as would justify the attempt. The consequence is that the peace on the Continent between the five Great Powers has been unbroken for a quarter of a century, and that there is every prospect that it will, in the absence of outside influences, long be

preserved. A second consequence has been that those Continental nations which seek expansion have sought their field, not in Europe, but elsewhere.

Before going outside Europe, however, it may be well to touch upon the situation created for Italy and for Austria by the state of things just described. Italy, in 1870, attained the consummation of her national unity. It was not ideally complete—nothing in this world is ideally complete—and for a time enthusiastic patriots could not but remember that there were Italians or Italian-speaking inhabitants in Dalmatia, Trieste, the Tyrol, Nice, and parts of Switzerland. The first impulse of these enthusiasts was, naturally enough, to seek the perfect realisation of the national ideal by the acquisition of those outlying districts, but in time common-sense prevailed. The substance of unity had been gained, and it was evidently not worth a great war with Austria, a great war with France, or an attack upon neutral Switzerland, merely to make the frontier of the Kingdom of Italy coincide with the line marking, for the time being, the somewhat complicated border of the region in which the Italian language is spoken. Common-sense, which rejected these impracticable dreams, very soon found the true object of Italian national policy, which was the preservation of the independence of Italy, her establishment as a nation able to assert her own will in regard to her own

affairs, an ability which is the essence and the definition of a Great Power. This kind of national policy—the expressions just used really describe the policy of every nation—involves a certain harmony between the end and the means. The end is always conceived of as defence; the means are fleets and armies, coupled with such a diplomacy as will avoid unnecessary quarrels and will secure, as far as may be, the co-operation of other Powers in the assertion of purposes considered vital. Italy, lying entirely within the Mediterranean, and possessing, as integral parts of her national territory, the islands of Sicily and Sardinia, is bound to be, in the first instance, a maritime and naval Power. Her defence is the defence of the Alps and the destruction of any hostile fleet.

Superficial critics, both in Italy and in England, have asked the question, Why should Italy wish to defend herself? What Power intends to attack her? The answer is that every nation must necessarily be resolved to direct its own policy according to its own hopes, interests, or ambitions; and that no nation worthy the name, no nation that respects itself, will accept the position of being the auxiliary, the hand-maid, the humble servant of another Power. The Italians, on finding themselves a nation, were, in the first instance, under the influence of the past, under the spell of their detestation of that Austrian power which had for so long a period exercised

dominion over a large part of their territory. But no sooner was national unity attained than it began to be evident that Italy had no quarrel with Austria, and that each of the two Powers had a very great interest in assisting the other to maintain itself. On the other hand, the French were never tired of calling on the Italians for the display of their 'gratitude'; in other words, Italy was to repay France for having deceived her in 1859, and for the retention of Rome until 1870, by placing the influence of Italy in European and Mediterranean affairs at the disposal of the French Government. The first and most necessary decision of Italian patriotism was to reject this theory of gratitude, and to refuse to be the satellite of France. It was, therefore, against the policy of France that Italy had to defend herself. The French design of supremacy in the Mediterranean meant the end of Italian independence in the sense just set forth, for Italy can never be a Great Power, can never have the full control of her own destinies, if the sea which surrounds her is in the power of a French navy wielded by a French Government for purely French purposes; and that this was the intention was clearly revealed to the Italians by the French seizure of Tunis, a country in which Italian interests, measured by the numbers of the resident Italian population in the country, were beyond comparison greater than those of France. The perception that French designs in the Mediterranean were incom-

patible with her own aspirations, and that her quarrel with Austria was a thing of the past, brought Italy into the Triple Alliance. But we must be careful in interpreting the meaning of that Alliance, especially as the treaty or treaties to which Italy is a party have not been published. We may infer from the text of the Austro-German treaty that the treaties with Italy are purely defensive and deal with specific eventualities. Italy probably receives the promise of aid in case she should be attacked by France. But if Germany will not bind herself to support Austrian claims in Turkey, much less is she likely to have bound herself to support Italian claims or prospects in the Mediterranean or upon the shores of that sea. Italy may propose in the future to acquire Tripoli. But Germany can hardly think Tripoli a more vital matter to herself than Bulgaria. The Triple Alliance, then, may be taken as a guarantee for the preservation of Italy as she is and of Austria as she is, but not as a guarantee of either Power against the consequences of an adventurous policy.

It may well be the case that both Italy and Austria look for more than Germany can think it her interest or her duty to give; that each of the two Powers is anxious to guard her future—Austria against the effects of a Russian advance to Constantinople, and Italy against the results of a French supremacy in the Mediterranean. But for help in the effort to prevent the realisation of either of these disagreeable

possibilities Austria and Italy must not look to Germany. They are compelled to appeal to the only remaining Great Power, that is, to England. There is evidence tending to show that during Lord Salisbury's last administration some assurances of the kind sought for were given by him both to Austria and to Italy; and the prospect of British co-operation with these two Powers in all probability contributed to maintain the peace without territorial or other change. Whether the assurances given by Lord Salisbury were renewed by Lord Rosebery, and whether they still hold good, it is difficult to say. Little or nothing has been said about them for several years, and nothing has happened from which a positive inference can be drawn. More than one Cabinet Minister has quite recently referred to the isolation of England in terms which are hardly consistent with the existence of pledges of any kind to any of the Great Powers, and the most probable inference is that, whatever was the case before Mr. Gladstone's last ministry came into office, there is now no distinct understanding between England and Austria or Italy. British Ministers of both parties are so prone to declare that alliances cannot be made by England, and the party system is accompanied by such complete changes of view with regard to foreign affairs, that England has almost ceased be regarded on the Continent as a Power with whom alliance is to be had. The Continental Great Powers accustom

themselves to leave her out of their calculations, except as an erratic force which may or may not be exerted in the direction corresponding to the apparent, or even the evident, direction of British interests.

VII

THE DRIFT OF RUSSIAN POLICY

THE policy of Russia may be regarded, and ought to be regarded, from three different points of view; that of the Russians, that of the other Continental nations, and that of Great Britain. It is right to begin with that of the Russians. Lay out before you the map of Asia. It is not the slightest use discussing policy without the facts, and the fundamental facts, in every case, and most of all in the case of Russia, are geographical. The map alone gives the clue to the history and the policy of the Russian Empire. We have to impress upon our minds what the Russian Empire was in the latter part of the 18th century, and what it is to-day. The difference reveals the lines upon which Russian policy has moved, and which need only be prolonged in order to show the lines along which it must and will continue to move.

We may begin by tracing the border of Russia in Europe as Catherine the Great found it. It started from the Arctic Ocean, about a hundred and fifty miles east of the North Cape, and ran overland at a good distance from the Gulf of Bothnia till it struck the Gulf

of Finland at a point midway between St. Petersburg and Abo. Then, starting from Riga, on the Baltic, it ran in a curve convex towards the east to Kief, and from Kief with a convexity towards the west to Azof, at the mouth of the Don. From Azof it continued on the north side of the Caucasus parallel to that range as far as the Caspian. From the Caspian it followed the river Ural and the Ural Mountains to a point a little south of the latitude of Moscow, and thence it ran in an irregular line across Asia, keeping far to the north of the Sea of Aral, well to the north of Lake Balkhash, and slightly to the south of Lake Baikal, and reached the Sea of Okhotsk at its southernmost point well to the west of the mouth of the Amour. Even at that time the area of the Russian Empire was far greater than that of any other continuous territory under one Sovereign in the world; but since then it has been increased by the addition of territory larger than all Europe, without Russia, taken together.

The first expansion was towards the west. Russia has gained in this quarter a belt of territory stretching from the shore of the North Sea to that of the Caspian, averaging not less than three hundred miles in width, and including the whole of Finland, Lithuania, the greater part of Poland, the north shore of the Black Sea, the Crimea, the Caucasus, and part of Armenia. Instead of being a land-bound State, shut up to the frozen Arctic and the enclosed

Caspian, Russia has obtained a fair share of the coast of the Baltic and a good part of the coast of the Black Sea; and that part of her Polish territory which was formerly the Grand Duchy of Warsaw forms a wedge driven in towards the centre of Europe, overlapping on one side the Baltic provinces of Prussia, and on the other side the Austrian territory of Galicia. In the main, this expansion towards Europe and beyond the Caucasus was effected during the period when Europe was distracted by the conflicts of the revolutionary epoch, or exhausted by its consequences.

In Asia the border remained stationary until 1845. Since then there has been a constant advance in two distinct regions. The frontier, which in 1845 ran from the mouth of the Ural, with a semi-circular sweep northwards, till it came down to the Altai Mountains, now starts from the southern edge of the Caspian and makes a semi-circle in the opposite direction to reach the same point. These two lines enclose an area acquired by Russia during the last fifty years as large as Russia in Europe at the time of Catherine the Great. This enormous extension in Central Asia has its counterpart in the Far East, where, in 1858, was acquired the province of the Amour, about as large as Spain, in 1860 the maritime province beyond the Amour, reaching from Nikolaievsk to Vladivostock, about as large as Italy, and in 1875 the Island of Saghalien.

In this process of expansion two currents seem to have alternated. First of all a pressure upon Europe carries the Russian border forward until resistance becomes serious. This is accompanied by a pressure upon Turkey, which has never been relaxed, but which produces an advance only during the periods when the European Powers leave Turkey without support; and it has been followed, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, by an enormous and rapid advance, both in the western and the eastern half of Asia.

The extension of Russia is evidently the most natural and inevitable thing in the world. A great Power, formed by a very large homogeneous population, ruled by a dynasty popular because, as the late Sir John Seeley has so well pointed out, it represents the tradition, of protection against an oligarchy, that in other countries is generally associated with the rise of democracy, could not but extend its borders in regions where there was no solid resistance to be overcome. The anarchy of Poland was a standing invitation to the neighbouring Great Powers to annex that country, and the dissensions between Austria and Prussia inevitably in the partition gave Russia the lion's share. The movement towards the Black Sea merely followed the course of the Russian rivers, and the conflict between the orthodox race and the representative of Islam was as inevitable as the flow of the Dnieper and the Don. In the same way the

annexation of the Kirghiz steppes in the reign of Nicholas was probably a necessary, and certainly a natural, measure for the settlement of a long frontier not protected by any great natural obstacle. British experience in India and elsewhere shows that it is difficult to restrain the advance of a frontier in a region of unsettled and half-civilised tribes, so that an advance of the Russian Empire in this direction requires little or no justification. The extensions in the Far East are defended on the ground of a natural desire to obtain an ice-free port on the Pacific, and, if these acquisitions are admitted to have been legitimate, it is impossible to object to the construction of a fortified harbour, nor to its having been baptized by the high-sounding title of Vladivostock, 'the Lord of the East.'

This is, substantially, the Russian point of view, and it may be summed up in the statement that the advances made by Russia are natural in Russia's circumstances; in other words, that a Power which is strong enough to take its neighbour's territory will take that territory. It is a good and sufficient explanation of the action of that Power, but it throws no light whatever on the question whether another Power strong enough to prevent such annexation will not find it equally natural to prevent it the moment it has a sufficient motive for doing so. The European States, for instance, and certainly those which are the neighbours of Russia,

may safely be assumed to believe that Russia has as much European territory as she ought to have, and to be anxious, if they can, to prevent her acquiring more. On the theory of what is natural it is evident that restriction of the extension of Russia in Europe depends, not upon the self-abnegation of the Russian Government, but upon the power of the other Governments to defend themselves, and Russia is already so great that this power can hardly be exerted successfully, except by a combination of States. The Triple Alliance represents such a combination, but its purpose is strictly confined to the defence of the territories belonging to the States which are members of it. We have seen in a former chapter that these States do not undertake, as part of their joint programme, to defend the Turkish Empire. Germany, being always afraid of France in her rear, is unwilling to provoke the hostility of Russia by the defence of Turkey. Yet that defence is a matter of the greatest interest, probably of vital interest, to the whole European community—not merely to Austria, to Germany, and to Italy, but to France and to England.

For the present purpose it will be enough to show how British interests are affected. The argument of those who would not resist Russia is based upon a supposed theory of natural rights. Russia, it is said, depends for her commercial prosperity upon the navigation of the Black Sea. This is a proposition

which no one will deny; but it does not for a moment follow that Russia has any right to the possession of Constantinople or of the shores of the Straits. The arguments that apply to the Black Sea apply, with equal force, to the Baltic, which is as necessary an outlet for the northern half of European Russia as the Black Sea for its southern regions. But no one outside of Russia has ever maintained that the commercial necessities of Russia entitle her to annex the territories which overlook the Sound. Russia shares with Germany the right to demand that the passages from the Baltic to the North Sea shall be freely open to the transit of her merchant ships without any kind of embarrassments or hindrances being set up by the Scandinavian States whose territories command them. The theory that Russia, as a Baltic Power, has a claim to the possession of Copenhagen or of Elsinore would be universally scouted; yet it rests upon precisely the same basis as the Russian claim to the possession of Constantinople.

The water-way formed by the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles has a character of its own. Each of the two straits is commanded from its shores. A narrow channel, many miles long, overlooked by high banks, cannot be passed by ships of war if the banks are in the possession of a civilised army in which the art of fortification and the use of artillery are understood. A civilised power in

possession of the territory through which either of these straits runs must therefore always be able in peace or in war to close the water-way at its pleasure to ships of other nations. Whatever legal theory may be set up these straits are, as a matter of fact and of force, the territorial waters of the Power which owns their banks. A half-civilised weak Power like Turkey, which exists only upon sufferance, is unable to make the most of the advantages inherent in the possession of the straits. If both the straits were in the possession of Russia, their unparalleled importance would soon be made manifest. The coast of the Black Sea has an extent about equal to that of the coast line of Italy, together with Sicily and Sardinia. The Black Sea is a natural road to every part of this coast line, and the natural communication between all its different points. The trade which passes by the water-road is necessarily considerable. Suppose that Russia were in possession of the Bosporus, and that she chose to prohibit the passage of ships not under the Russian flag. The necessary consequence would be the creation of a very large Russian mercantile marine, which would monopolise both the internal traffic of the Black Sea and the communication between the Black Sea ports and the Sea of Marmora. If Russia possessed the Dardanelles also and closed them to foreign flags, Russian ships would carry all the traffic between the Black Sea ports and all the rest of the world. The advantage

to Russia would be so great that it may be considered certain that if in possession of the straits she would adopt the policy here described. In time of war, of course, the Black Sea would be inaccessible to the enemies of Russia, and the control of that sea in peace and war alike would necessarily and swiftly make Russia the actual possessor of all the countries round its shores, that is, of the whole north coast of Asia Minor, as well as of Roumania and Bulgaria up to the Iron Gates. It is evidently natural that Russia should seek to improve her position in the world by the acquisition of the Straits. It is equally evident that once in possession she would make an end of British and other non-Russian shipping trade with the Black Sea by a system of regulations so devised as to favour the Russian at the expense of other flags.

Constantinople, with its environs on both sides of the Bosporus, forms one of the most remarkable military positions in the world, and in the hands of a civilised military Power would better deserve the term 'impregnable' than any other position known to strategists. Russia in possession of Constantinople would be so protected against any attack as to be, for practicable purposes, unassailable. It would be impossible for the rest of the world to bring pressure to bear upon her. So long as the Black Sea is open this kind of invulnerability is unattainable, because a combination between the maritime and the military

Powers will always be strong enough, if not to invade the Russian Empire or to endanger its existence, at least to cause it inconvenience serious enough to compel a modification of anything objectional in the national policy. The disagreeable effects upon Europe of a Russian acquisition of the Straits might, for a time, be mitigated if, while Russia acquired the Bosporus, another strong Power obtained possession of the Dardanelles, for in that case it would always be possible to reply to any Russian measures for the exclusion of foreign merchant ships from the Black Sea by corresponding measures for the exclusion of Russian merchant ships from the Mediterranean. But the power which might acquire the Dardanelles would be compelled to create there a fortified position not less impregnable than that formed by the shores of the Bosporus.

It is evident that of all the Great Powers Great Britain has most to lose from the closing of the Straits, and equally evident that the Russian acquisition of Constantinople, carrying with it, as it necessarily does, that of Bulgaria and Roumania, would be a standing menace to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and it may safely be asserted that the opposition between the purposes of Russia on the one hand, and of Austria-Hungary and of Great Britain on the other hand, in regard to the Black Sea, is inherent in the essential characters of the three States, and that, while the vital interest of Austria and the very con-

siderable interest of Great Britain admit of no modification, Russian legitimate interests can be fully secured without any territorial change in Turkey.

Passing from Europe to Asia we may observe that there are no longer any ungoverned tribes to annex. There is no vacant space between the frontier of Russia and that of other States which, if they are not all at the present day Great Powers, have all of them at least great traditions. Russia is conterminous with Turkey, with Persia, with Afghanistan under British protection, and with China.

The advocates in this country of the Russian cause —Great Britain for twenty years past has abounded in advocates of every cause except her own — are never tired of explaining that the whole object of Russian policy is to reach the sea. There are three seas in question—the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Pacific.

To the Mediterranean Russian trade will always pass by the Bosporus. During the nineteenth century there has never been any hindrance to the passage of Russian trade by this its natural route, and it is certain that no power other than Russia in possession of Constantinople will attempt to set up for the navigation of the Straits any other rule than that which applies in the Sound. The distance of the Russian frontier at Kars from the Mediterranean at Alexandretta is about four hundred and fifty miles, equal to the whole breadth of Spain and Portugal.

The intervening country is a high mountainous plateau, over which no trade route capable of competing with the Straits can ever be made, yet Englishmen can be found to suggest that Russia has some sort of a claim to advance her territory to Alexandretta, in order that the trade of Kars, which is only a hundred miles from Erzeroum, should be taken four times that distance over barren hills to reach the sea at the Gulf of Iskanderun.

From the Persian Gulf the nearest point of the Russian Empire is six hundred and fifty miles away, farther than from Hamburg to Venice. Even if the Russians conquered Persia and made Bushire or Basra into a Russian port, the trade of the southern part of the Caspian would still proceed by the shortest way to the sea, that is, by the railway from Baku to the Black Sea.

Lastly, Russia is to find a warm harbour in the Pacific. For what purpose? It cannot be an outlet for Russian trade, for the whole breadth of China lies between the Russian Empire and the warm ports of the Pacific. The theory that a Power which extends across the northern half of Asia is entitled to conquer any parts of Southern Asia which it covets in order to find an outlet for its trade across half the continent, across vast deserts, and over the most impenetrable ranges of mountains in the whole world, is too absurd to require serious refutation, and those who commit themselves to it merely show how much may be presumed

upon the carelessness of the British public with regard to the facts of geography. This ridiculous hypothesis has the further weakness of being quite unnecessary, for the policy of Russia admits of a simpler explanation.

What Russia seeks are naval arsenals as convenient bases for the creation and for the operations of a great navy. With the largest territory in the world and the largest army the Russian Empire seeks to become the rival of the great Maritime Powers. If she can once attain to that position she will be the most formidable State in the Old World, and will press upon all her neighbours like a nightmare. The annexation of Persia and of the greater part of China would then be merely the preliminaries to the expulsion of the British from Asia, which will become not merely possible but easy whenever a hostile naval combination is able to dispute with Great Britain the command of the sea.

Consider, map in hand, the meaning of Russia's latest Asiatic moves. The territory on the Pamirs recently annexed is a sort of central bastion projecting southward from the general line of the Russian frontier. It flanks on the one hand the indefensible region of Afghan-Turkestan, with which Russia is conterminous on the north, and, on the other hand, the plain of Eastern Turkestan, which begins at Kashgar and Yarkand, and extends along more than two thousand miles of desert bordering the great

Central Asian range as far as the western frontier of Manchuria. The advance south along the Pamir at one end of this plateau and down to Vladivostock at its other end are the preliminary moves of a forward march of the Russian border, after which it will include the whole of Eastern Turkestan and Mongolia. The Russian intention of laying the Siberian railway through Manchuria is only a veiled declaration that at no distant date the Great Wall of China is to mark the Russian frontier; while it is notorious that the Russian positions on the Afghan frontier are such that, whenever the relations between Great Britain and Russia become strained, the Russian move upon Herat cannot be prevented, although the British Government is fully pledged to resist any further Russian encroachment upon the territory of the Ameer.

Great Britain is bound by her maritime interests to resist the Russian designs in regard to the Black Sea; she is bound by her duty to India, admitted by all British Governments, of both parties for many years past, and embodied in the most formal assurances given to the Ameer Abdurrahman, to resist the Russian design in Central Asia; she is bound, in defence of her trade, to resist the Russian attack upon China.

Opposition to Russia is the cardinal point of British policy, of any defence of British interests. The task has been rendered far easier than it was by the rise of Japan, for Japan, as a Maritime Power, is

threatened in the same way as Great Britain, and the danger to her is greater in proportion as she is weaker. The Chinese Government during the last few months has become aware that Russia is a far more formidable and deadly antagonist than Japan. The moment is, therefore, favourable for a combination between China, Japan, and Great Britain for the defence of their common interests; and the resources of the three Powers are fully equal to the task. The share of Great Britain would consist in supplying China with a number of officers and with the necessary arms to make a serious army of some of the excellent fighting men of which China has an almost inexhaustible supply. In the organisation and training of a Chinese army, Japanese officers would also be able to render great service. The British navy would assist the Japanese navy in maintaining against Russia the control of the sea. The alliance once formed would render it impracticable for Russia to invade Chinese territory without a declaration of war from the three allies. In such a case the principal Russian fleets would be driven by the British fleets into the Baltic and Black Sea, and whatever Russian ships were in other waters would be destroyed. The military forces of Japan and China would be amply sufficient to defeat any Russian armies that can be moved across Asia by land.

VIII

THE PRESENT SITUATION

I SET out from the sense of bewilderment produced in the British public by the events which accompanied the close of the year 1895 and the beginning of 1896. I assumed that the manifestations of unfriendliness or of opposition to Great Britain which came upon us with a suddenness by which many were startled, could hardly be the result of mere accident or personal caprice; that they must be the outcome of causes that had been long at work, and which at a given moment revealed their existence through their effects. An examination of the recent policy of each of the great Powers of Europe has thrown some light upon the nature of those causes.

The Continental nations during the period between 1815 and 1870 were absorbed by endeavours to modify the settlement made at the close of the Napoleonic war, which left Germany and Italy without either the unity or the political institutions that are indispensable to the welfare of a great nation. Both countries were divided and political liberty was denied to them in the interest of the dynastic

ascendency of the Habsburg Monarchy and of that predominance of France upon the Continent of which the Second Empire inherited the tradition. Thus the greater part of the nineteenth century is filled up in continental history by the effort of Germany and of Italy to attain to national unity.

During the same period, at the beginning of which England, then the sole possessor of a navy, had the undisputed control of every sea, the British Empire expanded without opposition. The British administration in India extended its authority to the borders of Afghanistan, Persia, China, and Siam, and brought the whole population of India under the scope of its direct or indirect supervision. The continent of Australia and the adjacent islands received a population of British race, which created a group of states thoroughly British in thought, speech, and tradition. The British territories in North America acquired political unity and the institutions of a self-governing nation and increased in population, in prosperity, and in an attachment to the mother country which does not appear to be marred by the fact that in one large region at least the population is not of British but of French descent. In South Africa considerable progress was made towards the formation of a group of states recognising the unity of their interests and their predominantly British character.

Throughout this period Great Britain was uninterruptedly at peace with all the great Powers

except only during the Crimean War, which was undertaken in alliance with France, and in general agreement with Austria and with Italy, for the assertion of what was regarded as a principle of European right violated by Russia. There was no attack upon the British Empire, and the great work of settlement and administration just reviewed was carried out without opposition other than the occasional and purely local resistance of some half barbarous tribe, or of some disaffected interest. The great Powers were fully occupied in Europe: in the rest of the Old World hardly any other power than that of England was known. The French government, indeed, undertook the administration of Algeria, which for a long time involved considerable military effort without corresponding political or commercial success. A number of Frenchmen assisted Mehemet Ali in the administration of Egypt, and M. de Lesseps, aided by a large Egyptian subsidy, undertook the construction of the Suez Canal, with the net result that the Egyptian government became heavily indebted to European creditors, and that ultimately European intervention was required to save the country from bankruptcy and anarchy.

The great changes in Europe were completed in 1871. Their results were, first, to make Austria-Hungary an Eastern Power distinct from Germany; secondly, to put an end to the French design of a continental ascendency maintained by interference in

Germany and Italy. The first effect upon France was that she renewed her army without being certain whether the purpose was to resist a fresh attack from Germany, or to make a fresh attack upon Germany by way of revival of the old design. The re-armament of France rendered necessary a corresponding process in Germany. Austria, expelled from Germany, became more sensitive than ever to her interests in the south-east of Europe, and the old opposition between Austria and Russia was thus intensified. Germany, anxious to avoid a conflict with Russia, but still more anxious that the Austrian power should be maintained, attempted to mediate between the two rivals. The Russian government, disappointed, became estranged from that of Germany, which, to avert the danger of a Franco-Russian combination, negotiated the alliance with Austria and Italy, Italy being brought into opposition to France by her interests in the Mediterranean. Thus Europe was divided into two camps.

The German government hoped further to secure itself by the accession of England to the Triple Alliance. This was not to be had for the asking, and accordingly the German government endeavoured to stimulate the interest of England in an alliance by the promotion of those French designs most likely to be disagreeable to England. Germany also, by way of still further accentuating the importance to England of a good understanding

with herself, initiated a series of Colonial undertakings, calculated to irritate British feeling rather than seriously to damage British interests, and extorted concessions chiefly by displaying her power of being disagreeable in the field of international negotiations. The doubt whether England can be relied upon for help in case of need has compelled Germany to go to great lengths in the effort to conciliate the goodwill of Russia, without estranging her Austrian and Italian allies.

During the central period of the nineteenth century, British governments, absorbed in domestic legislation and in the vain attempt to restrict the expansion of the Empire, sought as much as possible to keep clear of all share in the European disputes in process of adjustment, disputes in which they perhaps rightly held that Great Britain had no direct interest. Of Great Britain's position or duty in the world no very lucid idea prevailed. The conception of an Empire in the modern sense, and the significance of the command of the sea seem to have been almost unknown. The dominant wish was to avoid responsibility; the only duty recognised in regard to Africa, Asia, Australia, and America was to have as little to do with them as possible. Yet during this period British energies were as restless as ever. The whole continent of Africa was explored by British travellers; all its ports, at any rate outside the Mediterranean, were seats of an almost exclusively British trade,

27741

and so strong was the drift of British energy towards Asia and Africa, that nothing but the determination of cabinets to have as few duties as possible outside the British Islands prevented the coasts of Africa and of many parts of Asia from becoming British protectorates.

The political changes in Europe were accompanied by an enormous development of industry and of trade due to the introduction of the steam-engine both for manufacture and for transport by sea and land. When, ten or twelve years after 1870, the continental nations found leisure to look abroad, they discovered England in possession of something very like a monopoly of manufactures, of shipping, of ocean trade, and of prosperous colonies, and they naturally began to compete as well as they could in each of these departments. The Great Powers being all fully armed, a policy aiming at serious changes in Europe has become extremely dangerous, and the chief continental Powers recognising this fact have directed their attention to the half-civilised regions outside of Europe where no serious local resistance is probable, and where, until recently, the only European influence was that of Great Britain.

Thus Great Britain during the last few years has found her influence in almost every part of the world confronted, more or less unexpectedly, by a rivalry, a competition, an opposition, in which each of the principal national Powers of the Continent is repre-

sented. It is not merely that Russia has advanced in Central Asia until, in the minds of the natives, the question has arisen whether England or Russia is the stronger power, nor that the once paramount influence of England in China and Japan is threatened by the policy of the Russian Emperor; it is not merely that the French have, in late years, proved by their acts that they recall with regret and have revived the great design of Colbert. Germany, too, has somewhat rudely disturbed the tradition that colonies were a monopoly of Great Britain, and, even the Italians, wishing to take part in the new movement of extra-European expansion, have found it necessary to negotiate with England about the limits to be assigned to their sphere of influence on the coast of the Red Sea. Of the Great Powers Austria alone is prevented by her non-national character from entering into this new field.

This general awakening of a European interest in Asia and Africa has created for England a new situation fraught with discomfort, perhaps with peril.

The danger arises, not from a direct intention cherished by the continental Powers to compose their differences and to combine for the avowed purpose of destroying the British Empire, but from the probability of those Powers finding it their interest to postpone the quarrels which divide them, to prolong indefinitely the truce which has lasted now for five-and-twenty years, to delay action for the attainment

of European ends which they are at present prepared neither to renounce nor to pursue at the risk of a great war, and to seek, with as little risk to themselves as possible, such gains as may be found in the acquisition of new markets, reserved in each case for their own special use, and of possessions in other continents which may serve either as sites for future settlement, as encouragement to their shipping trade, or even as naval bases for the benefit of their fighting fleets. This speculative policy outside of Europe causes a certain friction between each Power which embarks upon it and Great Britain. The timorous mildness of British cabinets has produced in continental governments the belief that in all these matters Great Britain will give way to a sufficient parade of seriousness, or to a threat. Hitherto this method of obtaining concessions from British governments has been fairly successful, but it has resulted in arousing a certain dissatisfaction in England. The British public is disgusted with the light abandonment of British interests which has become habitual, and the interest in the navy as the weapon of Imperial defence which has thus been revived has led to a considerable strengthening of that service. British cabinets can no longer profess to take seriously the bluster of a single Power. The continental Powers are therefore induced to consider the possibilities of an anti-British combination. In such a combination, even though for a subordinate

and temporary purpose, lies the root of something more serious. It accustoms foreign statesmen, the newspaper writers whom they control, and the public which reads the newspapers, to think less of the dissensions which separate the Powers of Europe from one another and more of the causes of the friction which exist between them all and Great Britain. It suggests to them the idea that the truce which has prevailed on the Continent for a quarter of a century might with advantage be converted into a peace and that an agreement might be reached, in virtue of which, while each Power should renounce some European object once deemed to be important, compensation for the sacrifice thus made might in every case be obtained at the expense of the British Empire. This train of thought must lead to the grouping together of the several demands made by continental Powers for concessions from England, and a British Government would then be compelled either to fresh surrenders, greater and more humiliating than have yet been made, or to so decided a negative reply as would be a rebuff to the combined Powers. Such a rebuff would, in the present state of the world, excite profound animosity and might very easily lead to a war, in which none of the continental Powers would appear to risk very much, while England would risk everything. When war has once begun the feeling on both sides always becomes exceedingly bitter, and the conditions of modern war

are such that after a conflict of force has begun it is impossible to be sure that it will end without the entire overthrow of one or the other of the parties.

Great Britain finds her policy at different points confronted by an opposition from each of the three principal Powers of Europe. If this opposition were in each case serious, if at each point vital interests of her own were in conflict with interests vital to the other Power, her three antagonists would be drawn together and would combine to resist her. If that were the nature of the case her situation would be precarious; her navy, by no means equal to the task of securing victory over the fleets of such a combination, would require to be enormously increased, and she could not count upon the assistance of any continental ally, for no continental state could, even with British help, venture upon resistance to the three great military Powers. The combined Powers, moreover, would find it their interest to bring about a war before the British navy could be sufficiently strengthened.

The fundamental question of British policy, or to substitute the definition for the term, of the defence of British interests, presents itself in the form of an inquiry whether the motives which keep the Powers of Europe apart are stronger or weaker than those which tend to unite them in opposition to Great Britain. According to the answer given we might infer either that Great Britain must arm for resis-

tance to a combination of the Powers or that such a combination is in no case to be dreaded. But it will be found that the question admits of no categorical answer, because the motives of the Powers to some extent depend upon the action of Great Britain. This is not the least important consideration in the determination of the course which it is best for her to pursue.



BOOK II

THE DEFENCE OF BRITISH INTERESTS

BOOK II

THE DEFENCE OF BRITISH INTERESTS

I

THE NEED FOR A POLICY

THE question upon which our whole inquiry turns, from which it sets out, and to which it must continually return, is that of the defence of the British Empire. I am anxious to approach this question from a hard matter-of-fact point of view, and to find the answer given, not by elaborate theories, but by common sense. Common sense suggests that when the business in hand is defence we should take some sort of a survey of that which is to be defended, and give ourselves some kind of account of the attacks against which it must be protected. That which is to be defended is, in the first place, British territory; in the second place, British interests; and in the third place, British rights.

An attack upon British territory is, of course, an act of war, and will not be made by any Power that has not resolved upon war. The civilised Powers,

of the world are, as a rule, extremely reluctant to go to war, and as every improvement in civilisation makes war more dangerous, causes its effects to be more keenly felt, and greatly adds to the advantage which the better-prepared side has always had in an international trial of force, it is probable that in proportion to their knowledge of war Governments will always refrain from beginning it so long as they can see a reasonable alternative course. But British interests can be injured and British rights infringed by Powers which by no means intend to push their encroachments to the point of open violence. A few illustrations may be given of such action.

The respective rights of the English and of the French in regard to Newfoundland have been defined by a series of treaties, beginning with the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Newfoundland belongs wholly to Great Britain, and the treaties give the French no other right than that of fishing in a certain portion of the territorial waters of Newfoundland, and of landing on a certain portion of the coast of the island for the sole purpose of fishing and drying fish, occupations in which they are not to be molested by British subjects. In negotiations for one of the treaties the French asked for the exclusive right of fishing in the waters, which was refused, and they accepted the refusal. Upon the interpretation of the treaties and the definition of British and French rights no doubt has ever been expressed by any British Government.

For many years past, however, the French have claimed and have attempted to exercise in these waters rights going beyond anything that the treaties allow them. Successive British Cabinets have been ready to negotiate upon this matter, that is, they have shrunk from asserting what one and all of them believe to be the rights of Great Britain, and have concluded and renewed, from time to time, a *modus vivendi* by which, so long as it lasts, a portion of these rights is sacrificed.

This is a flagrant instance of the failure of British Governments to assert British rights, and it has been defended in Parliament by Cabinet Ministers of both parties on the ground that to have asserted the rights of Great Britain would have been to run the risk of a war. In other words, neither party, when in power, has dared to enforce the just rights of the nation. I venture to assert that it is impossible for Ministers actuated by this spirit to defend the British Empire, for it is a spirit of giving away that which it is their duty to retain, so soon as they imagine that force might be required as a support to right. The first fact, the most elementary fact, of international relations is that as between nation and nation no right is worth a straw unless there is force behind it. There has not been a time during the last fifteen years when a French Government was ready to go to war in support of the unfounded French claims put forward in regard to the Newfoundland shore, and

nothing more was wanted for the preservation of the law as established by treaty than the determination of the British Government to enforce that law. I begin with the case of Newfoundland because it is a specific instance of the violation of undoubted rights permitted during many years by British Governments of both parties; and it is a crucial instance, because the official utterances of both sides involve the admission that neither party when in office has the courage of its convictions in regard to resistance to the most barefaced form of encroachments upon the Empire—the infringement of specific rights defined by treaty.

Another illustration of precisely the same kind of weakness is worth noting. In 1880 England and France were bound by agreements concluded before that date with regard to two groups of islands in the Pacific, those of Raiatea and the New Hebrides. The two Governments had agreed that neither of them would ever at any time take possession of either of these groups of islands. In that year the French took possession of the Raiatea group. Negotiations took place, and the British Government provisionally acquiesced in this breach of faith, whereupon in 1886 the French seized the New Hebrides. Then the British Government agreed to recognise the French as lawful possessors of the Raiatea group in consideration of a French promise to evacuate the New Hebrides. So much for the assertion of British rights.

Interests seldom admit of the same strict definition as rights—indeed, the word interests, as a rule, covers rights which lack something of the official status conferred by strict legal definition; in the last resort, everything that a Government has to defend or assert is a right of some kind—but, dispensing for practical purposes with the refinements of definition, we may consider a few instances of the sacrifice of British interests to the fears of British governments.

The island of Madagascar has been in the lifetime of men now living the one great instance of the success of British missionaries. The inhabitants received from them many of the elements of civilisation, and in the footsteps of the missionaries trade had begun to follow. There never was a case when Great Britain might with greater propriety have stepped in to save the independence of a half-civilised race. The material interests created by the missionaries were quite sufficient to justify British intervention to save the island from conquest, and, as the principal object of the French in seeking to annex Madagascar was to obtain a naval base in close proximity to the British trade routes between the Cape and India and between Australia and the Suez Canal, there was abundant reason for such intervention. The Malagasy, whose only hope of independence was in Great Britain, were thrown overboard with a bad grace for fear of a quarrel with France.

The case of Siam was one in which Great Britain

had a double interest. The trade was almost entirely in British hands, and the country was a barrier between the French colony of Tonkin and the frontier of British India. But the recent history of Siam has been one of British protests as loud as they have proved ineffectual. The treaty lately made with the French Government preserves the nominal independence of one-third of the country at the expense of the rest, and has given the French a legal status for the attempt to deprive our countrymen of half their trade, an attempt which, perhaps, the commercial energy of the French will not suffice to make dangerous. The same treaty contains a promise to negotiate a fresh commercial treaty in regard to Tunis, which is another and perhaps a more serious surrender, for the existing treaty, until the Siam agreement was signed, could not be abrogated by the French without our consent. The object of the French in obtaining the promise was to substitute for the existing treaty one which they can abrogate at pleasure, and thus to pave the way for the extinction of British trade in Tunis.

We may pass to the surrender of British interests or rights in presence of the encroachments of Germany. Fifteen years ago the trade on the coast of Africa outside the then existing settlements of the European Powers was almost entirely in British hands. It was protected only by the British navy, and that protection was accorded equally to traders

of all nations, and was specifically acknowledged by such German traders as had formed establishments in these regions, establishments for the most part in the hands of persons who had been brought up as clerks in the British houses. In 1884 the German Government formed the design of promoting German trade in Africa at the expense of British trade by annexing a number of these districts, that is, by hoisting the German flag over the heads of British traders in places where, for the most part, the English language was the only means of communication between the ambitious German traders and the natives. Cameroons was seized by the Germans in order to anticipate its annexation by Great Britain, which the German Government well knew to be in contemplation. The German Government may have been within its legal rights, but the manner in which this transaction was carried out was such an affront to Great Britain that had a statesman who valued his country's honour been in office at the time he would have staked his political existence to have carried out the decision to make Cameroons British territory, even at the cost of war with Germany. At the same period the territories of the Sultan of Zanzibar were so permeated with British influence and British trade that nothing but the name and the form of a British protectorate were lacking. At the present moment almost the whole region is under the German flag, except the island of Zanzibar itself,

which was bought in again by England at the price of Heligoland. In the negotiations by which Germany has obtained from England the recognition of her right to these African Colonies her Government has constantly employed, not the threat of war, but the threat of creating embarrassments for England in the performance of her duties in Egypt. The first such threat would have been met by a strong British Minister with a refusal to have any dealings whatever with Germany, so long as she proposed to conduct her business in that way. The astounding thing is, that British Governments pocketed these threats, keeping them secret or consigning them to the safe oblivion of blue-books, although during most of the period when this was going on the position of Germany in Europe was so delicate that the preservation of the peace, which was Germany's most vital interest, depended to a great extent upon the goodwill of England.

The policy of Russia has already been described. At every step it destroys a British interest or violates a British right. The present action of Russia in relation to China and Japan is an attempt to establish Russian in lieu of British influence in China, and if it be true that a secret treaty has been signed between the Emperors of Russia and of China, it is to be feared that the Russian design has been successful. In Central Asia the greatest interest of England is to keep the Russian border as far as possible from that

of British India; but the Russian border has almost uninterruptedly advanced, the process having uniformly consisted in the monotonous repetition of the following sequence of events—a Russian advance, a British protest, a British acquiescence in the advance already made by Russia upon condition that there shall be no further advance, a further Russian advance, and so on. In regard to the Black Sea, the British interest is not exclusive, but the British purpose undoubtedly has been, and ought to be, to withstand any alteration of the *status quo* to the advantage of Russia. The history of the region since 1870 is that of continuous changes, all of them in the Russian interest. Russia bound herself to have no fleet in that sea: she has created one. She bound herself in 1878 never to make Batoum a naval arsenal: it is a naval arsenal. She gave a distinct understanding that Bulgaria was not to become a satellite of Russia: Bulgaria has just accepted that position.

The purpose of this retrospect is to show what a British policy ought not to be, and unhappily the very best way of explaining that consists in describing what British policy has been for many years past. We maintain a government for the purpose of asserting our national rights, of protecting our trade—not against legitimate trade competition, but against attack by weapons which are not commercial—and in general for the purpose of watching over our national interests. A review of recent history reveals

the fact that this function has, to say the least, been very imperfectly fulfilled.

I do not for a moment assert that since 1870, or even since 1884, British interests have in every case been abandoned. We have had disputes with Portugal, with King Theebaw, with the tribes of Waziristan, of Chitral, and of Matabeleland. In these cases we have asserted ourselves, and had the better of our adversaries. But it is impossible to go over the various disputes of recent years between Great Britain and other States without perceiving that our statesmen, while they have been bold and firm in dealing with insignificant Powers that could not by any possibility have been dangerous to us, have exhibited remarkable discretion, to use a mild term, in their transactions with the Great Powers of the world. We were very ready to submit to arbitration the quarrel raised against us over the seal fisheries in Behring Sea by the United States, yet it may be doubted, and is doubted by all who read the correspondence, whether our case in regard to the seal fisheries was a whit less perfect than our case in the matter of the Venezuela boundary. Is there not something disagreeable in this state of our national affairs? It is not merely that our trade suffers; our name is not quite as good as it was, our self-respect has been lowered. This is a condition of things that must be altered. There are few Englishmen just now who do not feel dissatisfied; but the

questions raised by a discussion of foreign affairs seem so wide, and to busy men so complicated, that few care to give the time needed to think them out and to probe to the bottom the sore which is weakening the nation's life. Those who have no time to pore over blue-books and foreign history may be quite willing to consider whether the view here put before them has common-sense in its favour.


LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

II

A POLICY PROPOSED

It matters little in itself to Great Britain how the frontier lines of France, Germany, Austria, or Italy are drawn. From this pretty obvious fact many politicians infer that Great Britain ought to have nothing to do with the European Powers, that she ought to encourage her subjects to trade with them but avoid anything like a European policy. The exponents of this view point to the British Colonies and dependencies and to the ocean, and declare that there lie the interests of the nation. As far as it goes this statement is quite true. British interests lie for the most part beyond the bounds of Europe. But the inference that Great Britain needs no policy in Europe is false; it is not only a mistake, but a fundamental and fatal mistake. A policy, if it means anything at all, means the defence of your interests; it means resistance to those who assail them. British interests are not threatened, and cannot be threatened, except by the Great Powers of the world, of which five out of six are European. The sixth, the United States, confines its action to the New World.

A quarrel between Great Britain and the United States cannot arise so long as the United States adhere to the doctrines laid down by Washington and by Monroe, to the effect that the United States will abstain from interference in the affairs of the Old World, and will resent European interference in the affairs of the American Continent. Great Britain abstains on principle from interference on the American Continent, and confines herself to the management of her possessions there. A quarrel with the United States can therefore arise only by the United States abandoning their traditional doctrine and attempting to deprive Great Britain of her American possessions. Such a course is improbable, for it would involve a complete reversal of American policy and the transformation of the United States into a wantonly aggressive Power. That the change is impossible can hardly be asserted, for Mr. Olney's despatch of the 20th of July 1895 set up a claim on behalf of the United States to the sovereignty of the whole continent, of which the logical outcome would be a war for the annexation of British North America, of the British West Indies, and the other American territories of Great Britain. But that part of Mr. Olney's despatch did not commend itself to the good sense of his countrymen. We ought, however, to bear in mind that a reversal of the tradition of American policy is always possible, and that it may come about either by the attempt to assert in practice

the claim to sovereignty on the whole continent, or by the abandonment of the principle of non-interference in the Old World. Such changes of policy as these are contingencies of the future, well worth consideration, but hardly forming a prominent factor in the problem of British policy at the present time.

Great Britain's primary interests are her trade, the merchant ships that carry it across every sea, and her Colonial and other possessions in Asia, Africa, and on the islands of every ocean. These interests are infringed or threatened by European Powers—by France, by Russia, and by Germany. Their defence involves resistance to these Powers.

One State can resist the action of another State either by force or by negotiation. The employment of force is, of course, war, and forcible resistance either to France, to Russia, or to Germany implies a war, of which the scene must needs be, not in the region about which the conflict arises, but in the region where force can most effectively be brought to bear. A war with France or with Germany is a war in Europe, a maritime war, to be conducted in the Channel, the North Sea, or the Mediterranean; a war with Russia is a maritime war in the Baltic, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific, and a continental war in Asia. Negotiation is either the bargaining of one interest for another, leading to compromise, or it is the suggestion of a possible war in which one side displays the possibility of the use of forces so formid-

able that the other side abandons its purpose or postpones its design to a more convenient opportunity. Thus the defence of British interests involves an opposition to the European Powers that assail them, and must consist in a policy in regard to these Powers, to be carried on by bargain, by the display of possibilities of war, or by actual war.

At the present moment British interests are threatened by three concurrent hostile designs; there is a French design to terminate the British Protectorate in Egypt, and to acquire the northern half of Africa, to the detriment of the British Colonies between Sierra Leone and the Cameroons and of British trade on the Niger; there is a German design to acquire an Empire in Central Africa stretching from coast to coast, and to support it by relations with a Transvaal independent of Great Britain; and there is a Russian design to extinguish British trade with the Black Sea, to undermine the British power in Asia, and, in co-operation with France, and perhaps with Germany, to make an end of British trade with China for the benefit of Russian and French political and commercial influence. It is quite evident that to resist all these three designs at once by making war at the same time against France, Russia, and Germany, would be a dangerous undertaking. It would be a logical and legitimate method of defence, to which the main objection is that it would be hardly likely to succeed. Yet, if the three Powers could make up

any quarrels of their own, and could agree to co-operate in the joint promotion of their several anti-English designs, the British government would have to choose between fighting the three Great Powers and abandoning the great interests which they assail. The question of British policy, therefore, the problem which the nation has to solve, before it is too late, is whether there is no means of separating the three Powers, or of keeping them separate, and thereby rendering it practicable to resist one of them at a time, or, at the worst, two at a time. It is obviously desirable also, if possible, to find some Power or Powers which have reasons of their own for resisting the Power or Powers that England wishes to resist, and which will therefore be ready to co-operate with her in a joint resistance. The perfect solution of the problem would be attained if it were practicable, having selected the most dangerous and formidable of England's antagonists, to combine all the remaining European Powers in opposition to that Power, and thus to frustrate the obnoxious design without war, by creating a certainty that if pursued it would be resisted by overwhelming forces.

The recent mismanagement of British action in regard to the Far East and to Armenia has led the German Government to suspect that Great Britain was seeking an understanding with Russia, and perhaps with France, so that it became necessary for Germany to reconsider her relations with her Conti-

nental neighbours. The more recent disaster to Italy in Abyssinia increases the difficulties of Germany. Thus at the present moment a fresh grouping of the Continental Powers is under consideration. If England holds aloof, her interests will be sacrificed to the peace of the Continent, and she will be confronted by a combination far stronger than her naval and military preparations will enable her to oppose with any probability of success. She will have to choose between the sacrifice of her interests without war, and the still greater sacrifices that must follow defeat. But the uncertainty of European relations which compels the Great Powers to reconsider their grouping gives a great opportunity to a British statesman. There is a chance for Great Britain to compose those of her differences with her European neighbours which are temporary and accidental rather than vital and enduring, and, this done, to take the lead in the formation of a new combination strong enough to defeat without war those antagonistic designs which most seriously threaten her interests and her prospects.

England has three sets of Colonial or extra-European quarrels—with Germany, with France, and with Russia. Some must be made up in order that the others may be settled according to England's wish, and not according to the wishes of her enemies. With Germany the disputes concern certain districts in Africa of no vital importance to any one, least of

all to Germany, and also certain alleged German rights in the Transvaal. None of these matters are worth a war to Germany, and there is no reason to think that Germany over-estimates them. Baron Marschall, the German Foreign Secretary, speaking in the Reichstag on the 4th of March 1896, gave it clearly to be understood that these disputes were not worth Germany's pressing. 'The policy of the Empire throughout the world must not be in contradiction with the policy in Europe. We cannot be a bulwark of peace in Europe and seek quarrels beyond the sea.' Those words are a clear invitation to England to make up her quarrel with Germany, and imply that it can be settled without any abandonment upon the English side of important interests or of self-respect.

England's differences with France concern Newfoundland, a number of Colonial questions, and Egypt. The more important Colonial issues concern Madagascar and Siam, and have recently been composed. The French will never fight merely to uphold their encroachments upon British rights on the Newfoundland treaty shore. The principal question concerns Egypt. That can be settled only in one way, by France frankly accepting the situation.

The opposition between England and Russia is of quite a different kind. Russia cannot attain her aims without the destruction of British trade in the Black Sea, the exclusion of British trade from a large part of China, and the maintenance on the North-west

Frontier of India of a position from which the Indian Empire can be annoyed or disturbed. To none of these results of Russian action can England give her acquiescence; she must resist them all, now and always, unless she is prepared to accept in Asia a position of inferiority to Russia, which of itself would make the Government of India difficult if not impossible.

At present, then, it is open to England to come to a clear understanding with Germany, in order if possible to detach France from the alliance with Russia, and to resist with all her might and with the assistance of other powers the aggressive purpose of Russia. This object would be served by the conclusion of the following series of treaties, each of them for a specified term, say of five years:

(1) Between Great Britain, China, and Japan, each of the three Powers engaging to assist the other two in resisting any Russian encroachment upon the Chinese Empire, including Korea. There is reason to believe that Japan and China are both anxious for such a Treaty, and the aid of the British navy, which need not for the purpose detach ships from European waters, would suffice to enable China and Japan in concert to resist any Russian force that can be moved to Eastern Asia.

(2) Between Great Britain and Germany. This Treaty should first of all set out clearly the Colonial interests of each party, which the other party will

engage to respect. It should then define the interests which England and Germany respectively hold vital and will not permit to be infringed by France or Russia without war. These in the case of England will be: her position in Egypt; the freedom of the Black Sea to the trade of all nations, and the freedom of the Straits and of their shores from a Russian occupation; and the border line demarcated in Central Asia between Afganistan and Russia. The two Powers will agree to regard any infringement of these interests by either France or Russia as an attack on the Power (England or Germany) that has declared them vital, and will exchange pledges in case of such attack by France or by Russia on either of them to remain neutral, and in case a Russian attack should be supported by France or a French attack by Russia then to declare war against both these Powers.

(3) Between Great Britain and Austria for the defence of the Black Sea and the Straits against Russian aggression.

(4) Between Great Britain and Italy for the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean. Italy might also be invited to become a party to the treaty with Austria, and should be promised a subsidy in the event of her assistance being called for.

Each of these treaties would be purely defensive, involving action only when and in case the specific interests to be protected were assailed. It will be

observed that none of the Powers engages to fight in any cause in which it is not vitally interested, with the exception of the engagement made by England and Germany each to help the other in case of attack by both France and Russia. This engagement is justified by the importance to either nation of the preservation of the other in its position as a Great Power.

The effect to be looked for is the prevention of Russian aggression without war. Russia could not move with any chance of success either in the Far East or in the Black Sea. If she moved in Central Asia she would find the Indian Empire in a good state of defence, and the interference of France upon the Russian side would be prevented by the action of Germany. But the preservation of peace and of the *status quo* in Europe and Asia is not the only result to be expected. The system of treaties here proposed might be made the means of detaching France from her alliance with Russia, a service which England might render to the common cause. It would then become practicable for the five Western Powers to agree upon a solution of the Eastern Question, to propose its acceptance by Russia, and, in the event of her refusal, to carry it out without regard to her intentions.

III

THE OBJECTIONS TO AN ALLIANCE WITH RUSSIA OR WITH FRANCE AND TO A POLICY OF ISOLATION

THE policy suggested at the close of the last chapter will probably be received by the thoughtful reader with considerable hesitation, and with a disposition to shrink from committing his judgment to arrangements so far-reaching and to obligations so specific. But I do not despair of producing in those minds that are not closed by prejudice or by party tradition full conviction that the policy proposed is sound.

In order that a particular course of action may commend itself to the judgment of common sense, it must be shown to fulfil three conditions. The demonstration must be given that the proposed course if adopted will lead to the end in view. In the present instance the object is the defence of British interests, and I shall have to show that the system of treaties which I have sketched, or rather the common action which they cover, offers a complete and effective protection of all the interests of Great

Britain, with the smallest amount of risk, with a minimum probability of war, and with a maximum probability of success in case war should become necessary. It must further be made clear that the course proposed is practicable, that is, that the treaties suggested are such as will be accepted by the other powers whose co-operation is sought, upon terms involving no sacrifice of any of those British interests which it is the object of a policy to maintain. These demonstrations must be supplemented by an examination of the other courses that might seem possible, proving that each of them is either impracticable or that it will fail to fulfil the purpose, the defence of British interests. A national policy must not merely comply with the demands of common sense—it must satisfy the conscience; and no demonstration will be satisfactory that fails to show that the course proposed is just and right.

It is convenient to begin with a review of the other courses which have been or might be proposed.

There is a school which proposes that we should make a treaty with Russia by which we should acquiesce in her obtaining freedom of passage through the Dardanelles, while guarding against the contingency of her obtaining possession of the shores of those Straits or of the Bosporus, and at the same time that we should come to an agreement with her by which, while we allow her to annex parts of Manchuria and of Korea, British and Russian

spheres of interest in the Far-East should be defined. These proposals rest upon an imperfect appreciation of the use and of the force of treaties.

It is evidently a mistake to found our action upon a treaty which is sure not to be kept. Now, there is only one guarantee that the Power which signs a treaty will fulfil the obligations which the treaty imposes. It is that the acts which it has bound itself to perform or to leave undone are acts which its own interests, and which an intelligent and patriotic view of its own welfare, require to be done or to be left undone. No Government will be bound by promises which put itself or its successors into a strait waistcoat. You might as well expect a young tree to keep a promise not to grow. If you want a tree not to grow you had better cut it down, and if you want it not to grow in a particular direction you must either lop off its branches upon that side, or place there some obstacle firm enough to divert the course of the branches as they develop.

The policy of Russia to acquire the control of the Black Sea and of its gates is not a wicked or gratuitous design but a natural growth. Europe has tried to prevent it by any number of treaties, usually obtained either by force or by the threat of force; but all those treaties one after another have gone to pieces. To base a British policy upon a Russian undertaking not to do that which Russia cannot help doing is surely a mistake. We must

absolutely reckon upon the continuity of Russian policy in regard to the Black Sea.

Again, no arrangement that Great Britain can make will put it out of the power of Russia, whenever she pleases, to exercise pressure upon China and in the direction of the north-western frontier of India. The power to exert such pressure will and must always be an instrument of Russian policy. Whenever Great Britain is at issue with Russia upon any subject whatever—and there is no way of averting the contingency of a future quarrel with a great Power—Russia will find in Central Asia and in the Far East the means of assailing British interests.

I cannot, however, convince myself that expansion in the Far East or in Central Asia is vital to Russia. The great stem of her national life is in Europe, and the flow of the sap is to the South rather than to the East. Accordingly the movement may be more readily checked in Asia than nearer home. There may be something to be said in favour of an acquiescence in Russian designs on the Black Sea, because those designs are difficult to oppose; but the Russian policy in the Far East, which is comparatively easy to resist, directly assails a considerable British interest. It is not merely that a Russian annexation of Manchuria and part of Korea will in itself close an important field to British trade, but the acquiescence of Great Britain in that annexation must convince both China and Japan that Russia is stronger, at any rate, in the Far

East, than England, and that therefore they have more to hope from Russian protection against England than from English protection against Russia. Convinced of that, these nations will place their policy at the disposal rather of Russia than of England, and the first effect of the change will be a great modification of the commercial advantages which have hitherto resulted from the predominance of British influence in that part of the globe. In the Far East Great Britain is in a position, with the help of China and Japan—of which, provided she acts, she is assured—not merely to resist the Russian advance but to compel a Russian retreat. She ought, therefore, by a threat of action in that quarter of the world to induce Russia, if not to go back, at any rate to stand still in Central Asia.

The question of resistance to Russia in Europe, that is, in regard to the Black Sea, is more difficult. So long as France is the ally of Russia, Great Britain, with her present naval force, cannot alone withstand Russian action; for a British fleet operating about the Straits would have a French fleet in its rear, and the British navy has not sufficient force to enable it at the same time to operate towards the Black Sea and to neutralise the French navy. But to stay the advance of Russia and to prevent her acquisition of the Straits is the common interest of all the European Powers. The Powers combined are well able to effect this purpose, and nothing prevents the combination

but the outstanding quarrel between France and Germany, and the supposed determination of England never to co-operate with any other Powers. The moment Great Britain declares her intention to co-operate with other Powers in maintaining the existing European order, the forces available for resistance to Russia will be overwhelming, and Russia must therefore stand still. The alliance of France will not be sufficient to enable Russia to move, and France must then find that the Russian alliance places her under restraint. In this way it may be possible to bring about the restoration of France to her true position as a member of the community of Western nations.

The policy of Russia is one of aggression in three directions, and, in each of these directions, it brings her into direct conflict with an important British interest. Agreement with her is impossible, except by the sacrifice of one or more of these interests, and even that sacrifice would not, and could not, in the long-run, content her. We have inferred that British policy, in relation to Russia, must be one of permanent, unqualified, and, when opportunity offers, as it does at present in the Far East, of active resistance.

Another school attaches very great importance to a good understanding with France. It is in every way desirable to put an end to the friction which has so long marked the relations between Great Britain and France. The question is how to bring about that result. Let us consider for a moment,

first the questions at issue between England and France, and secondly the general attitude of French policy.

The French have in recent years acquired a considerable empire, both in Africa and in the Far East, without directly trespassing, except in a few minor instances, upon the sphere of British interests. The principal points of disagreement, apart from Egypt, have lately been settled by compromise, and there is not, among the questions actually pending, a single one which can reasonably be thought to be of such importance as to justify either nation in a war for its settlement. No French Government in its sober senses dreams of a war, in which the whole colonial possessions of France would be at stake, for the sake of a few miles more or less of territory on the Middle Niger, or for the sake of the New Hebrides, or for the sake of an extreme view of the construction of the treaties in regard to the Newfoundland shore. The sore point is Egypt; but in Egypt England is absolutely within her rights in all that she has done, and the French demand that England should evacuate Egypt has not more than a shadow of justification. No French Government retaining possession of Algeria, which was temporarily occupied more than half a century ago, or of Tunis, which was temporarily occupied in 1881, can, without the most barefaced hypocrisy, refer to the pledges given by the British Cabinet in 1882. The French demand cannot possibly

be raised in the interest of any theory of right; its purpose is to create a vacancy which France may fill up. No vital interest of France is affected by the British occupation. No doubt France is tempted to aim at supremacy in the Mediterranean, but that also is an object the pursuit of which must inevitably bring her into conflict with England.

A review of French history, in connection with the events of our own time, has suggested the conclusion that the ambition of France, finding the doors barred in Europe, is driven towards the revival of the design of a Colonial Empire, and to a renewal of the conflict of the eighteenth century with Great Britain for the command of the sea, unaccompanied by a simultaneous conflict with Continental Powers. If this should become the settled drift of French policy it is quite evident that an understanding with Great Britain would be impossible, and that the French must take the first opportunity and the assistance of any allies they can obtain to acquire naval supremacy in the Mediterranean and to wrest Egypt from British hands. But French policy has not yet definitely broken with its old course, and so far is the new course from being accepted and settled that I believe myself to be the first writer to have pointed out the probability of the change. In my judgment it is the task of British policy if possible to anticipate and to prevent that change. Once France has deliberately concluded that she has nothing to gain in Europe,

she will seek the alliance of Germany, and, if she should obtain it, England will find herself opposed by a combination of the three great Continental Powers, necessarily dragging the smaller Powers in their wake. It is this forecast which leads me to suggest a policy. I think it not too late, by such a system of treaties as I have suggested, to convince the French that the question of Egypt is as much settled as that of Alsace and Lorraine, to bring about their acquiescence in this settlement, and to effect such a world-wide delimitation of spheres of influence as may leave France sufficient scope for what may be called Imperial action without necessarily bringing her into conflict with England. By such an arrangement the otherwise inevitable conflict with France may be postponed, and a conflict postponed is sometimes a conflict avoided. The object of British policy should be, not to consider peace the greatest of British interests, but to endeavour to secure the vital interests of Great Britain without war and to employ every prolongation of peace for the purpose of knitting together the Empire and strengthening its defences.

Those who advocate, as the immediate object of British policy, the attainment of some kind of agreement with France, are compelled to propose that it should be attained by the evacuation of Egypt, if not also by acquiescence in the naval supremacy of France in the Mediterranean. This seems to me to be the negation

of a policy, because it sets out by a sacrifice of important interests which any policy ought to secure. It appears to me that a good understanding with France can be attained only by the opposite course, that is, by the resolute assertion of those British rights and interests which the French are disposed to threaten. The abandonment of Egypt and of the Mediterranean must encourage the French in their project of maritime ascendency; it must also deprive England of any possible assistance from Italy or from Austria-Hungary, and thus gradually strengthen the hands of France for further opposition to England. It is essential for England to convince the French that a renewal of the old conflict for the command of the sea cannot be to their advantage. This conviction will be produced so soon as the French Government has the certainty that in such a conflict England would have the alliance of Italy, and that the intervention of Russia on behalf of France would be followed by the intervention of Germany and of Austria on the opposite side. So soon as France abandons these anti-English designs, there is nothing to prevent a renewal of the closest intimacy between the two nations, for it is hardly necessary to repeat that the treaties which I have proposed in no case contemplate an attack upon France, or an encroachment upon any French possessions, or upon any tangible French right or interest.

It appears, then, that an alliance with Russia is out

of the question, because it must start from and end in a sacrifice of British interests, and can produce no kind of compensating advantage for England. An alliance with France must begin with the British evacuation of Egypt, and could be maintained only, first, by British acquiescence in a French occupation of that country, and ultimately in the recognition of the occupation as a protectorate, of exactly the same kind as that which exists in Tunis and in Algeria. The only advantage suggested for England from an alliance with France is the preservation of peace. The Russian or the French alliance commends itself to those whose object is not the preservation of British interests, but the maintenance of peace by their sacrifice. That is a policy in every way acceptable to the enemies of England, for it facilitates the gradual destruction, without the trouble of war, of that complicated structure of rights and interests which we call the British Empire. For those who believe that the British Empire is worth preserving, to whom the word England means something worth living for, and therefore something worth dying for, the choice is between an alliance with the central European Powers and a policy of isolation.

The argument chiefly used by politicians when they refuse to consider the wisdom of an alliance has no relation whatever to the state of the world nor to the necessities of Imperial defence. The protection of British interests forms no part of it. It is entirely

summed up in the phrase 'an alliance is unpopular, public opinion is not in favour of it.' This is an argument which naturally commends itself to men much occupied in canvassing for votes, but its employment is scarcely consistent with the character of a statesman. If a given course is the right one for the preservation of the Empire, it is the business of statesmanship to inform public opinion on the subject and to bring about a general recognition of the true conditions of the world. Moreover, the plea that public opinion will not consider an alliance is hardly sincere. The British public is very rightly averse from the old-fashioned meddlesome policy which saw in every little European dispute an occasion for British interference. But never since the time of Marlborough has the British public shown a greater interest than it does at present in the Empire, nor a greater willingness to listen to any competent exposition of the means, whether naval, military, or political, which are required for its maintenance.

What then is the meaning of that abstinence from alliances which has lately been glorified under the name of isolation?

The word is commonly used in connection with the opinion that we should not or need not at present make treaties, but that, in some coming time of need, the co-operation of other Powers will be desirable and obtainable. This is hardly a policy; it involves the conclusion of treaties under pressure and in haste

instead of their conclusion after deliberation, and when the judgment is unbiased by considerations of immediate danger. What is the basis of the assumption that alliances will be offered to us, at the critical moment, by Powers to whom, until we are ourselves in imminent danger, we are to refuse our assistance? The critical moment is, of course, that when Great Britain will be compelled to use force for the protection of some vital interest, for no school thinks it right to go to war for any cause not vital to ourselves. It must be assumed that no other Power, or at least none with which we could be allied, would go to war except for the defence of its own vital interests. The possibility of an alliance at the last moment thus depends on some other Power having a vital interest in resisting acts which we too, by our vital interests, are compelled to resist. But such a common purpose is not likely to spring up suddenly; if it will exist in time of crisis it must exist now, for the vital interests of nations are not changeable and ephemeral, but stable and lasting. Moreover, if the two Powers thus fundamentally in accord would, when combined, be strong enough to assert their common purpose by war, it is probable that their peaceful co-operation, regulated by treaty, would secure their objects, so long as they are defensive, without war. Thus the school which, while believing an alliance possible and desirable, would postpone its conclusion, admits the principle of community of

interests upon which the policy of alliances is based, and differs from the advocates of an alliance to be now formed only in regard to the right time. Its adherents would wait for a crisis, that is, it would appear, for an actual or at least an imminent attack by force upon some British possession. Postponement of this kind renders difficult the assertion of British rights against encroachments, the most insidious and perhaps the most dangerous, which do not involve the open threat of war, but which cannot be resisted without the display of possible warlike measures. How, for instance, except by the disclosure of the probability of a war in which the chances would be against her, can Russia be induced to abandon her designs upon Turkey in Europe, upon Afghanistan, and upon Korea? In practical policy everything turns upon the judgment of the situation. I cannot but think that those who have not seen in the events of the last two years the revelation of dangers threatening the existence of the British Empire will never admit, until it is too late, that the time for action has come.

The school that persists in ignoring the gravity of the present situation usually employs the language of universal benevolence. We are to be everybody's friend though we are to be on nobody's side. In practice, the interpretation placed by the rest of the world upon this attitude is, that the Power thus holding aloof is everybody's enemy.

The preservation of our interests obliges us to resist the purposes of Russia, at any rate in Farther and Central Asia, to resist the demands of France in regard to Egypt, and to be on our guard against her encroachments in other parts of the world. At the same time we must give Germany to understand that there are British rights and purposes with which no interference can be permitted. All these negatives cannot be maintained at once without the risk of a war for which we are certainly not prepared. If then no alliance is to be made and war is to be averted, there must be a sacrifice in one quarter or the other, we must concede something either to Russia, to France, or to Germany, and not much reflection is needed to see that in the absence of any alliance this process must go on indefinitely, that concessions must be made, first to one Power and then to another. The isolation of inaction must lead to the abandonment of one British cause after another, and to the gradual shrinking of the British Empire at all the points at which its natural tendency is to expand.

Very different is the position of those who advocate the effectual protection of the national interests, but who, believing that the co-operation of other Powers cannot be obtained upon satisfactory terms, would prefer action even in isolation to the abandonment of British causes. In order to be ready without allies to defend our interests, we must arm ourselves to the

point at which we shall have nothing to fear from any adversaries. Before adopting this course, it would be prudent to ascertain what amount of armament is involved. We should require a navy superior to that of any combination. Yet no satisfactory principle can be found by which to determine how many foreign navies must be included in the list of forces which the British Navy is to be ready to confront. For several years the standard adopted has been based upon some kind of comparison with two continental navies, but there is no reason whatever, except the assumption that the other Powers will be either neutral or on our side, why the limit should be drawn at two navies, or at three, or at any point short of superiority to all the navies of Europe. It is not thought likely by the advocates of this theory that more than two Powers will attack us. But the time when a State is at war with one or two formidable adversaries is the most convenient moment for other powers to press their demands, and in that case those demands must either be met by concessions or will be enforced by action which to resist, when we are already at war with a combination, will require a great superabundance of force. A war against more than two Powers requires, as will be seen when in later chapters the various cases of possible war are examined, the readiness in Great Britain of a very large military force, more efficient than is provided by the existence of the militia and the volunteers as

supports to the regular army. It is the one case to meet which Great Britain would have to be a first-rate military as well as a first-rate naval Power, unless, indeed, the victory of the navy against any possible combination could be assumed with a degree of certainty rarely granted in human affairs.

To prepare our own navy and our own army for the defence of the Empire is undoubtedly right. But neither the naval nor the military preparations required to be ready for resistance to a combination can be quickly carried out. A large increase of the navy cannot be effected in less time than is needed to train a great number of officers, for good officers are indispensable to efficiency, and their preparation is a very much slower process than either shipbuilding or the raising and training of seamen. A great increase of our military forces, such as would render fully efficient an army of several hundred thousand men, would also involve great expenditure and a long period of organisation. How then is the time for these preparations to be obtained if no alliance is to be had, or if it is not desirable to accept one? Evidently in that case the moment of action for the defence of British interests must be indefinitely postponed. What is to be the policy in the meantime? Resistance to aggression cannot be attempted, for we are not ready for war without allies against a combination, and diplomatic resistance, unless its negative can be sustained by force, is foredoomed

to failure. The policy of isolation, then, even as advocated by those who contemplate action, involves a preliminary period of waiting and arming, during which the interests of the Empire must be sacrificed either without compensation or by way of compromise. When our intention to arm with a view to future action is perceived by the Powers whose policy is opposed to our own, the merest prudence will suggest to them that they should act promptly before we can be ready.

Thus, whether it involves action or inaction, isolation means postponement, and offers us no help in dealing with the present situation and in resisting aggression such as we now witness in more than one quarter of the globe.

The true policy consists in the prompt assertion of British rights whenever and wherever a movement is made that would infringe them. Such a continuous defence of the Empire must rely in the first instance upon the British forces, which it should be the constant care of the Government to develop. It is true that if the various cases of conflicting interests are catalogued, the defence of the Empire seems at first sight to require forces greater than those available. If, however, they are not merely catalogued but classified and analysed, it will be seen that there are few cases in which British rights can be attacked without a simultaneous assault upon the rights and interests of other Powers. The defence

of her own rights by Great Britain makes her the champion of the rights of others, whose interests impel them to act in concert with her.

Where this condition exists British isolated action is unnecessary, for it is not practical statesmanship to refuse to act because a part of the force available belongs to another Power, ready for its own sake to co-operate with us, and on this unreasonable ground to decline to join hands with the would-be ally and to lose time in preparing additional forces of our own for hypothetical action in the future, when the assistance we now disdain may no longer be available, or may be given to the other side. No doubt there are British interests which do not coincide with those of any other Power—the defence of the North-west Frontier of India is perhaps the most important instance—but a comprehensive view of all our interests, and of the chief interests of all the other Powers, shows that by inviting and accepting co-operation, in those cases where it is the expression of a common interest, we should create a world-wide system of defence by which even the assertion of our own specific and peculiar interests would be facilitated.

But the right course will never be reached upon the assumption that we must postpone action until some point of British territory is invaded. No other Power has a direct interest in the defence of British territory, and if we wait until we are in this sense attacked we shall never find an ally. On the contrary,

we shall have created the impression that we are a decayed nation, and other Powers will consider, not how they can benefit by the help of a State that they believe to be declining, but how they can best acquire a share in the spoil. The essence of policy lies in choosing for assertion and for active defence those points in the extensive fringe of our world-wide interests and those moments of time at which our self-defence will coincide with the self-defence of other Powers.

IV

JUSTIFICATION OF THE POLICY PROPOSED

THE ground has now been cleared for the demonstration of the effectiveness, the practicability, and the justice of the positive policy proposed. The first question that arises is whether the series of treaties sketched in the second chapter of this book would, if agreed upon and carried into effect, render possible a complete defence of the interests of Great Britain. It is important to distinguish between the form and the substance, between the treaties and the action which they contemplate. I begin with the action provided for in the various cases which may occur. Apart from such trifling disputes as may always arise with any Power, but which always admit of an easy settlement, provided they are not accompanied by more serious quarrels, British interests are threatened, or appear to be threatened, by the action of great Powers in the following cases:—

(1) In the Far East. Here the aggressor is Russia; the force to be used in resisting the aggression is that of the British navy in

co-operation with the navy of Japan and the Chinese and Japanese armies.

(2) In the Black Sea. Here again the aggressor is Russia; and she is to be resisted by the joint forces in the first instance of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary.

(3) In the Mediterranean. Here the aggressive Power is France; the defending force the British navy; to be assisted in case of need by the Italian navy.

In each of these cases the existence of a British interest is beyond doubt, though there are differences of opinion as to its magnitude, and upon the question whether in each particular case the interest is worth defending. A careful consideration will probably show in regard to each case that the opinion sometimes maintained that the interest is not worth defending arises from the belief that it cannot be defended with hope of success, or that the exertion required from Great Britain for its defence would be disproportionately great. In other words, it is not thought worth Great Britain's while to embark upon a war with Russia in order to prevent a Russian annexation of Manchuria and Korea, or of the Chinese territory lying to the north-west of Pekin, or to prevent the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia, and so on. But that which it may not be worth England's while to defend by herself may

very well justify her acting in conjunction with an ally whose forces for the particular purpose may, combined with her own, be most effective. There is no doubt that in each of the cases the proposed ally is most anxious for his own sake to act in the way which the treaty suggested prescribes. China and Japan are alike ready to oppose Russian aggression in the Far East, and are prevented from doing so only by the fear that they are not strong enough to succeed—a fear which the co-operation of England would remove. Austria in the same way is eager to stay the advance of Russia towards the Straits, and Italy to resist any further extension of French power over the Mediterranean. The policy proposed covers British interests at a series of points and against a series of encroachments. It implies resistance, in each case desirable in itself, against some aggression, but in each case the practicability of the resistance by an isolated England is doubtful; her forces are not equally effective at every point on the globe, and at some of the regions under consideration the action to which her local interests point would not be prudent unless there were sufficient security that during its course she would not be assailed by a formidable enemy in some other part of the world. The system of treaties proposed gives this security, and knits together into a whole a series of interests so as to make their defence practicable at every point. The action suggested is that which each of

the Powers concerned would adopt for its own sake, but which would involve too great an effort or too serious a risk if undertaken in uncertainty as to the probable course of the other Powers. The treaties are therefore more than a mere form. They bring the nations parties to them into a real community beneficial to each one of them.

The crucial question is whether and upon what terms Germany will accept the proposed alliance. My belief that she will do so rests upon evidence which falls under three distinct heads. First of all come the views expressed by Bismarck, both in his private and in his official correspondence in the period between 1856 and 1866. At that time the greatest danger which Bismarck foresaw for the future of Germany was that of a Franco-Russian alliance. He discussed over and over again the probability of such a combination, and the dangers which it involved for his own country. Over and over again he expressed the view that the proper and natural method of averting or resisting the danger consisted in an alliance between Prussia, Austria, the German Confederation, and England. Over and over again he declared that such an alliance, if the parties to it could be trusted to stand by one another, would be a sufficient defence. There seems little doubt that during the period when those letters were written Bismarck considered this alliance to form the ideal defence for Germany. He was,

however, doubtful whether either the German Confederation or Austria or England could be relied upon, and in view of these doubts he thought the most prudent course for his own Government was to conciliate as far as possible, the goodwill of France. He thought it better for Germany to become a member of the Franco-Russian combination than to run the risk of being crushed by an attack from that combination in the absence of any trustworthy allies. Since that time some of the conditions of the alliance which Bismarck thought the best have been fulfilled. The German Confederation was then the doubtful ally of Prussia, but at the present moment Prussia and the States which then formed the Confederation are united as the German Empire. Germany can now count with almost absolute certainty upon Austria, and in addition to Austria, the Kingdom of Italy with a good navy and a large army is also her ally. The addition of Great Britain to the combination would give Germany a security far greater than could possibly have been foreseen by Bismarck thirty or forty years ago.

The second reason for my belief consists in a consideration of the manner in which the colonial policy of Germany has been conducted since its inception in 1884. It is impossible to believe that the peculiar character of German action in these matters was due merely to the wish to obtain the comparatively unimportant districts of which Germany has

become the possessor. German diplomacy in these matters was deliberately and decidedly provocative of English feeling, and the only rational explanation possible is that Germany was exceedingly anxious to convince Great Britain of the value of her alliance and of the disagreeable nature of the consequences of its rejection.

Lastly, the evidence is not wanting that the present situation is intolerable for Germany. Her own interests may be preserved, if not permanently, at any rate for some time to come, by any kind of working agreement with France and Russia. Such an agreement can be obtained only by Germany's acquiescence in some parts of the policy upon which France and Russia are agreed. France and Russia have in common, while their present agreement lasts, an opposition to Austria as regards the future of the Balkan States, to Italy as regards the future of the Mediterranean, and to Great Britain as regards the future of the world. Germany is more immediately endangered by the sacrifice of Austria and of Italy than by the sacrifice of British maritime and colonial interests, and therefore, if she is compelled to make a sacrifice in order to postpone the necessity for a conflict with France and Russia, it must take the form of a compromise with those Powers by which the interests of Austria and of Italy would, at any rate in the immediate future, be secured, and which would leave France and Russia at liberty, with the

assent, if not with the co-operation of Germany, to assail British interests throughout the world. Accordingly we have in recent years seen Germany doubtful of British policy, temporising with France and Russia, persuading Austria and Italy to acquiesce in French and Russian designs which they alike bitterly resent, and promoting, at the expense of Great Britain, the designs of Russia in the Far East, and of France in Africa. She is driven to this course by the indecision of England, for without England she can neither secure Austria against Russia nor Italy against France. The accession of England to the combination renders any concessions whatever unnecessary, and would, I believe, be welcomed by Germany as a great deliverance, provided of course that it was effected under conditions which would give the German Government full confidence in the determination of England to abide in the policy, and to fulfil her pledges.

Two conditions, however, must be fulfilled by any agreement for mutual defence negotiated with Germany by a British statesman. It is evidently indispensable that the treaty with Germany must not involve any preliminary or subsequent sacrifice of British interests to Germany, and that it must be so framed as to preclude the possibility of its being used to entangle England in an aggressive war or in a war foreign to the main purpose of defence.

A sacrifice of British interests is uncalled for.

The only possibility of a conflict of interests between England and Germany concern either trade or colonies. There is a serious competition in trade between the two countries: it has long subsisted, has never led to serious dispute and never will so long as it is conducted on both sides with political good sense. The opposition of colonial interests is seeming rather than real. The German colonies have no such value to Germany as would justify for their extension the sacrifice of a possible alliance with England; they are not suitable fields for German settlement and they cannot for generations become markets of such magnitude as to be worth consideration in comparison with the markets afforded to German goods by the British Empire. Nor is the existence of the present German colonies in any serious way detrimental to British interests.

The object of the series of treaties which I have proposed is to preserve the peace on the basis of the existing order; not to extend the possessions or the rights of the parties to them at the expense either of one another or of outside powers. For this reason I have suggested that England and Germany should exchange schedules of the interests which they intend to maintain. The account of British interests would take due note of a class of British rights which, though not territorial, ought to be maintained with absolute firmness. In recent years several of the great Powers have undertaken to make use of their territorial sovereignty in

order to favour the traders of their own nation. This they may or may not be entitled to do, but what no British Government ought to permit is that an uncivilised or half-civilised region, in which British trade is predominant and in which the European settlers and the European material interests are mainly British, should be annexed by another Power with a view to the extinction of British trade and of British material interests and to the introduction of its own trade and of its own material interests in their stead. If such a region is to be brought into the European political system Great Britain has a claim prior to that of any Power to undertake its government, and this claim ought in no circumstances to be waived without good and sufficient reason. The proposed schedule of British interests ought to include all those regions in which the trade or other interests of Great Britain answer to the description here given, and their recognition by Germany ought to be a *sine quâ non* preliminary to the conclusion of any agreement whatever between the two Powers. In the same way unqualified recognition of existing British rights in South Africa, and in particular of the position of the Transvaal as a protected State within the British South African Empire, ought also to be required.

An exchange of explanations between England and Germany upon the subject of the vital aims and interests of the two nations must lead to a general agreement and to the perception that the interest of

both powers is in favour of the preservation of peace upon the basis of the existing order both in Europe and elsewhere. Neither power ought to place its policy at the disposal of the other, but neither power can be benefited by the serious humiliation or weakening of the other.

A combined attack by France and Russia upon Germany and her allies can only have one of three results: either there will be a long indecisive war or one of the combinations will triumph over the other. Any of these results would be a misfortune for England. The exhaustion of a long war would be a disaster for civilisation; the defeat of Germany would leave England face to face with France and Russia; the defeat of France and Russia would lead to a German ascendency on the Continent of which the ultimate consequence would inevitably be a conflict between Germany and England. Nor can Germany wish to see a great accession of strength to France and Russia consequent upon a war in which those two Powers should humiliate Great Britain. This mutual interest of England and of Germany in the maintenance of each other's position among the great Powers would be expressed in an undertaking that each of them should come to the assistance of the other, in case of an attack upon either by France and Russia in combination.

The necessary guarantee against a misuse of the alliance will be obtained by means of the schedule of

the interests to be defended. But indeed there is little probability that any great Power will wantonly take steps to bring about a war. The dangers of a conflict between the powers are too great. A clear definition by each party of its vital interests cannot be a matter of insuperable difficulty, and when these definitions have been exchanged and approved on both sides, no first-rate statesman will risk his honour and reputation in subtle attempts to trick his ally into a war for some purpose lying outside the true scope of the agreement. At the same time it is well to bear in mind that the negotiation of an alliance of this kind is not a matter to be lightly undertaken and ought not to be entrusted except to a Government which has won by substantial proofs of its appreciation of the national purpose the confidence of the British people. It will be observed that less appears to be required from Germany than from Austria, Italy, or England. It is upon England and Austria and upon England and Italy that must rest in the first instance the defence of European rights in the Black Sea and in the Mediterranean. But the action of these powers requires that the support of Germany shall be assured as a reserve to meet the eventuality of co-operation between France and Russia. Italy cannot resist France at sea even with English help unless she is secured by the alliance of Germany against a French attack by land, and Austria cannot undertake, even with the support of England, to throw herself across

the path of the Russian advance towards the Straits unless the assistance of Germany in case of war is assured to her. This assistance, it should be observed, is not guaranteed by the existing Triple Alliance, which carefully refrains from committing Germany to the support of Austria except in a war in which Austria herself is directly attacked.

The general view that the true interest of Germany will be served rather by an alliance with Great Britain than by opposition to her is confirmed by an obvious analogy. The German nation by its union in the new Empire has attained to a primacy upon the European continent, resembling in many respects that which had been acquired by France at the time when Louis XIV. assumed the government. The aim of German statesmen must be to maintain the influence thus acquired without misusing it in the attempt to convert it into a domination such as would be incompatible with the independence of the other continental States, and with the peace of Europe. Designs such as are sometimes attributed to the German Government for the subversion of the independence of Holland, or for the further territorial extension of the Empire upon the Continent, would probaby lead to the rise of such a general opposition to German policy as confronted the designs of France during the eighteenth century. An attempt on the part of Germany to become the rival of England in a contest for maritime power would have conse-

quences still more disastrous; it would necessarily unite against Germany all the independent Powers of the world. The combination in the hands of the same Government of the greatest military power with the greatest naval force would create an intolerable predominance of which, in modern times, the mere apprehension has always been sufficient to arouse a coalition for the purpose of preventing its becoming a reality. The greatest of German maritime interests is German trade, which has been fostered rather than repressed by the world-wide power of the British navy. There may be individual Germans who cherish the idea of a predominance founded upon the destruction of the British Empire, but it is hardly conceivable that such a conception comes within the scope of the policy of the German Government. If this were the case, it would become the duty of the British Government to study the conditions of a great combination against Germany, and to attempt its formation even at a considerable sacrifice of British interests not vital to the Empire. But to assume that a German Government entertained any such design would involve the belief that the German character has been essentially modified during the lifetime of the present generation. In any case the right way to discover the true intentions of the German Government lies in an offer of the kind of agreement which I have sketched.

The alliance between Great Britain and China and Japan forms an independent treaty, not necessarily connected with those to be negotiated with the European Powers. None of the other Powers have any direct interest in the Far East, where England is the Power in possession of the field, and Russia the Power that seeks to expel her. This is a region in which England's interests and her resources justify her in acting with or without the support of her Continental allies, which would become necessary only in the event of joint action in aggression by France and Russia together.

The system of treaties which has been explained makes no direct provision for the defence of India. No other nation than our own has any but a remote interest in the maintenance of British rule in India, and it is upon the British and Indian armies that the resistance to attack directed against that country must rest. The Indian army, British and native, is efficient, but the British force in that country is on an establishment calculated only to meet the requirements of peace, that is, the preservation of order and the protection of the frontiers against incursions of half-civilised tribes. If the engagements made to the Ameer of Afghanistan are to be fulfilled, a considerable reinforcement of British troops will be required. The alliances contemplated do, however, assist the defence of India very materially by the provision made for the case of aggressive war against

the British possessions undertaken not by Russia alone but by Russia with French support. The defence of India against invasion from the North-west can be successfully conducted so long as the sea is open for the movement of troops from England. This condition cannot be guaranteed with the present force of the navy in a war in which England alone is opposed to Russia aided by France. The entrance into the quarrel on the British side of any Power having a navy must help to turn the balance in Great Britain's favour. The alliance with Japan is valuable from this point of view, and still more valuable as giving the opportunity for an effective counterstroke against Russia in case that Power should resume her advance in Central Asia.

It remains briefly to discuss the question of the justice of the policy here set forth. No power is required by the proposed treaties to act except in defence of interests vital to itself, interests which it ought to defend and would if it could defend without any alliance, with the sole exception of the engagement exchanged between Germany and England to help one another to resist a joint attack by France and Russia. This engagement is justified by the importance to civilisation of the preservation of every great Power, and of the preservation of peace. But not only are the treaty Powers to be committed solely to the defence of their own interests; they are to abstain from any attack upon the established

interests of others. No French interest is to be disturbed. It seems hardly too much to assert that the arrangements proposed will promote the best interests of France. Certain it is that France cannot without danger to herself and without detriment to the cause of civilisation, attempt to reopen the question of the command of the sea; yet in the absence of such an alliance as has been suggested, it has been shown that she will be tempted to do so. The existing colonies of France offer ample scope for her energies, and for so much of her trade as does not find a field in the markets of Europe and of Great Britain and her colonies and dependencies. The greatest benefit that can be conferred upon France must consist in rendering it possible for her, without loss of self-respect, to forget her quarrels with England and her bitter feelings against Germany. The policy which I propose puts a bar on the execution of any design either of attack upon England or of revenge upon Germany. It ought to be accompanied by the most studious consideration for French interests and French susceptibilities on the part of Germany, of England, and of their allies, in all matters where sacrifice of the interests or rights of the allies to French aggression is not required. In this way it may be hoped that France, finding the Russian alliance of no avail to her, will be content to let it drop, and that ultimately the concert of Europe may be so far restored as to allow the allied powers and France to consider to-

gether those European interests which it has so long been the policy of Russia to disturb.

During the period of security obtained by the alliance a prudent British Government would so organise itself for the defence of British interests as to be able, if necessary, upon the expiration of the treaties to reconsider its policy. The nature of this organisation I shall examine in the third book, and in the fourth shall attempt that larger view of England's position in the world from which must come the full justification of the policy now proposed.

BOOK III

THE ORGANISATION OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE DEFENCE OF BRITISH INTERESTS

BOOK III

THE ORGANISATION OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE DEFENCE OF BRITISH INTERESTS

I

DIPLOMACY

THE interests which a British Government has to protect are spread over the whole world. There are possessions in Asia, Africa, and America of which the frontiers may cause troubles. There are British subjects and British property in every country, and in very many countries security both of person and of property depends upon the respect felt by the inhabitants for the power of England. The British Government is in constant communication with every other Government, and you cannot run over in your mind a list of the States in the world without being reminded in almost every case of some question which has been at issue between the foreign Government and our own, or of some possible or probable cause of dispute. Our interests being world-wide in extent

and continuous in duration, their protection involves that our Government shall be unremitting in its attention to what is going on in every part of the globe, and shall be ready at any time to defend a British case against any foreign Government or Governments whatever. So vast a business cannot possibly be carried on without a system. There must be a method of doing the work, a set of principles for its conduct, and an organisation for carrying it on. Organisation is represented by the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service; the method would be embodied in the practice of these departments; and the principles would constitute a theory of foreign policy.

The theory of foreign policy—at any rate, of British policy—is comparatively fresh ground, and the purpose of these essays is rather to stimulate inquiry into the subject than to offer cut-and-dried conclusions. It may, however, not be out of place to call attention to the way in which a theory must be sought, to the kind of questions which must be asked, and to some of the answers which will be given. The only source from which a theory of foreign policy can be drawn is the history of foreign policy, and the history of British foreign policy has yet to be written. The history of our own institutions, of the development of our constitution, or of the changes in our social life will not help us. We require a trustworthy account of the relations between Great Britain and

the other countries, more especially the other nations of Europe. It would be an account of conflicting or convergent interests, of disputes and their settlement, of alliances and wars, and would, at every stage, survey the European situation at that moment and explain the attitude chosen by the British Government and the motives by which our statesmen were guided. Such a story would be a diplomatic history of Europe, a comprehensive account of international relations embracing all the Powers and covering a long period of time. The history of Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has been written in this way by the German historian Ranke, and it is to Ranke's histories of England, France, and Germany rather than to the party controversies of to-day that those who wish to contribute to the strengthening of British policy during the next century should turn. Sir John Seeley in his *Expansion of England* applied what may fairly be called the method of Ranke to British policy in the eighteenth century, and the popularity which that work attained might well serve as a stimulus to attract into the same field some of the many younger men who at present, with all the advantages of modern training, are seeking to win their spurs in the field of letters.

If, even with a very imperfect historical equipment, we ask the question how the British Empire has been created, how British foreign affairs during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were conducted with

such successful results, we cannot avoid reaching certain general answers of practical utility at the present day. England, or, rather, Great Britain, found her independence threatened by the Spanish monarchy. She was compelled to resist, and found herself therefore fighting on the same side as the United Netherlands and France. At a later stage she was compelled to resist the attacks of the French monarchy, and enjoyed the co-operation of Holland and the German Powers. The consequences for England were that in the first struggle she developed a strong navy, and that in the second struggle her navy became so strong as to overpower all others. The inference is that in the defence of British interests two instruments have usually been employed concurrently. There has been a fighting force, the navy, which has been used to destroy the navies of hostile Powers, and there has been a policy which has been so directed as to find allies. In short, the moment the appeal to history is made we discover that the statement constantly repeated by all our politicians at the present day, that England shuns alliances, is in direct contradiction to the facts.

A little reflection on this bird's-eye view of past policy will explain various other phenomena which seem to puzzle many people just now. The first of these is what may be called the unpopularity of England among nations. A long series of attacks upon her compelled her not merely to have a fleet,

but in course of time to destroy all other fleets, and thus to have for many years almost the monopoly both of maritime power and of maritime trade. The result was something very like a monopoly of what we now call Empire in the sense of a great chain of possessions beyond the sea. So long as a number of Continental Powers required our assistance they readily acquiesced in our supremacy at sea, but during the middle of the nineteenth century there have been two important changes in the world. The improvements in navigation have made the sea a far more valuable road than it was before, and have brought the world into a comparatively small space. It is to-day for practical purposes very little larger than Europe alone a hundred years ago. The union of Germany and the union of Italy have made wars in Europe bear a much more dangerous aspect, so that the Continental Powers, in spite of their apprehension, are all of them readier to turn their eyes across the sea than they were before. These two causes have co-operated to make the other Powers more jealous than of old of the British monopoly of the sea. It is, of course, in the true sense of the word, no monopoly, for the British navy has been used not to exclude but rather to protect and assist the trade of other nations, but the Powers may be excused for calling it by that disagreeable name. When their historians look back they also, of course, see the history of Europe as a series of conflicts in which England has been engaged

upon one side or the other; but, under the influence of their present perception of the great advantages of maritime trade and of a Colonial Empire, they are apt to think that England alone reaped the benefit of all their former quarrels. The Frenchman sees that when the French Monarchy and the French Republic tried to domineer at the same time both over Germany and over England, the French lost the chance of becoming the first maritime Power without in the long-run making any substantial gain from Germany. The German perceives that Prussia by the good fight she made in the Seven Years' War, and by her exertions from 1813 to 1815, contributed towards the extension of the British Empire, which is of course no direct advantage to Germany. He is apt to forget that without the far greater exertions of England Prussia would have remained a French province and Germany be non-existent. But these one-sided historical reminiscences, which unfortunately are cultivated with great diligence, especially by German historians, account for a good deal of the ill-feeling towards our own country, and for some of the difficulties which our Government experiences in its negotiations with Continental Powers.

Another general reflection which should be taken to heart is that, however widespread the network of British interests, a quarrel dangerous to Great Britain can arise only with one or more of the Great Powers. A war that can be a serious matter for the Empire

will always, at any rate until the whole balance of civilisation has been altered, be a war with an European Power or with the United States. Apart from the interference of these Great Powers Great Britain can do as she likes in the rest of the world. The defence of the Empire therefore involves the ability and the readiness to compel a Great Power or a combination of Great Powers to accept peace upon Great Britain's terms. The one essential condition of success will always be the power to win a great sea fight, or a series of sea fights, in European waters or in the North Atlantic. This conclusion might seem too obvious and too elementary to be worth noting, yet it seems hardly to have established itself in the minds of those whose grasp of principles of policy we should expect to be the firmest, the members of British Cabinets. Mr. Goschen explained in his speech on the estimates for 1896-7 why the five new ironclads are to be of the 'Renown' type, and not of the 'Majestic' type, the difference being, that in the 'Renown' a sacrifice is made of protective armour in order to obtain a lighter draft. The reason was, that the lighter vessels can go where the deeper ones cannot, and this was understood to mean that the new ironclads are to be able to pass through the Suez Canal. But in a war against a European or an American navy, the battles must be fought in the waters between Port Said and Sandy Hook, and the side that sends battleships away from these waters,

and beyond the Suez Canal, will be giving odds to the enemy. This strategical point is mentioned here, merely as an illustration of the far-reaching importance of a clear and consistent view of questions of policy. Success in war depends more upon sound policy than upon any other factor, and the deeper we go into the inquiry as to the causes of victory, the more clearly does it appear, that good strategy rests as much upon common sense in policy as upon military skill or bravery.

To the theory of policy I shall return in later chapters and content myself for the present with these suggestions as to the nature of the inquiry and its importance, but the questions of organisation and of method require further elucidation. The foreign policy of Great Britain is conducted, in the name of the Queen, and under the responsibility of the Cabinet, by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who is assisted by and exercises authority over the Foreign Office in London and the Diplomatic Service abroad. The Foreign Office is merely an enlargement of the Secretary of State, a bureau or series of bureaux, which assists him in his work. The Queen's representatives abroad are his medium for the transaction of business with foreign Powers, and as the foreign Powers have their representatives in London, communications may pass to a foreign Government, either through the foreign Ambassador in London, or the British Ambassador

in the foreign capital. Generally speaking, the Ambassador is nothing but an agent acting upon instructions. According to the extent of his tact, judgment, and knowledge, he will more or less successfully fulfil the mission entrusted to him, but in every case the decision, the choice of the course to be adopted, rests with the Secretary of State. It is evident that that official requires for the satisfactory performance of his duties something more than personal attainments. The knowledge of foreign countries and of British rights and interests, which must extend to every part of the world, and must cover an indefinite period of time, must be greater than any one man could acquire in the course of a lifetime. The correspondence that must be kept up, and the records which must be preserved and ordered, so as to be at all times accessible, will be such as far to transcend the detailed supervision of any one man. To enable all this work to be done under the control of a single mind, is the purpose of the organisation.

No one who knows anything either of the Foreign Office or of the Diplomatic Service, can fail to recognise the ability and the high character which prevail among the public servants of these departments. If, therefore, there is something lacking in the work of which they are the instruments, it must be attributed, not to personal or individual shortcomings, but to some defect either in the organisation itself, or in the methods by

which its work is regulated. I propose to point out a number of such defects, but let no reader imagine that I am about to make a case for what is called reform, or to find excuses for the action of agitators. The Secretary of State has full authority over the whole system of which he is the head, and any criticisms made upon the diplomatic system are criticisms upon the Secretary of State and upon his predecessors. A strong man at the head of an organisation will take care that that organisation fulfils its purpose, so that where there is something lacking of fulfilment, the inference concerns the strength of the man at the head.

British diplomacy fails first in initiative, secondly, in continuity, and thirdly, in comprehensiveness. Initiative is almost unknown. Among all the difficulties with foreign Powers, which have occurred during the last twenty years, there is no case of a British Foreign Secretary having taken action spontaneously before the matter had been brought to his notice by some action of a foreign Government, and in too many cases it has required very decided action of that kind before a Secretary of State could be induced to move at all. Take the case which has recently occupied so much of our thoughts, that of Venezuela. The frontier of British Guiana has been in dispute for more than half a century, and possibly enough during most of that period, there was no very urgent need to do more towards its definition, than

was attempted by Great Britain; but as long ago as 1887, the interest of the United States Government in the matter was made known to the Secretary of State. The presence of a British Minister or Ambassador at Washington ought to ensure that the Secretary of State is fully aware of the drift of public opinion in America. To observers in the United States, it has long been evident that a strong feeling was growing up hostile to Great Britain, and favourable to the preposterous claims of the Venezuelans. It was surely desirable that steps should be taken in anticipation of the moment when this American feeling should translate itself into serious diplomatic action. Mr. Olney's despatch, which was the beginning of such action, was dated July 20, 1895, Lord Salisbury's replies were dated four months later, and the publication of the British case did not take place till March 6, 1896, eight months after Mr. Olney's despatch. There is nothing secret in the matter. The publication of the British case prejudicially affects no British interests, and the question naturally arises, whether there would not have been great advantages in the publication of the blue-book in March 1895, by which, in all probability, the intervention of the United States would have been prevented, and, failing that, in an earlier reply to Mr. Olney, followed speedily by the blue-book.

The four months' delay in replying to Mr. Olney were probably caused by the careful consideration

given by Lord Salisbury to the subject, and by the deliberation which no doubt took place between the Foreign Secretary and his legal and other advisers. In other words, those four months represent the time taken in considering the question and deciding upon the answer. The four months' further delay are sufficiently accounted for by the labour of preparing the Blue-book. No other explanations could be quite satisfactory, and these serve only to illustrate the worst weakness of the British system. Here was a dispute of fifty years' standing, in which the possibility and even the probability of the interference of a third Power had been evident for eight years, and yet the beginning of that intervention finds the Government so little prepared, that four months are still necessary to concoct the answer, and four more months to put together the evidence upon which the British case is based. Why did not the Foreign Secretary upon first receiving notice of the interest of the United States in the matter—that is, in 1887—at once cause the Foreign Office to prepare a statement of the British case, and place on record in the office, not for publication, but for future guidance, his view of the means by which American interference was to be prevented, or, if it should be offered, to be resisted?

II

INITIATIVE—CONTINUITY—COMPREHENSIVENESS

BRITISH diplomacy fails, I have said, in respect of initiative, of continuity, and of comprehensiveness. Perhaps these failings ought to be attributed to the policy rather than to the diplomacy. Strictly speaking the word policy covers the decisions which a government makes from time to time with regard to its course of action, while diplomacy means rather the machinery by which those decisions are formulated, communicated, and recorded. The faults enumerated involve weakness in the policy, but are discussed under the head of diplomacy, because they are in some measure due to badly-arranged machinery, to defects in the system which can be and ought to be remedied. In the last chapter I gave an illustration of want of initiative. It has never in our time occurred to any Foreign Secretary to take action in anticipation of the action of a foreign Government. Let a foreign Government press a Secretary of State hard enough and it may extract from him some utterance, some

sign of life, possibly even some action. He is capable of reaction under the influence of a stimulus from without, but, at any rate within recent experience, incapable of a spontaneous movement.

Take the case of Siam. The French conquest of Tonkin and Annam was completed in 1886. By that time the British Government was perfectly aware that the French were contemplating the acquisition of Siam, or of a portion of that country. If the machine had been in proper order the Secretary of State, as the director of British Foreign Policy, would have then fully considered the matter and made up his mind. He would not have been in doubt, for no Government since 1886 has been in doubt, that a French acquisition of any part of Siam was an operation contrary to the interests of Great Britain. That being clear he would have considered the means of preventing the undesirable event. There were two ways of doing this—a right one and a wrong one. The wrong way was to wait till the French invaded the country, and then to suggest that they should desist, and that if they persevered the British navy might take the opportunity of making use of its new ironclads and guns. This was the wrong way, because it is always a mistake to allow a matter that can be quietly settled to drift to the stage when effective action may involve fighting, especially if as a fact you are not ready to fight. But this wrong way was actually adopted. Neither party in office did any-

thing until the French invasion of Siam was in progress. Lord Rosebery then used what diplomatists call 'firm language.' The French, however, kept on their course, and the British guns did not go off because they were not ready. The right way was to have made a treaty with Siam in 1886 or in 1887, or at any time up to the close of 1892, by which Siam would have been assured of British protection upon condition of giving proper guarantees against any infraction on her part of existing French rights or interests. Such a course, however, though prescribed by common sense, would have violated the sacred tradition of office, which is, in regard to foreign affairs, never to look ahead, never to think of the future, and never to act until compelled by events. This sacred tradition is a fetich which ought to be destroyed.

The reader who cares to find another instance of waiting upon events may profitably reflect upon recent occurrences in South Africa. The prompt decision to order Dr. Jameson to retire and to declare him an outlaw has been greatly applauded, and was probably in the circumstances correct. But the attitude of the burghers of the Transvaal has been perfectly well known for many years to the British Government, which has also been aware since 1884 that Germany professed great solicitude for so-called German interests in regard both to the Transvaal and to Delagoa Bay. The maxim that a stitch in time saves nine appears to be derived from too humble an

occupation to be worth the consideration of the Secretary of State.

The want of continuity in the conduct of foreign affairs has often been remarked upon, and is usually attributed to the party system, under which a Secretary of State is liable to be succeeded, sometimes at short notice, by a representative of the opposite side. Certain it is that the national interests have suffered on more than one great occasion in the past from the extreme oscillations of the party pendulum. The classical instances of this kind of misfortune are the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and the Treaty of Paris in 1762. Both in the war of the Spanish Succession and in the Seven Years' War the British arms had been eminently successful. In both cases the Ministry which had conducted the war was suddenly overthrown and replaced by a Ministry determined to make peace at any sacrifice. In neither case was sacrifice necessary, and both St. John in 1713 and Bute in 1762 are now considered to have unnecessarily betrayed their country's interests. Harley and St. John threw overboard our ally the Emperor, and Bute left Frederick the Great in the lurch; and it is these two great desertions which more than any other events have caused Continental historians to regard England as an untrustworthy ally. To the unseemly haste of the Ministry of 1713 are due those French rights on the Newfoundland shore which have ever since been a cause of trouble, and Lord Bute in 1762

gave up Cuba and Manilla, which had been conquered from the Spaniards, and allowed the French to retain Pondicherry. I refer to these well-known incidents of what my readers may be disposed to call ancient history to point out that the two great reactions in policy of the eighteenth century were not the results of our democratic system, which is much more modern. The change of Ministry in each case was due to a court intrigue; the sacrifices made for peace and the desertion of our German allies are not attributable to the changeable temper of public opinion, but in the one case to Queen Anne and in the other case to George III.

Nowhere is continuity of policy so requisite as in the beginning, the continuance, and the conclusion of a war. A war should never be undertaken for an object that can be gained without it, and should certainly never be terminated, if the fleets and armies have been victorious, without securing the purpose which was intended, with such additional advantages as may have been justified by the extent and success of the operations. Public opinion is always apt to grow tired of a war while it lasts, and the statesmen who negotiate for its conclusion require to be both clear-headed and firm to prevent the efforts that have been made being thrown away. The Crimean War was undertaken for the defence of Turkey. The arms of the Allies were victorious, but the substantial result gained by the peace was nothing but a promise

from Russia, to which she could be held only by the prospect of a fresh war in case it should be violated. Experience shows that no Power will permanently be bound by a promise not to do that which it has a palpable interest in doing. The condition of peace in 1856 should have been the abandonment by Russia of her territory south of the Caucasus, and the opening, rather than the closing, of the Black Sea.

Shilly-shallying is not unknown even in periods when there is no change of Government. If you neglect the vulgar but thoroughly sound maxim, 'look before you leap,' you may fall into a ditch, and your movements in the endeavour to extricate yourself are just as likely to be retrograde as to be progressive. Mr. Gladstone in 1882 invaded Egypt against his own judgment and conscience, which he endeavoured to appease by the promise to evacuate the country again as soon as possible. It is always a mistake to promise before you have considered the conditions under which your promise must be fulfilled, and it is certain either that Mr. Gladstone's Government had not considered, when they promised to leave Egypt, the state of things which their departure would create, or that if they gave a thought to the matter they forgot the essential facts of the case. The history of General Gordon's mission is an extreme case of alternation between two opposite courses. Another instance is furnished by the declarations made during the last six months in

reference to Armenia. The excuse made is always the same. Circumstances have changed; the action of others—of the Mahdi in one case and of the Emperor of Russia in the other—had rendered it impossible to carry out the original design. But the policy of Russia has never been a secret, and to set out upon a course which could be rendered futile by Russian action such as was not difficult to foresee was to make retreat inevitable. The decision to abandon the garrisons in the Soudan was as certain to evoke a protest at home as the attempt to withdraw them without the use of force to end in failure.

It will be found that the principal cause of vacillation in foreign policy is the habit of procrastination. If you put off making up your mind until circumstances imperatively require you to do something you will be tempted to decide in a hurry, without sufficient knowledge, without proper deliberation, and therefore to decide wrongly. When you have begun to act in accordance with your wrong decision you will discover your mistake and be compelled to change your plan.

The greatest failing, however, is want of comprehensiveness. A Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is continuously dealing with all the Powers in the world, and, as a rule, he has to discuss with each of the Great Powers a number of different questions. He is prone to behave as though his mind were a honeycomb full of pigeon-holes, none of them having any possible communication with any of the others,

and each pigeon-hole occupied by one single transaction with one single Power. This is the reverse of a well-constructed mind, in which the pigeon-holes are organically connected, classified, and grouped together. You have a number of matters at issue with France. There is a long list of what may be called geographical questions—The Newfoundland shore; the boundaries of the settlements on the West Coast of Africa; the frontier of the Niger Protectorate; the treatment of Siam; the question of Madagascar; questions concerning various islands in the Pacific, and the eternal Egyptian question. Then there are matters which hardly admit of geographical distribution—the question of tariffs, of their administration, and of the treatment of British subjects in France, which is very often of a nature to arouse great indignation in this country if the facts were made public. The habit of Secretaries of State is to deal with each of these questions by itself on its own merits, as though none of the other questions existed. Now and then it has occurred to a Minister to put two or three of them together, as in the case, mentioned in the preceding chapter, of the New Hebrides, and as in the case of the Siam treaty, in which the promise of a new commercial treaty in regard to Tunis was included. But no British Minister of the present generation has ever taken together all the questions at issue with any one Power in order to negotiate a settlement of them all. There was, indeed,

a few years ago, a comprehensive agreement with Germany in regard to African matters by which Heligoland was given away, it must be assumed as the price of Germany's goodwill. Subsequent events have proved that Germany's goodwill was not gained, and that one very important African question was not included in the transaction. The conduct of policy requires not merely that all the points under discussion with a single Power shall be constantly held in a single view; it is still more necessary to collect and review together the relations of Great Britain with all the Powers. Indeed it is this comprehensive general view, in which a statesman sees as a whole the relations of his country with all the other Powers in the world, that constitutes the essence of a policy.

There is no better illustration of the bad habit of dealing with an important question by itself, of the danger of disconnecting matters which cannot be separated from one another, than is furnished by the treatment accorded by recent Ministries of both parties to the affairs of Armenia. The condition of that country was one with which the history of the former European provinces of Turkey has made us familiar; it was that of Greece before the Hellenic rising, of Servia before the days of Kara George and of Milosch, of the Herzegovina and of Bulgaria until 1876. The Christian population, forming in certain districts the majority of the inhabitants, were without

rights, and as the Orthodox doctrine of Mohammedanism makes Islam—submission to the Faith—the condition of the possession of any rights, it is impossible for any non-Moslem population under a Mohammedan Government to exist except upon sufferance. The Turks are very tolerant so long as they are the masters; the latitude allowed to the infidels permitted to live among them is considerable; but when their own power is in question they are as relentless as any other depositories of power, and in such cases their religion is as merciless as that of the Hebrew prophet who hewed Agag in pieces before the Lord. The waning power of the Turks, whose Empire during the nineteenth century has from time to time had to be bolstered up by the assistance of the Western Powers, has made them feel that the Christian population of their provinces is a source of possible danger. This consciousness has, of course, not ameliorated the lot of the Rayah, who have seen in the Christian Powers their only protectors, and the appeal of the Rayah to the Powers has always embittered the Turk against them. Accordingly any movement on the part of the Christian inhabitants which could be construed into insurrection has been suppressed with relentless and merciless force. The Treaty of 1878, by which Great Britain undertook, in return for permission to occupy Cyprus, to assist the Sultan in the defence of his frontier in Asia Minor made mention of certain unspecified reforms which

the Sultan was to introduce into his government, and many persons held that the guarantee of the frontier involved a moral obligation to obtain for the Armenians the practical recognition of their rights as the subjects of a more or less civilised Government. The question was how could this be effected.

The only possible way was by some form of constraint laid upon the Sultan, who, as head of Islam, could not possibly introduce legislation admitting rights in those who reject the faith. He might enjoin upon his officers to treat the Christians with special indulgence, but his officers, well knowing that any such edict would scarcely be issued except in deference to the will of a foreign Power, would believe themselves to be fulfilling his real wishes by ignoring it. The only way of giving rights to the Christians is by substituting a Christian for a Mohammedan Government, and the Turks could acquiesce in this only if confronted by their own famous choice between submission and the sword. In other words, the only effective means of helping the Armenians was to threaten the Sultan with the extinction of his power. In that case he would have done what his predecessors have frequently had to do, and sacrificed a province to save the Empire. This course was, however, from the beginning out of the question. Russia regards herself as heir-apparent to those parts at least of the Turkish Empire which border upon her own territory. Russia might have consented to

join in an attack upon Turkey on the understanding that she was at once to take Armenia, and that no other Power should take any other part of the Turkish inheritance. No British Government, however, could have made such a proposal, and in case of an attack upon Turkey under other conditions it was the policy of Russia to defend the Sultan, in whose property she has a reversionary interest. In any case, in the present state of the world it is out of the question that Great Britain alone should upset the Turkish Empire.

If the use of force to constrain the Sultan was out of the question, then the employment of threats which it was impracticable in case of the Sultan's refusal to carry into execution was ridiculous. Still more fatal were bound to be mere remonstrances, to which the Sultan might easily reply either by sullen silence or by counter remonstrances protesting against the British occupation of Egypt, which is nominally a part of his dominions, or of Cyprus, for which the British Government itself pays him tribute. No doubt a collective remonstrance from the Powers of Europe, made upon the understanding that unless the Sultan complied with their wishes the Powers would co-operate in the employment of force, would have produced the desired effect. But such common action was evidently impossible at a time when the Powers are divided into hostile groups armed to the teeth against one another; and, in fact, the mere invitation sent by the British Government to France

and Russia to allow their representatives to join in inquiries about what had happened in Armenia sufficed to make the German Government suppose that England was contemplating a general understanding with the Dual Alliance.

Thus it is clear that the policy pursued in regard to Armenia by Lord Rosebery, by Lord Kimberley, and, until its failure, by Lord Salisbury was based upon an inexcusable shutting of the eyes to the general state of the world, which was the principal factor to be taken into consideration. The right course would have been to have represented to the Armenians in the clearest light the impossibility of helping them, to have advised them to carry submission to its utmost limits, refraining from anything that could be construed as insurrection or as an appeal to any foreign Power, and at the same time, while assuring the Sultan of British support, to have privately appealed to his liberality and clemency to secure the kindly treatment of the Armenian Christians. It may be said that the Sultan is powerless even in his own dominions in a matter of this kind. If that is the case, and I am not prepared to deny it, the moral is that nothing could be done for the Armenians without the destruction of the Turkish Empire, that the collapse of Turkey cannot be far distant, and that the British Government ought, while there is time, to decide upon its course and to prepare for its action in that eventuality.

III

THE FOREIGN OFFICE

A SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs who was anxious for comprehensiveness and continuity in his policy could do much towards securing those qualities by the simple expedient of a rational organisation of his staff. In every foreign capital he has an Ambassador, Minister, or other representative, supported by a number of assistants. It would be reasonable to have in the Foreign Office at home a separate organ, which for the present I will call a sub-department, for each country in which there is a representative. In the case of a great Power the work of a sub-department might employ the energies of several persons, while in the case of small Powers or Powers with whom British relations are insignificant it is possible that a single person might do the work of two or more sub-departments. The business of a sub-department would be not merely to keep up the correspondence with the foreign Government and the record of transactions, but to make a continuous study of the policy of the foreign Power and of British relations with that Power. The sub-department would be a sort of intelligence office in relation

to that country, the Embassy abroad being its principal, though not its only, source of information.

It should be an unalterable rule that the head of the Embassy and the head of the corresponding sub-department in the Foreign Office should each of them every year write an annual report upon the policy of the foreign Government and upon the corresponding portion of British policy. This report ought to take stock of all pending questions whatever between the two nations, to recapitulate all the decisions taken in regard to the several questions, and to make a note of all matters still requiring decision, accompanied by such an explanation of the bearings of these still undecided points as would suggest their proper place in the general scheme of policy in regard to the country dealt with. It should be an absolute rule that every transaction and every communication with a foreign Power should pass through the sub-department to which that Power was assigned.

The sub-departments would be grouped into departments corresponding to groups of nations, the function of the head of a department being to keep a general view of the relations between Great Britain and the Powers covered by his sub-departments as well as between those several Powers. He, too, would be required to frame an annual report, which would be not so much a summary of the reports of his sub-departments as a review of them

in their connection. His business would be to study in their connection the relations between the several Powers entrusted to him.

There would necessarily be a cross classification both of departments and of sub-departments, and that in two ways. International business has to be arranged not merely according to countries, but also according to subjects. There must be a political branch, a consular branch, and a commercial branch, each of them cognisant of all transactions of the kind assigned to it with all countries. Cross classifications of this sort are, of course, necessary in every business, and it is evident that the classification by nations belongs more especially to the political, which is the most important branch. Each political sub-department would be supplied by the consular and commercial branches with so much of their own information as concerned its particular country.

The business of the permanent chief on the political side of the office would be to collect into a single view the relations of Great Britain with all the Powers—not merely to summarise and record, but to study, upon the basis of the work of the several departments, the general policy of the nation. His annual report would be a balance-sheet taking stock of all pending questions, of all decisions made, of all matters still open for decision, and of all issues likely to arise and to require decision. A branch of his office would be a historical bureau engaged in

writing the continuous history of the national policy.

It will be observed that these suggestions take a hypothetical form. The Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service are too little known to outsiders to make it practicable to say that the arrangements are not in fact those here suggested; and it is probably right that the working of these institutions should not be exposed to the public gaze. The public has to judge by results. I infer, however, with a good deal of confidence, that the system here sketched does not in fact exist. The machinery may be there, but if such regulations as have been described for the acquisition of information, for its classification and study, and for comprehensive annual reports or stock-takings were in force there would certainly be some trace of their existence in the many volumes of blue-books which have been published upon foreign affairs. The blue-books hardly ever record more than correspondence or minutes written *ad hoc* to meet some kind of emergency. Annual reports are occasionally found from certain of our representatives abroad, for instance the annual report which Lord Cromer writes upon the condition of Egypt; but of regular reports of the kind here suggested upon the relations with any one country, with any group of countries, or with all the Powers in the world, no trace exists. Again, if the heads of political departments and of the political side of the

office were relieved by sub-departments according to nations of all the details of correspondence and record, they would be at liberty to concentrate their attention on the large questions, the right grasp of which is the most important matter, and to draw up from time to time upon the prospect arising from any new departure, such as the French initiative in Siam or in Madagascar, or the beginning of German Colonial policy, memoranda embodying their view of the bearings of these new undertakings upon the interests and purposes of Great Britain.

The great diplomatists of the Continent—Richelieu, Mazarin, Frederick the Great, and Bismarck—from time to time endeavoured to clear their view, both of the situation with which they had to deal and of the method according to which it was to be treated, by compiling memoranda of this kind.

Consider how the system just described would affect the Secretary of State. The mere perusal of the annual balance-sheet produced by the permanent head of the political branch would oblige him to take a comprehensive view of the national policy, and as any question which he might ask with regard to any particular point would be answered by the production of the historical review of the relations with the Power concerned, and of the last memorandum noting the view previously formed on the subject, he could hardly decide to adopt a different view without being aware that he was making a

breach of continuity. The more the method here proposed is considered, the more far-reaching will its consequences appear to be.

The difficulty of adopting such a system is merely one of expense. The Foreign Office appears to find full employment for its present staff in the ordinary work of correspondence and record. The additional duties of search for information, of its digestion, and of constant general supervision, as well as of historical composition, would require a considerable addition to the numbers of persons employed. The additional staff must, of course, be composed of men of the best education as well as of the highest character, and such men ought to be liberally paid. The most important work done for Government is, unfortunately for the country, by no means as well paid as it might be. A man of good training and first-rate ability can often command a much larger income from services to a private company or from his own enterprise in a profession than from services rendered to the State, and it is not altogether good for the public service that this should be the case. Take an extreme view of the requirements of diplomacy, and suppose that it were necessary to increase the Estimates by as much as £200,000. An outlay of this amount is not worth a moment's consideration where the national welfare is in question. It is hardly a quarter of the cost of a single battle-ship. It does not approach the cost of

the smallest military expedition, and it is beyond doubt that any means which will give even the probability of a more continuous and far-sighted direction of British policy would save a far greater sum than that here named by removing those oscillations of purpose which cause parsimony to alternate with extravagance in military and naval preparation.

The same system, the introduction of which will be a security against sudden change or chance ideas in the treatment of matters of policy, will also of itself tend to promote initiative. A Secretary of State, upon looking over a table showing him all the pending questions and all the questions likely to come up, and having at his elbow an organisation for the purpose of studying such questions, will be sure to set that organisation in motion. He will have the means of making up his mind with regard to approaching difficulties before the moment for action has arrived, and if, as we may assume, he has good business habits, will make some kind of note or cause some kind of note to be made of the conclusions which he reaches.

The Secretary of State does not stand alone. His authority is limited by the responsibility of the Cabinet. He cannot take any important decision without communication with his colleagues or without their approval, and in very many cases his greatest difficulty is to carry them with him. The right way to do this both from his point of view and from theirs is to

bring a question before the Cabinet at an early stage of its history. The system which has here been suggested will enable him, soon after the first signs of a new departure in any part of the world, to lay before his colleagues of the Cabinet a statement of the nature of the anticipated change, a review of its bearings upon the general policy of the country and upon the interests of the Empire, accompanied by his own view, arrived at after due study, with the assistance of his staff, of the course which he recommends to the consideration of the Government. With these materials before it the Cabinet will be able to form a deliberate judgment, and the Secretary of State, after consultation with his colleagues, will be able to deposit in the archives of the Foreign Office, not merely a project of policy in relation to such a matter as, for example, the newly revived design of Russia in regard to Manchuria and Korea, but a statement of the policy in regard to that subject approved by her Majesty's Government. He will then be in a position to carry on his further inquiries and to continue his study of the problem with a firmer hand and a more decided mind than would otherwise be possible.

There is great advantage in the consultation of the Cabinet at an early rather than at a late stage of any new movement. The problem of national policy looked at as a whole always involves not merely the consideration of the object to be pursued, but that of

the means by which it is to be attained. You must from time to time review not merely your wishes but your forces, and the diplomatic defence of British interests is inseparable from the naval and military arrangements for their defence in case of war. Every fresh decision in policy requires that the Secretary of State for Foreign affairs should compare notes with the First Lord of the Admiralty and with the Secretary of State for War. To make a decision which you are not prepared to carry through is to pave the way for revoking your decision as soon as the Power with which you are dealing shows a firm front. It is therefore necessary to hold the balance between the objects which you are determined to pursue and the means at your disposal for their attainment. Your policy must at every stage go hand in hand with your naval and military preparations. You must not only know what you want, but you must count the cost. And undoubtedly there are in very many cases objects desirable enough in themselves, British interests which, regarded in isolation, seem worth asserting, but which, when considered in relation to the effort which would be needed for their successful maintenance, wear a different aspect. Interests like these are, however, useful pawns in diplomacy. You take good care, if you can, not to let the other Power perceive that you are ready to sacrifice them, and by that means you get the best price that you can for the sacrifice when it comes.

The consideration that the director of policy must always be in touch with the political directors of the navy and army is a sufficient reason for the early consideration by the Cabinet of all new international issues. Not only may a new development in policy involve modifications in the defensive system of the Empire, but fresh developments in the armament of other Powers may react upon British policy. If, as is obvious, time is required to modify a policy in order to meet a new situation, a much longer time is required to develop or to modify naval and military preparations with a view to the execution of a modified policy. The ministers holding authority over the fighting services require the most ample warning of any probable change in the international situation in order to give time for their subordinates fully to consider its strategical bearings, to work out the alterations necessary in their existing arrangements, to obtain the votes of money necessary for such alterations, and, finally, to carry out the designs covered by those votes. All this preliminary labour is quite indispensable for a Government which is to act with firmness and thereby to win, not only the confidence of its own people, but the respect of other nations.

A brief explanation will now be in place in regard to the word sub-department, which has for convenience been used in the description of the system proposed. The object of a good system is the classi-

fication of the business not at random, but with a view to secure that it shall be dealt with in such a manner as to facilitate continuity and comprehensiveness of treatment. It is necessary first of all to arrange that all the transactions with a single country, the whole of the policy relating to that country, shall be taken into a single view. There is only one way to secure this. All these transactions must pass through a single mind.

In the case of a Great Power like France it is probable that the task of drafting and recording the correspondence would in itself be too great for one man, to say nothing of the additional research and study. But, however many assistants were required, one single person, the head of the sub-department, should be made responsible to the Secretary of State for supervising or being cognisant of all the business done with France. This person will of course have no authority except as to the methods pursued within his own office. He will sign no despatches, will make no decisions. His business will be to know all about the policy of France and the policy of Great Britain in relation to France; to constantly think about the subject, to supply all the information that is required, and to prevent any important consideration from being forgotten by the Secretary of State. He will be the sub-department, any assistants that he has being merely expansions of himself, and working under his guidance and according to his instructions.

In the case of less important countries—such, for example, as Chili, or Greece, or Liberia, it might very well be practicable to charge one and the same man with the supervision of the relations with two or more of them. The word sub-department is therefore perhaps not strictly applicable, but English administrative terminology hardly supplies the word required.

We are prone to think of any department of Government as a sort of corporation with some kind of vague community of responsibility. But in an efficient system there can be no joint responsibility. For every act done in any department or division of a well-organised office the head of the department or division is alone responsible to his superior. If anything goes wrong in the department he is to blame, and cannot clear himself except by proving that the mistake was made by one of his assistants acting either without his authority or in disobedience to his instructions. Organisation really means the classification of the work to be done, and its distribution among a number of men in such a way that no necessary work is omitted, and that there can be no doubt who is the man charged with any particular duty. This kind of classification and the law that the duties should be grouped naturally, rationally, or scientifically, are given by the merest common sense. The art lies in making the classification correspond with the purpose for which the

business is carried on, and in giving every important point of view into the charge of a special officer. We have, for instance, a great many Consuls to watch over, and we, therefore, have a Consular Department in the Foreign Office, but from the point of view of policy it is of the greatest importance to keep together everything that concerns our relations with a particular country, and therefore unless we are prepared at a critical moment to be without a comprehensive and continuous view of those relations we must have for each important country an officer specially charged with keeping such a view. In the same way there is no guarantee that the Government shall always have a general combined survey of our relations with a group of Powers, or with all the Powers, unless the maintenance of such a survey is the special duty of some capable person.

IV

THE PRIME MINISTER

Our inquiry into the nature of the organisation by which the foreign affairs of Great Britain are conducted cannot end with the Foreign Office, for the Foreign Secretary is a member of the Cabinet, to which he is responsible. Hardly any political subject has been more obscured by the inexactitude of slovenly expression than the nature and the working of the Cabinet. The matter is not without difficulty, for the usage is not perfectly known except to those who have themselves been Cabinet Ministers. Moreover, the usage varies from time to time—the process of development is constantly going on. The most recent exposition by a competent hand is given in Mr. Morley's *Life of Walpole*, which, as far as it goes, may be taken as a safe guide, subject always to the qualification that it was published in 1889, and that the process of development has not been arrested during the subsequent seven years.

The Cabinet is a committee selected by the Prime Minister from the members of his own party. The Prime Minister is said to be chosen

by the King, but in this, as in almost all Constitutional matters, the formal language which it is customary to employ fails exactly to correspond with the actual facts. It describes the practice of a past age which has gradually fallen into disuse; the language and the forms may be fifty years old, a hundred years old, or several centuries old, and for this reason the formal language of the Constitution usually conceals rather than reveals the true nature of the modern practice. 'In practice,' says Mr. Morley, 'the choice of the Crown is pretty strictly confined to the man who is designated by the acclamation of a party majority.' Where the party does not clearly know its mind the influence of the Crown comes into play, but when the party has a well-recognised leader the selection is marked out in advance. 'The Prime Minister, once appointed, chooses his own colleagues and assigns to them their respective offices.'

The committee thus formed wields the whole authority of government. In formal constitutional language the authority of the Crown in all executive matters is exercised only through the Cabinet. Here, again, the conventional phrase is a little out of date. Authority is always attributed to the Crown, but as it can be exercised only through the Cabinet the distinction is not for our present purpose essential, and would require investigation only in the improbable case of a strong difference of opinion between the

King and the Ministry. Much more important are the relations of an individual Cabinet Minister, on the one hand to his colleagues, and on the other hand to the department over which he presides and the relation of the Cabinet as a whole to the House of Commons. The Cabinet has full authority over every department of Government, and each single Minister wields that authority in behalf of the Cabinet over the department entrusted to his supervision. The individual Minister carries on the work of a particular department, and for that department he is answerable or responsible to his colleagues in the Cabinet. The Cabinet itself in turn is answerable or responsible to the House of Commons. 'Responsibility to the Crown,' says Mr. Morley, 'is slowly ceasing to be more than a constitutional fiction . . . the only real responsibility is to the House of Commons.' But this responsibility of the Cabinet is a joint responsibility. 'As a general rule every important piece of departmental policy is taken to commit the entire Cabinet, and its members stand or fall together. . . . The Cabinet is a unit. . . . Its views are laid before the Sovereign and before Parliament, as if they were the views of one man. . . . The first mark of the Cabinet, as that institution is now understood, is united and indivisible responsibility.'

Thus, for each departmental act the Minister at the head of the department has the express or implied concurrence of his colleagues, and the censure of the

House of Commons upon any such act would lead not to the dismissal of the Minister, but to the resignation of the Cabinet. A Cabinet Minister can do as he pleases in his own department, provided only that he can bring about the acquiescence of his colleagues in his wishes. So long as that is secured the House of Commons cannot effectually interfere with him except by turning out the whole Cabinet. 'In case of differences arising between departments it is to the Prime Minister that the appeal lies, and the regular course for a Minister who is dissatisfied with his chief's decision is to retire,' but 'the Sovereign has a right to demand the opinion of the Cabinet as a court of appeal against the Prime Minister or any other Minister.' That is to say, a Minister who wishes to take an independent course and is confronted by opposition within the Cabinet may appeal to the Prime Minister, and, failing his support, may appeal to his colleagues as a body. If he fails he must either submit or resign, and if he carries his point against the Prime Minister he will break up the Cabinet. It is not considered correct to say that the Prime Minister has authority over his colleagues, but his great influence over them, due to the fact that he is their leader and has selected them, is strengthened by the practice of acquainting him with all projects of importance in any department and with all important business to be submitted to the Cabinet. 'With the Foreign Secretary he is in close and continuous

communication as to the business of the Foreign Office. Foreign affairs must always be the matter of continuous thought in the mind of a Prime Minister.' It is evident that there is no such thing as the direct responsibility of a Cabinet Minister for the business of his department to the House of Commons. His personal responsibility is to his colleagues, but when he confronts the House of Commons they are by his side and share his responsibility. On the other hand his authority over his department is unlimited so long as his colleagues approve of his action.

The immediate object of this inquiry is to ascertain how the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is affected by his position in the Cabinet. Mr. Morley dwells upon the necessity for a close intimacy between the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister, and in recent years the practice has been, with some interruption, for the Prime Minister himself to be at the head of the Foreign Office. It can hardly be doubted that, if and so long as the foreign policy of the country is the matter of most urgent national concern, this practice should be followed, and a review of the history of the last three centuries shows that the periods when the relations of Great Britain with the rest of the world lapse into an inferior degree of urgency are transitory and occasional. The management of these relations is the very nerve and essence of the nation's business. The nation is carrying on at various points spread over the whole world a con-

tinuous work of trade, of settlement, and of the education, by means of just government, of races to which that boon has long been denied. At home it is accumulating wealth as the means of a better education, a better social order, a higher life for each and all. These efforts require to be constantly protected against interference from outside. It is the business of the Government to watch them with a view to this protection, to detect in advance every design of interference, to avert such interference, if possible by negotiation, and to resist it, if necessary, by force.

No one is so well able as the Minister specially charged with this watchfulness to foresee and to measure the assaults which it may be necessary to resist. In other words, no one but the Foreign Secretary can rightly gauge the extent and character of a probable or impending war. No one but he can properly estimate what should be the standard of naval and military preparation. Upon the due observance of this standard depends the success with which British interests can be defended, either by diplomacy resting upon adequate force, or in the extreme case by the use of that force.

The Foreign Secretary, therefore, ought to be a person of great influence over his colleagues at the Admiralty and at the War Office, and that condition is best fulfilled by his being Prime Minister. No one can so well maintain the harmony between the various members of the Cabinet as its chief, and it must not

be forgotten that while the Foreign Secretary, at any rate in troubled or uneasy times, will be led to place as high as possible the standard of preparation for naval or other war, the Chancellor of the Exchequer will at all times be prone to think the standard too high. The end should determine the means, and it is better to give the greater influence to him whose business is to look at the end. A Prime Minister who is Foreign Secretary will, better than any other, overcome the objections of a Chancellor of the Exchequer to necessary expenditure on the army and the navy, and a Foreign Secretary who is Prime Minister will be compelled, as no other Foreign Secretary could be, to give due weight in the shaping of his policy to considerations of expense. He will be more likely to count the cost than a Foreign Secretary whose interest is entirely absorbed in the policy he would like to carry out.

The welfare of a nation cannot be cut up into departments. A community is a living thing which must be treated and considered as a whole. It is one body, and if there is disease in any part the whole body is sick. Even this old-fashioned analogy is too narrow. Short of the community which embraces all mankind, a nation is the highest expression of human life, and every human life, however many-sided, is one and indivisible. You may subdivide it in contemplation; you may speak separately of the soul and the body, the mind and

the will, the character and the affections; you may distinguish between a man's business and his pleasures and between his character and his career, but in reality all these things go together, and are conditioned by one another. So it is with the nation. Its prosperity and wealth involve a guidance in which all the various elements that go to make them up are held together, and, as it were, fused in a single mind. This comprehensive view should be that of the Prime Minister in consultation with the Cabinet. We are all familiar in our own lives with the condition which I have tried here to describe. We know that the prosperity of a man's household depends upon his activity in the service of his fellows, and that his own well-being depends upon and takes his character from his exertions. If he sits at home absorbed in himself or in his studies, he is apt to become flabby and indolent, and out of touch with his fellows. If he gives himself wholly to outside affairs, his home life and his affections suffer. A nation is in much the same case. Home affairs and foreign affairs act and react upon one another. Too much absorption in the one brings with it neglect of the other, to be followed sooner or later by a reversion to the opposite extreme.

I have often asked myself, though without finding any conclusive answer to the question, whether in the last great war with France England did not unnecessarily over-exert herself. I suspect that a clea

view of her insular position, and a true insight into the working of her maritime power, might have induced her Ministers, after the battle of Trafalgar, or, at any rate, after the capture of the Danish Fleet, to have kept clear of the Continental war, and to have been content with retaining the control of the sea. The many military expeditions had from the beginning most of them been failures, and, though Wellington's operations in the Peninsula dazzled the public eye by the splendour of the victories gained, I cannot convince myself that even without Wellington's operations the Continental nations would not, with little longer delay than they actually required, have combined successfully for the overthrow of the French domination, and that the British Navy rightly employed would not have been a sufficiently effective help without either the costly expeditions by land or the almost equally costly subsidies.

This view, which I admit to be heretical, and which I hold merely by way of hypothesis, is favoured by some of the strategical opinions of two of our greatest seamen. Nelson, in 1796, felt sure that if the naval force at his disposal had been slightly larger he would have been able with naval force alone to prevent the French invasion of Italy; and a few years later Cochrane, afterwards Lord Dundonald, was equally convinced that with a comparatively small squadron he could have rendered impossible the French invasion of Spain. A great part of the national debt

which still weighs heavily upon us was incurred in military expeditions and subsidies between 1807 and 1815. A more purely maritime policy at that epoch would have been far less costly and would have perfectly secured every British interest, while no one acquainted with the history of the Continent since 1814 can doubt that the interference of England at the Congress of Vienna was beneficial neither to herself nor to the other Powers, whether they had lately been her allies or her enemies.

According to this view, England, for many years after the death of Pitt, meddled more than was necessary with the affairs of the Continent, and in doing so overstrained her powers. To such an excessive strain might be attributed the deplorable prostration of subsequent years and the utter incapacity to grasp the true conditions of national welfare which was evinced by the successors of Pitt, in forgetfulness of that Minister's earlier home policy, during the period between the Congress of Vienna and the first Reform Bill, if indeed the period of ill-conducted domestic policy ought not to be carried down to the year 1846. At that date begins the reaction of which Cobden and Bright were the best representatives. Attention was entirely concentrated upon domestic affairs, and the neglect of this branch during the earlier period was made up for by a spell of unprecedented almost feverish legislative activity. Our relations with the rest of the world were utterly forgotten except when

the inconvenient action of some foreign Power gave us a rough reminder of its existence, and the Liberal Party, which owed its success to its being the original exponent of the need for legislative reforms, almost adopted as part of its creed the impossible motto of Cobden that there should be 'no foreign policy.'

I have described at some length these great swings of the pendulum in order to consider how their repetition may best be avoided. The change for which I look will come so soon as the Foreign Office is entrusted to a statesman with an idea. The statesman is still to seek. It depends entirely upon the nation whether or not he is found. He will not make the idea; on the contrary the idea will make him. For ideas are not arbitrarily constructed, they are natural growths springing up of themselves and irrepressible. The root from which a true British policy will spring is the idea of the nation and of its work in the world to which we give the name of Empire. The man who can lead the nation and unite the Empire will have emancipated himself from the yoke of party by thinking of England. He will have traced the growth of her greatness and the nature of her power. He will have lived alone, absorbed in the effort to grasp the course of the world. His imagination will have watched as a thing apart the turning globe, the field of history. He will have perceived in its watery envelope the great occasion for daring, for invention, for communication, for civilisation, the

road which brings the races of mankind together, and the control of which is three-parts of the government of the earth. He will have followed the struggles in the course of which Englishmen gained that control, and the consequent spread of British power upon the fringe of every sea. He will have lived, too, among his fellows, and will have inhaled the breath of life that stirs the Empire. He will have seen the restless energy of settlers in new countries, making Britain greater from year to year. He will have watched the silent work of England's servants in the East; the judge, the tax-collector, the planter, living, among men of alien race and faith and under a burning sun, the English life that they have lived at home of truth and duty. He will have perceived in the recognition by Buddhist, Hindoo, and Moslem of the strength of an English purpose, that upon them is dawning the knowledge of a humanity higher than that which their fathers left them, and will see in the education of the East a task set before his country not less momentous than that settlement of the West which she has already in great part accomplished. With unbounded confidence in his country's energy and devotion, and knowing that her task of colonisation, if not completed, has been carried to the point at which its fulfilment is secured, he will turn to that other missson of uplifting the long-suffering races of the East, and will see in the management of British

relations with the Great Powers of Europe the means of maintaining the control of the ocean highway, and of securing that England in future shall be in the East, what she long was in the West, the great pioneer, the upholder of law, the preserver of peace, the leader of mankind.

No man who is possessed with the idea of the nation is in the least degree likely to neglect necessary legislation or proper administration for the sake of adventures abroad, nor will he by any consideration of popularity or of party be induced to relax his vigilance in the protection of the British interests entrusted to his charge. The danger is that the right man may come too late, for he ought to be at work in peace and to have charge of the national policy in time to avert the kind of crisis which, if his appearance were too long delayed, would compel him to begin his career by the conduct of a great war. Lord Rosebery has told us how the younger Pitt, in March 1791, was led to turn his back upon Europe. He wished to interfere in the Russo-Turkish war which was then going on in order to prevent the town of Otchakov from becoming Russian territory. He discovered, after he had begun to negotiate for the co-operation of other Powers, but before he was finally committed to action, that the policy which he contemplated would be exceedingly unpopular, and he therefore precipitately abandoned it. Lord Rosebery considers that in these

circumstances Pitt had good reason for turning his back upon Europe. 'He had been compelled to swallow a mortification that his proud spirit could not easily forget. He had learned that in foreign affairs Parliament is an unknown quantity, and that in Great Britain the immediate certainties of trade generally outweigh the most elaborate views of ultimate advantage.' I am inclined to believe that Pitt made a mistake, and that the followers whose support he was afraid to lose were wiser than he. No one looking back upon the affair now considers that the preservation of Otchakov to Turkey was an object sufficient to justify Great Britain's undertaking a war, and, so far from Parliament having failed to understand Pitt in the matter, it seems probable that Pitt had failed to explain himself.

No British Foreign Minister, no British Government, ought to conduct British affairs in the dark. Parliament and the country ought to be kept familiar with the main lines upon which policy is conducted, and with all the principal decisions. Any other course may at any time lead to disastrous results. A nation will not carry on war vigorously and effectively without confidence in and even enthusiasm for its cause, and to spring a war unexpectedly and without explanation upon the British public is likely to bring about either the fall of the Minister or a painful division in the country at the time when it ought to be united. Pitt's turning his back upon Europe was a rush to an

extreme of which the consequence was that events in a few years drove him to the other extreme. A great statesman's ambition is not to be a great war minister nor to be a great peace minister, but to secure the welfare of his country under all circumstances, to make the most of peace so long as it can be preserved, and not to shrink from war whenever it becomes necessary.

V

THE PROBLEM OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

WHEN a statesman has been recognised by the nation as deserving its confidence he will not be long in finding his place at the head of the Government. He will form a Cabinet of men like-minded with himself, inspired by the idea of which he is the exponent, and looking up to him as their trusted leader and friend. Let us now watch that government in action. We can do so with considerable certainty, for we know precisely what such a government must do. It will assuredly not trouble itself with the views or theories of any sect or clique, but will consider simply what common sense prescribes for the welfare of the nation and the prosperity of the Empire.

We may pass over the whole field of legislation and civil administration, not because it is no part of an inquiry into the national policy, but because experience shows that great legislative and social changes are the outcome of a gradual development of public opinion and feeling. They cannot be introduced by the fiat of authority, and can neither be prevented nor long retarded when once conviction that they are neces-

sary has ripened in men's minds. The domestic problem which England has to solve is at present social rather than political, but, though we are all aware that this is its character, no solution as yet propounded commands the assent of more than a small sect. A wise government, therefore, will for a long time to come refrain from legislation, which would needs be either experimental or doctrinaire, and will content itself with the endeavour to fertilise the extra-Parliamentary discussion of social questions by promoting to their proper place in the system of public instruction the historical or political sciences.

Apart from foreign relations the political problems which are at present the most urgent and which are likely to retain their urgency concern the relation of Great Britain to the other members of the Empire. The government which we contemplate will perceive that neither social development at home nor the happy settlement of the question of Imperial unity is possible without security from attack, and will make that security its first object.

Accordingly, the first business of such a Cabinet as has been described will be to take stock of the world and of the position of the Empire, to consider well every probability which they perceive of opposition to British purposes from any quarter, and of infringement upon British rights by any Power, as well as every likelihood of mutual support which may be afforded to each other by Powers thus in opposition

to Great Britain. They will strike out as insignificant whatever quarrels may be healed by reasonable and timely concession. Those which remain will represent a balance of danger for which provision must be made.

The Cabinet will next take stock of the means of defence. This is the point at which every Cabinet of our time has failed of its duty. There may have been Governments that have considered the subject of defence; there has been none which has inspired the nation with a reasonable confidence in the success of its endeavours. Every Government, without exception, since 1870 has in this matter relied upon what is vulgarly known as the confidence trick. Their position has been: 'We are a committee of capable and patriotic men; the organisation of defence is our first duty; therefore you may be quite sure that the defence of the Empire is in order.' Declarations which when analysed are tantamount to this have been so often either accompanied or speedily followed by palpable and notorious evidence that the defences were not in order that they have ceased to carry conviction. A Cabinet led by a great statesman or even a Cabinet controlled by common sense and duty would begin by satisfying itself on the subject and then communicate to the nation the grounds of its satisfaction.

The first step is to ascertain how much navy and how much army are required. A civilised army to be

resisted can come only from Europe or from America, and can reach the British Empire by land only in India or in Canada, while to any other part of the Empire it can proceed only by sea. An army crossing the sea must be met, not by another army, but by a navy. The Empire then requires an army sufficient to protect India or Canada against land attack, or, if there is a probability that both these attacks might be simultaneous, an army sufficient to resist both at once. That gives us one item in the programme.

The navy must be able to prevent any army crossing the sea to attack British territory. The commander of an enemy's army will never go to sea except under the protection of his own navy. The British navy, therefore, before attacking his army must defeat his navy, and that must be effected before the army has completed its journey across the sea. If the British navy is strong enough to be able in war to sink, destroy, capture, or otherwise effectually dispose of any navy that could escort an attacking army there is very little chance of an army adventuring itself on the sea to make its attack. In the past Great Britain and the Empire have been defended by a navy acting in this way. Naval officers and naval strategists appear to be agreed that this is the best way to protect the British Empire, though of course they are further agreed that if you have such a navy it is very convenient also to have a small but vigorous army which, after you have cleared away

the enemy's fleets, may be landed on the enemy's territory for the purpose of annoying him. This gives us a second item in the military standard, and the first part of the standard of strength for the navy, which must be strong enough to have a good chance of defeating and destroying any hostile navies.

This part of the standard is purely a matter of observation and professional calculation, observation to discover the forces of existing navies, and calculation to ascertain what proportion is requisite to give a good chance of defeating a navy of given strength. If we may have war with a given Power our navy must be prepared to give us victory over the navy of that Power; if with two Powers a victory will be wanted over their combined navies; if with three over all three navies, and so on. The Foreign Secretary's business is to say which Power or what combination of Powers is to be the basis of calculation, while the observation of the navies thus designated and the calculation of the naval force required for victory over them are the affair of the Admiralty.

During the contest we must protect our commerce and maintain our influence in various remote parts of the globe. A certain force to be specially devoted to these purposes will form a second item in the standard, and it goes without saying that the provision of a naval force corresponding to a given standard implies the provision of docks, arsenals, coaling stations, and protected harbours at such

points in the various seas as a sound naval judgment thinks requisite. From this follows a third military function, to be performed either by the soldiers of the War Office or by those of the Admiralty—the marines—consisting in such military defence as is required for these docks, arsenals, coaling stations, and harbours. This survey appears at first sight to be exhaustive, that is to say, if all the requirements which have been enumerated could be perfectly fulfilled, nothing more would be necessary; the Empire would be completely defended; it is therefore convenient here to collect, under headings, the requirements as yet ascertained. They are:—

A Navy able

(1) Thoroughly to defeat the navies of any enemy or enemies.

(2) At the same time to patrol the sea for the protection of British trade.

Military Forces—

(1) To repel attack by land upon India or Canada.

(2) To garrison certain ports used by the navy, which may be done either by soldiers or by marines, according to convenience.

(3) To be landed by way of counter-stroke upon an enemy's territory, after the success of the navy has cleared the sea for military transport.

There remains the question of the military defence of Great Britain, the question whether it is necessary to maintain in Great Britain an army for the purpose of repelling invasion, and if so, what should be the force and what the degree of readiness of that army. This is the principal controverted point in regard to the defence of the Empire. The controversy is perhaps to some extent artificial. There are two sides which may fairly be called the naval and the military, and the advocates of each in the course of the discussion are apt to overstrain their point and perhaps to say more than they really mean. But the expressions used, sometimes by naval and military officers of high repute, are repeated and affect the public mind.

Of late years, for example, the startling opinion appears to have been expressed by a number of army officers that the tasks here assigned to the navy cannot be fulfilled by a navy—that though you can count upon an army doing its work you cannot count upon a navy doing its work. From this they infer that even the most perfect naval preparation will not make Great Britain, still less any other part of the Empire, secure against the presence of an invading army, and that, therefore, because you cannot trust the navy to do its own work, you must maintain in Great Britain an army large enough to defeat an invading army.

I have called this a startling opinion because it

implies the impossibility of a command of the sea and of an Empire like our own, which rests upon the kind of naval supremacy which that phrase describes. The language used in support of this strange paradox of the impotence of a navy is hardly consistent. In a recent lecture the defensive function of an army at home was summed up in the following terms: 'To render it impossible for an enemy to land in the United Kingdom without the certainty of defeat, thereby freeing the navy for its proper sphere of operations—the enemy's coast line and the routes of seaborne commerce.' This is one of the passages in which the extreme paradoxical theory appears to be maintained, and it has been quoted by others than its author in support of that extreme theory, but it may well be doubted whether its author would adhere, if pressed, to the words quoted and would not admit that they implied more than he was deliberately prepared to assert. The lecturer hardly explained, nor do I understand how, if the British navy is operating near the enemy's coast—that is, watching the enemy's ports and fighting the enemy's fleets when they come out—the enemy's army, embarked as it must be on a huge fleet of transports, is to escape the notice of that watchful British navy and the destruction which it is the function of that British navy to deal.

If, however, the navy falls short of the standard already described, then no doubt its operation will be

facilitated by the possession of an army at home. Suppose, for instance, that the navy has been prepared according to the standard required for victory over two maritime Powers, and that we suddenly find ourselves involved in a war not only against those two Powers, but also against a third Power likewise possessed of a navy; in that case our navy, though it would probably be superior in numbers to those of two of the enemies, might very well be numerically inferior to the combined navies of all three. The Government would then have to make a difficult decision. By concentrating the whole navy at some point near home, they would make sure of preventing invasion unless and until their concentrated fleet had been defeated in a decisive battle. But by so doing they would leave the three hostile navies at liberty to meet together and combine, and so to have good prospect of success in the decisive battle—a success which would render possible the invasion of Great Britain. On the other hand, if the Government should decide at once to attack with very superior force one or two of the hostile navies, temporarily neglecting the third, they might hope in time to come out victorious from the war, and thus to save the Empire. But during the period when the third navy was unopposed, or was confronted only by an inferior British squadron, unable to fight it, though possibly able to watch it, that third navy might be employed to cover the transport of an army. During

that period, therefore, there would be great danger of invasion, and the fear of invasion might compel the Government to lose its one opportunity of securing naval victory. If there were, however, an efficient army at home the Government would be well advised to risk the chances and the dangers and all the temporary suffering of an invasion of Great Britain in order to obtain the ultimate success which must inevitably result from victory at sea.

This contingency of attack by a larger combination of enemies than has been made the basis of the standard of naval preparation appears to be possible if not probable. There is also the possibility, even with a well-prepared navy, of misfortune and consequent defeat, not necessarily decisive or final, and in that event also the possession of an army at home, the possibility of successful resistance to an expedition for the invasion of England, would be of the utmost advantage. For these reasons, which are hardly identical with those occasionally put forward by the extreme military party, there should be an efficient army, an efficient military force in Great Britain beyond what is required for a military counterstroke after a naval victory. The public ear is sought by two opposite schools, both alike tending to an extreme. The partisans of a certain military school sometimes speak as though they would base military preparations on the theory that the navy is non-existent or helpless. A certain naval school seems to

hold that Great Britain can be adequately protected even by a navy not strong enough to defeat the fleets of the enemy. Common sense would avoid these extremes, would admit with the naval officers that a perfect navy would be a perfect defence, but would recognise that perfection is not always attained in practice, and that some military provision for imperfect naval success is desirable; but common sense would also remind us that our past history justifies a large measure of confidence in naval power, and that we may provide a reasonable military insurance against the unforeseen without attempting to rival those great armies which necessarily form the mainstay of the defence of Continental States.

The first business of a statesman in earnest and of a strong Government will be to reach a definite and satisfactory settlement of the large issues at the basis of national defence, which I have reviewed in order to show their nature and the wide differences of opinion which at present exist in regard to them. At the present moment the Commander-in-Chief of the army appears to incline towards that school of military thought which is most at variance with the naval strategists in regard to the fundamental question of the respective functions of the two services in Imperial defence. Is it to be wondered at that all attempts to elicit from the members of the Government a statement of their theory of the defence of the Empire have been in vain, and that in

the prevailing confusion of thought expenditure has been enormously increased without the public having been brought in the slightest degree nearer conviction that the Empire is, in fact, ready for any emergency that may arise?

The uncertainty extends far beyond the fundamental question of the function of the army. Even in the army itself there are contradictory opinions upon matters of the greatest Imperial importance. The best of our Indian generals, presumably the most competent judges on the subject, are of opinion that the defence of the North-west Frontier ought to be conducted by blows delivered at the enemy before he comes too near to the present administrative border, and that to enable those blows to be struck with effect the Indian army must be largely reinforced from home; but more than one Secretary of State for War, acting it would appear upon the advice of other generals less familiar with India and its conditions, have given the Indian Government to understand that, in case of war with Russia, India must expect no such reinforcements. This and other questions, notably those concerning the application of the short service system to Imperial conditions, are too often discussed in a partisan fashion. The debaters upon each side sometimes behave like advocates of a theory, as though the only thing that mattered was that their doctrine should be right, as though in comparison to the victory of

their party in the dispute the preservation of the Empire was of no moment. But after all, the real purpose is the security of the Empire, and the question of means ought to be approached with an open mind.

In this matter, as in all others, the secret of clear vision is the single eye, and a Government which is really intent upon the defence of the Empire cannot be long or seriously in doubt as to the right answer to any of the questions which have here been raised. A Cabinet that wants to know the truth will not be long ignorant of it, but a Cabinet that wants only to remain in office may have very good reason for preferring to keep the truth a good way off. There has never been in our time a general consideration by any Government of the whole question of defence in which policy, expenditure, and the functions of the army and of the navy have been taken into a single view; and whilst abstaining from this inquiry, the only one that can lead to the desired result, Governments have committed themselves at nearly every point in the whole subject. They have taken steps in policy, in military and naval administration, and made declarations upon these subjects and upon that of finance, by which they are fettered. A full and free inquiry might reveal that they or their predecessors of the same party had blundered, and they therefore shrink from inquiry.

The late Mr. Stanhope, for example, when Secretary

of State for War, obtained the sanction of the House of Commons to a large expenditure in the reconstruction of barracks which were notoriously unhealthy; but the erection at various points in the country of a number of the best modern buildings for the accommodation of troops committed the War Office to the then existing distribution of parts of the army; yet a full consideration of the exigencies of defence might very well lead to the perception that the traditional distribution of the army is thoroughly unsound and interferes with its training and proper organisation. This is one of a hundred instances that could be given of the way in which Ministers are hampered by the traditions of their party, and the fact that they are so hampered is some consolation for the fact that when we look round for the statesman who is in the near future to be the representative of the national idea we fail to discover his semblance among the occupants of the front bench on either side of the House of Commons.

VI

THE CABINET AND THE ARMY AND NAVY

THE solution of the problem of Imperial defence will hardly be worked out except by a Government properly constituted for the purpose. The ordinary language of politicians seems to imply a belief that the Cabinet, being the result of a long course of political evolution, is endowed with omnipotence and omniscience. A well-selected committee of politicians, under the presidency of a capable leader, is perhaps the best instrument that could be devised for ensuring a general accord between the purposes towards which administration is directed and the prevalent tone of public opinion and public feeling, but some branches of administration deal with matters in regard to which public feeling and public opinion are entirely irrelevant, and to this class belongs the actual conduct of war. The issue of a conflict between two armies or between two navies depends upon the judgment and strength of character of the admirals or generals, upon the relative force and fighting efficiency of the two fleets or armies, and upon the spirit which animates them, which, within certain limits, can be ascertained beforehand,

but which bear little or no relation to the state of opinion or the state of feeling prevalent before the war in the two countries which are quarrelling.

We may with advantage consider for a few moments the kind of work which a Government at war has to do from the time when war becomes imminent until the time when peace is signed at its conclusion. A wise Government does not stumble nor drift into war; it goes to war deliberately in order to attain some end of great importance which cannot be compassed in any other way. That end will usually be defensive—the maintenance of the national authority in a territory to which the nation's right is disputed or the assertion of the right to decide without foreign intervention some question of great moment to the national welfare. Before abandoning negotiation and appealing to force the Government will have well considered the kind of constraint which must be placed upon the adversary in order to compel his assent to the settlement desired. It will always be found necessary first of all to defeat his armed forces—his navy, if he has one, and then his army; and afterwards to proceed to inflict such damage upon him, either by occupying his territory or by destroying his trade, as will make him prefer to accept a peace upon the terms offered by the victors to a continuance of the conflict, which might lead to those terms becoming still more disagreeable.

A Government which contemplates this mode of enforcing its intentions must consider — first, the means of defeating and reducing to impotence the enemy's naval and military force, and secondly, the kind of inconvenience which can afterwards be inflicted upon his Government. This kind of investigation will not yield a trustworthy result— it is quite evident that unless the whole calculation is made in close accordance with the actual facts the Government will be in danger of going to war under a false impression, and therefore of defeat and failure —unless the forces of both sides and the direction, time, and momentum of the contemplated blows have been the subject of systematic or scientific investigation, unless a trained naval judgment and a trained military judgment supplied with complete information have co-operated in the inquiry. Only a skilful admiral, with all the statistical and other conditions before him, can judge the probability that a given naval force will defeat or destroy another given force, and can suggest the best mode of operating for the purpose. With regard to the conflict between two armies, the judgment of a skilled general is equally indispensable. But the judgment of a statesman is required to answer the question whether a projected series of naval and military victories can be so used as to compel a foreign Government to agree to specific conditions of peace. The whole of this calculation must be

thought out; the admiral, the general, and the statesman must have not only compared notes but have entered fully into one another's minds before the decision to have recourse to force can safely be made, because it is the most dangerous thing in the world to plunge into a war without a clear and well-grounded view of what is to be gained by the war, and of the way in which success is to be obtained. If this analysis be applied to the British system of government, and if the Cabinet collectively may be taken as supplying the place here assigned to the statesman, it becomes evident that at every stage of policy, whenever there is a prospect of a serious quarrel with a foreign Power, the Cabinet absolutely requires, in the fulfilment of its duty, a close and intimate interchange of view with some competent and fully-informed admiral and general. The moment the decision has been made and war has been determined upon, the Cabinet is obliged to rely for the execution of its policy upon generals and admirals.

The executive command of an army and the executive command of a navy are admittedly beyond the sphere of competence of any political body; they are professional functions, and must be entrusted to professional hands. The commander of an army in war conducts his military operations according to his own judgment, though there is always an uninterrupted exchange of views between him and his Government for the purpose of keeping the military

action directed to the political ends of the war, and of maintaining due relation between the political intentions of the Government and the military results, positive or negative, which have been reached. A victorious general may enable his Government to raise its terms, and a Government of which the armies have been defeated may be obliged to abandon its original purpose.

All that has been said of the general in war, that is, of the military Commander-in-Chief, applies with equal force to the person entrusted with the direction of the naval operations. It is an accident of modern naval history that we are less familiar with the idea of a naval Commander-in-Chief than of his counterpart on land. The British navy during the great wars of the close of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century received its general direction from the Board of Admiralty, which in those days was a Committee of naval officers, under the presidency of the First Lord of the Admiralty, who was himself sometimes, though not always, a naval officer. The universal experience of armies, which is very much more extensive than that of navies, proves that executive authority cannot safely be entrusted to a deliberative body. A war fought by a committee is always badly conducted. All the judges are agreed that the first and most essential condition of success in war is unity of command, that is to say, that the whole

operations of the army shall be directed by a single mind, and that however many armies are constituted, and however widely separated they may be, the general instructions given to their leaders must all emanate from one mind, that of the Commander-in-Chief whom they all obey. A Commander-in-Chief, of course, relies upon the judgment of his subordinate on the spot in command of a particular force in regard to the mode by which the local object is to be attained, but he himself settles the scope and object of each set of operations. The same principles apply to the direction of a navy, and if a navy is to be used with the fullest possible effect, its operations must be, like those of an army, designed and controlled by the mind of one individual. The case of the Board of Admiralty during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars proves nothing to the contrary. It is certain that on several critical occasions during those wars the British navy had not the best possible general direction. Two instances of this were given in a previous chapter, and instances might easily be multiplied. In every modern navy, except that of Great Britain, the principle of unity of direction has been adopted. Moreover, the system of management of the British navy has been entirely changed since 1815, so that at the present time all the instructions to the admirals in the immediate command of fleets at sea are issued from the office of the First Sea Lord.

It is on every ground desirable that the First Sea Lord's position as strategical director of the navy should be made clearer both to himself, to the Cabinet, and to the public by a change of name which would reveal that upon him devolves the duty, which in regard to the army devolves upon the Commander-in-Chief, of the design and general supervision of the naval operations in any war. The title of Commander-in-Chief, which suggests itself as the most appropriate, appears to be disliked in the navy because it might appear to modify the status of the officers commanding upon particular stations, who at present have that title each in regard to his own station, and the title of Lord High Admiral is open to objection because the high officers who in former days were thus described exercised, not merely the strategical direction of the navy, but were endowed with the administrative authority which is at present nominally conferred upon the Lords of the Admiralty and in reality exercised by the Cabinet Minister, entitled the First Lord.

So soon as the First Sea Lord, as the professional head of the navy, has received a title and status corresponding to that of the Commander-in-Chief of the army, the Cabinet may be expected to grasp the fact that for the conduct of war, and, therefore, for naval and military preparation, it has to rely upon the professional judgment of these two officers, and that each of them also requires, for the proper performance of

his own duties, to be in constant and close touch with the supreme political authority. The settlement of the standard of naval and military preparation—a matter of which the importance and, at the same time, the neglect, has been sufficiently illustrated in the preceding chapter—can never be the work of the Cabinet alone. It must be the work of the Cabinet in consultation with the naval and military Commanders-in-Chief. Neither Commander-in-Chief alone can work out satisfactorily the design either of preparation or of action for his own service, because the essence of defence in the case of the British Empire is the combination between the two services. The two Commanders-in-Chief together are helpless to arrange preparations unless they are fully acquainted with the policy which those preparations are to enforce.

The necessity for this co-operation between the Cabinet and the two Commanders may be illustrated by the consideration of different cases of possible war. England might be at war, without allies, either against one Power, against two Powers, or against a larger combination, or she might be at war, in conjunction with allies, against a combination of two or more Powers.

Against any one Power the British navy may be fairly expected to maintain the command of the sea. In such a case, therefore, an invasion of England could hardly be attempted; the military forces would,

at a comparatively early stage, be employed in the attack of the enemy's territory; their mobilisation might be effected without haste, and a very large force would be available for the purpose.

In a war against two maritime Powers it cannot be assumed, with the navy at its present strength, that the command of the sea would from the beginning be assured. There would be a period of suspense, during which, while there would be no opportunity for sending an expedition against the enemy's territory, there would also be no probability of a hostile attempt at invasion. In this case the whole period of suspense in regard to the issue of the naval operations would be available for the mobilisation of the military forces, and according to the issue of the naval contest, would be the employment which they would receive.

In case of a war in which Great Britain alone was opposed by more than two maritime Powers there would be at least the possibility of an immediate attempt at invasion, to repel which it would be necessary that a very efficient force should be speedily mobilised, and there would be very little probability of any opportunity to use portions of the British army outside of British territory.

On the other hand, in case of Great Britain taking part as one of a number of allied Powers in a general war, the command of the sea would from the beginning be assured to the combination of which

Great Britain was a member, and Great Britain could safely employ the whole of her military forces, up to the limits of practicable transport by sea, in offensive operations upon an enemy's territory.

It is clear from this review that while the state of international relations must greatly affect all those particular preparations which are based upon a particular situation, the general framework of defence must lend itself to each and all of the various situations described. In every case the essential thing is prompt action by the navy, which can hardly be too strong. All the military purposes will be met by a force of which the first portion, kept at the highest standard of efficiency, can be promptly mobilised, while other portions are sufficiently well organised and sufficiently trained to admit of their being put into the field successively as the result of the naval operations is developed. If we may suppose that the Government, as soon as war is certain, calls out all the military forces of the country, there will, in every case of war but one, be a short time during which the militia and the volunteers will have the opportunity, not indeed to alter their organisation or modify the principles upon which they have been trained, but to devote themselves to the unintermittent practice of whatever they have already learned, and the extreme case of a sudden attempted invasion would be fairly provided for if the regular army could be mobilised and assembled

in full readiness to fight within a few days of the political crisis.

I have distinguished between special measures of preparation for a particular war seen to be imminent and that general preparation which finds its expression in the normal strength and organisation of the army and the navy as provided for in the estimates from year to year. It is the established practice, whenever hostilities or military operations are thought likely, for the military officer upon whom the Government relies to be directly consulted by the Cabinet. Even when the comparatively unimportant operations now in process on the Nile were under consideration Lord Wolseley attended several Cabinet meetings. This practice has been facilitated by the recent change in the military system, which has placed a professional soldier in the position of Commander-in-Chief. That it is not less desirable in the case of naval operations for the Cabinet to consult the adviser upon whom they rely in the matter of naval strategy is perfectly clear, and no one with a large experience of human nature and of affairs will doubt that such consultation in regard to naval matters would become more usual, and would be more effective, if the First Sea Lord received a status, an authority, and a responsibility more palpably on a level with those of the Commander-in-Chief.

If a Cabinet hesitates to commit itself in regard even to minor military operations without hearing from

his own lips the views of the Commander-in-Chief, that officer's views ought to be still more thoroughly considered in regard to the more general and more permanent arrangements contemplated in the annual estimates. The army and navy estimates lay the foundation of preparation for every eventuality of war, and if no Cabinet ventures even into wars of limited liability—wars in which the hostility, the opposition of a Great Power is not anticipated and in which, therefore, the existence of the Empire is not immediately at stake—without first satisfying itself that the measures to be taken have the approval of the best naval or of the best military judgment, still less ought that judgment to be neglected in the regular course of naval and military administration, during which are laid the foundations of the defence of the Empire and of the assertion of the nation's rights.

The only serious objection with which I am acquainted to the full recognition of the share of the naval and of the military commanders in what may be called the design of Imperial defence comes from those who fear that by this arrangement the authority or the importance of the Cabinet Ministers charged with the supervision of the army and the navy would be diminished. It might fairly be replied that if the status of the Secretary of State for War or of the First Lord of the Admiralty is such as to interfere with the effectiveness of the army and the navy for the purposes for which those ser-

vices exist, the sooner their status is diminished the better for the nation. But, in fact, the proposed system would strengthen the position of both those Ministers by leading to a better understanding of their true function, which is to be the medium of communication between the Cabinet and the professional heads, strategical and administrative, of the two services. The naval and the military strategist alike must, as we have seen, be fully possessed with the policy of the Government, and the naval and military administrators must just as fully be acquainted with the views of the Government regarding the amount of effort, that is, in practice, of expenditure, which is to be devoted to the development of force for the maintenance of that policy. Thus the function of the Secretary of State and of the First Lord of the Admiralty is to mediate, on the one hand, between policy and strategy, and, on the other hand, between the needs of the national defence and the restraints imposed by economical considerations, directly upon the development of force and indirectly upon the development of policy.

One change, indeed, there is in the status of the Ministers which might with advantage be made. The Cabinet Minister entrusted with the supervision of the navy ought not, in a country to which its naval supremacy is all-important, to hold a rank inferior in any way to that of his colleague who has charge of the army, and it is difficult to escape the conviction

that the efficiency of the navy would gain, and the services of naval officers would receive better recognition than they do, if the First Lord of the Admiralty were to receive the rank and precedence of a Secretary of State, the equal in every respect of any of his colleagues except the Prime Minister.

VII

THE SPIRIT OF MODERN ORGANISATION

Our review of the system appropriate to the general direction of foreign affairs, and of the army and navy, has taken the form of an inquiry into the system of management of the Foreign Office, the War Office, and the Admiralty, and of the relations between those departments and the Cabinet. It may fitly be supplemented by a general consideration of the transforming effect of the modern spirit upon the administrative arrangements of government.

With our grandfathers the great idea was the machine; with us it is the organisation. The difference is immense, and it measures the whole advance made during the nineteenth century. A machine is lifeless; it requires to be put in motion by a force supplied from without. At the best its parts move smoothly along their grooves and between their bearings in obedience to an impulse communicated. But an organisation is alive. In its every part there is spontaneous energy; it adapts itself to its work, and creates out of itself new organs adapted to perform new services. In a word, it is capable of development.

The progress of thought in regard to the working of institutions can be most conveniently illustrated from the case of an army. The origin of government is the necessity for defence, and every government is a natural development from the arrangements made for the command of an army. The history of ancient governments affords abundant illustration positive and negative of this fact; for while in Macedonia and in Rome authority always has the military stamp, the two great states in whose government the forms and spirit of an army are least apparent, Athens and Carthage, are those whose independence fails to survive a serious attack by a civilised power. The feudal system is essentially military, and the rise of the modern state outside England—whose insularity makes her, not a military but a maritime power—is always the work of the commander of an improved army. The citizen's first duty, which is the type of all his other duties and the foundation of all his rights, is the sacrifice of himself in the defence of his country. The process of development is more easily traced in the case of armies than in that of civil institutions; for every country with a position to maintain is obliged, upon pain of conquest, to remodel its army from time to time in accordance with the best contemporary conception of management, and the state which first gains an advance in this process acquires for a time a great advantage over its neighbours. This is the

record of Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus, of France in the early period of Louis XIV., of Prussia under Frederick the Great, of France under Napoleon, and again of Prussia under William I. Each of these leaders created a type which embodied the best thought of his time, and which his contemporaries could but copy. How, then, does the growth of military institutions illustrate the advance made by the nineteenth century in the conception of government or management?

An eighteenth century army was a machine. The private soldiers were practised in the performance of a number of regular movements, which were gone through in a prescribed succession with great accuracy. The officer was an instrument for the utterance of certain conventional sounds called 'words of command,' upon which his company or battalion proceeded to carry out a corresponding set of movements, the general himself acting in a conventional way upon a conventional order from the commander of the army, and any spontaneous movement by any one of the whole number of persons concerned being an interference with the regularity, precision, and uniformity of the structure. Spontaneity and originality were tabooed. The great military virtue was discipline, by which was meant uniformity in accordance with a rigid code, while complete accord with the code yielded the kind of perfection called smartness, which consisted in the

soldiers and the companies being as like one another as pennies from the same die. The officer's duty was compliance with rules, and the use of his mind was to remember them. What would now be called the training of an army consisted in drill—that is, in the constant repetition of the same movements until absolute precision and uniformity had been acquired.

A modern army is almost the reverse of all this. It must be pervaded with intelligence and with will. Every unit or part which composes it is expected to act of itself, and to exert its own intelligence as the guide by which it is directed. The private soldier by himself, the commander of a number of men, whether forming a small unit such as a company, or a large unit such as a brigade, has to do more than make preconcerted movements upon the transmission of conventional signals. Each man, according to his rank, has a sphere of spontaneous action. Obedience now implies more than movement in a groove; it involves rational action for the attainment of an end. The subordinate accepts and makes his own the purpose communicated to him by his superior, and to the fulfilment of that purpose devotes an effort of his own, judging and thinking for himself within the scope of his mission. Thus the officer, the man who exercises authority in obedience to a higher authority, is no longer a puppet pulled by strings, but a live man with a specific mission, con-

tributing towards the work in hand a spiritual force which he himself supplies. Discipline, in the modern sense, shows itself perfect in proportion as each member of the military society has the will, the intelligence, and the judgment requisite for the performance of the function which devolves upon him. He is an organ for a specific purpose, and a well-developed system has organs adapted for every one of its indispensable functions.

The supreme function is that of general direction, and it is, perhaps, here that the modern organisation best proves its potency superior to that of the old-fashioned machine. The difference is between the mechanical conception of the relation of assistants to their director and the organic conception of the same relation. The old-fashioned plan was to compile a code of regulations specifying as exactly as possible the duty of every subordinate in every sort of contingency that could be foreseen. These regulations made, the superior gave the word and his subordinates acted accordingly. The subordinate was not to think, but simply to do as he was told. The modern conception assumes that no code can provide in advance for an infinite number of future contingencies, that no man can take in all the infinite details of a great public business, that the subordinate as well as his superior has an intelligence, and that you improve him and improve his work by appealing to his intelligence, whereas by stifling it you degrade

him, and in the long-run reduce him to that which was the ideal of the old-fashioned plan, a mere machine. Accordingly, in the modern system the thinking and acting powers of the subordinate are called into play, and in this way he is trained and prepared to become himself a wielder of authority.

The head of a modern organisation may be compared with the founder of a school of thought or with the leader of a branch of scientific research. He is himself the exponent of an idea. His assistants become possessed with his idea and imbued with his method; they learn to develop the idea, and to apply the method in dealing with a particular corner of the field. Just as in the best university training of to-day the student, as soon as his instruction has so far progressed that he understands the mode in which knowledge is attained in the branch to which he devotes himself, is set to work as an independent investigator under the supervision of the professor, so the head of a department under the supervision of his chief applies his energies to the solution of the problems which arise within the sphere assigned to him. In this way the assistants of a minister become his organs; they are, as it were, parts of himself, extensions or enlargements of his faculties. The work remains his, for he inspires and directs it, but it becomes a greater work, more extensive, more accurate, more comprehensive than he could possibly

carry on without the help of a number of persons moved by the same spirit which animates him.

The analogy of scientific research has not been introduced at random. Modern life is thoroughly permeated with the conception of science, which may be defined as the organisation of knowledge. The method of science, by which alone perfect knowledge is attainable, consists in classification, abstraction, and analysis. The actual world must be separated into departments, and each department explored by itself. But the classifications of science are distinguished from those required in the work of government by a difference of purpose. The object of scientific inquiry is knowledge; that of government as a whole and in all its departments is action. The departments of science are differentiated by their subjects; those of government by the kind of action at which they aim.

The Admiralty, for example, is the department of government which has charge of the nation's action in war upon the sea. The object of its existence may be described as naval victory; for this purpose it must have at its disposal a number of natural sciences, for each of which it will require corresponding sub-divisions. It must, for instance, be fully equipped in such branches as the geography of the sea, meteorology, and astronomy. It requires also many applied sciences: all those which deal with the construction of ships and marine

engines, with navigation, and with the construction and employment of the various engines of maritime war. The Admiralty needs also information regarding the navies of other Powers. But none of the sciences properly so called supply principles for the general guidance of the Admiralty's action. What is required for this purpose is a theory of naval war, a theory for which the appropriate name is naval strategy.

Each of the great departments of government, unless its work is to be conducted at haphazard, requires, in regard to the kind of action to which it is devoted, a theory of practice. At the War Office this theory will be military strategy, at the Foreign Office it will be a theory of policy. Each of these departments, if properly organised, will have besides those sub-divisions which are engaged in collecting and classifying the current information regarding the doings of foreign Powers, and besides those auxiliary branches which can be consulted in regard to any of the natural or applied sciences with which it is most constantly concerned, a special sub-division engaged in perfecting as far as may be the theory of that kind of action for which the whole department exists.

A theory of action of any kind is usually based upon experience, upon the observation of past action of the same kind considered as a sequence of causes and effects, upon the history of the particular

kind of action under examination. Thus, if the departments we are considering were properly arranged there would be at the War Office a sub-division charged with the study of strategy—the theory of practice—in connection with military history, the record of experience. At the Admiralty there would be a sub-division for naval strategy in connection with naval history; at the Foreign Office a sub-division devoted to the theory of policy in connection with the history of international relations.

The director of a department is the person to whom the theory of the action of his department is most important, for he requires it as his constant guide. The sub-division charged with history and theory would, therefore, have a special interest for him and carry on its work in close personal relation with him, if not under his direct supervision. It would be the best school for all those members of the department whose abilities and character rendered it probable that they might rise to the exercise of authority; and these persons, being selected because of their promise of future good service, would be the best helpers of the head of the department in the studies which he would carry on in that sub-division. Thus the sub-division for history and theory would form the high training school for those destined to be leaders in the profession constituted by membership of the department.

The suggestion that the theory and the history of

war and of policy should be studied by specially constituted branches of the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Foreign Office, may seem to be the dream of a literary man, and it may be thought that such theoretical departments as are here proposed would be superfluous and involve an unnecessary expenditure of public money. This objection will certainly not be raised either by historians, by students of military or political theory, or by those who have practical experience in the management of war or of policy. The academic student of history, of strategy, or of policy always finds himself embarrassed by the want of practical knowledge and experience, while the ablest military commanders have always highly appreciated and most sedulously cultivated, so far as opportunity offered, both the history and the theory of their profession. It may also be safely asserted that a knowledge of the history of policy and a systematic view of the principles to be derived from it are most prized, and will be most usefully cultivated, by those who are engaged in the conduct of international relations. The history and the theory of war or of policy, if entirely divorced from the naval and the military life and from the conduct of affairs, are apt to be abstract and unreal, and on the other hand the admiral, the general, or the diplomatist who neglects the history and the theory of his profession rarely attains to the grasp of principle or to

the breadth of view which are requisite to enable him in a great emergency to bear the responsibility of decided action. The practice, the history, and the theory should be carried on hand in hand.

This general view of organisation for the direction of the three great departments reveals a distinction between them. The head of the department, whose decisions must be guided by a sound theory, will be at the War Office the Commander-in-Chief, and at the Admiralty the First Sea Lord. In both these cases a professional head is indispensable. In regard to the Foreign Office, the question cannot be suppressed whether the decisions shall be those of the professional head of the department, the permanent Under Secretary, or of its political head, the Foreign Secretary, and, according to the view explained in a previous chapter, the Prime Minister. The answer seems to be that there is a distinction between the cases, and that the Foreign Secretary need not be, and probably should not be, a professional diplomatist, though he must always be a person of special competence. He must have passed through the school of history and have mastered the theory of policy. At the same time, however, he requires other and more general qualifications, for policy is more than a departmental matter.

A true theory of national policy must deal with two elements, with two aspects of national action. It must be at once a theory of right, or, what is the

same thing seen from another side, a theory of duty, and at the same time a theory of force. In other words, it must be an analysis on the one hand of the ends to which national action is directed, and, on the other hand, of the means by which those ends are to be attained. A statesman must have that large appreciation of the spiritual element of human life, without which he will be unable to gather together the aspirations, the hopes, the fears, and the wishes with which the people whom he represents are instinctively and half-consciously possessed, and to concentrate and focus them into definite political aims which he can set up for his own guidance. At the same time he must have mastered the principles of what I may venture to call international dynamics, the laws by which, whether in peace or in war, the inter-action of the forces represented by nations is governed. In short, a national leader must be at the same time a political philosopher, a strategist, and a diplomatist.

The difficulty of a statesman's task, the reason why none but a great man can deserve that name, consists in the necessity that is laid upon him, under pain of failure, to hold together in one view the results of a correct analysis of social and political ideals, of the principles which control the current dealings between nation and nation, and of the laws of strategy. These three branches of knowledge must be completely fused together in his

mind, so that he thinks not in the abstract and in departments, like the several investigators whose conclusions he has mastered, but in the concrete, like an ordinary practical man. The instinctive judgment of the practical man is what we call common sense, and the statesman's judgment must be common sense developed and raised to a higher power by the aid of a circle of sciences. His function is to solve a continuous series of practical problems, in none of which the decision can be given by any single science or any single department, and none of which can be rightly decided without a correct view of conditions falling within the province of a number of distinct departments.

The problem which presents itself at the present moment to the British statesman responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs appears at first sight as a number of simultaneous questions. For instance, How is the situation created in the Transvaal by Dr. Jameson's action to be dealt with? What is to be the attitude to be adopted towards the United States, towards the German Empire, towards Turkey, towards Russia? How are British interests affected by the misfortunes of Italy in Abyssinia? And so on. But none of these questions can possibly be rightly answered by itself. Each of them is only a part of the larger question, What is the general purpose of British national action, and what are the means by which it has to be attained?

BOOK IV

THE IDEA OF THE NATION

BOOK IV

THE IDEA OF THE NATION

I

THE FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH POWER

If the British Empire is to fill its true place in the world it must first find its true place in the hearts of its own subjects; they must have a reason for the national faith that is in them. That reason will be given by an analysis of the laws of British power and of the conditions which justify its exercise. This final inquiry will set out not from the assumption that might is right, which is the creed of despotism and the argument of caprice, nor from the theory that right is might, which is the mistake of shallow enthusiasts, but from the conviction that the universe is the manifestation of an intelligible order inseparable from the order revealed in the processes of thought; that the laws of the material and of the moral world arise from the same source, and are but different aspects of the same reality. We cannot but believe that in the end right must prevail over wrong,

and the faith that this is the real and ultimate law of the world is the foundation of all that is best in human endeavour. What, then, are the moral laws which determine the rise and fall of states, and how are they related to the dynamical laws which determine the effect of the application of force in the intercourse between nations?

The essence of humanity is free will. The human being is conscious of making a choice in his actions, and the connection between this choice and its consequences is reflected in conscience, which identifies the man with his acts. To the will, the power of choosing our course, we give the name of freedom, and we regard it as the characteristic mark of humanity. The course of human life, individual and collective, consists in the development of this power, and to its consistent exercise we give the name morality. The freedom or the will of one man is limited by that of his fellows. Community or fellowship is the second mark of humanity, the counterpart of freedom or will.

History records under two aspects the development and inter-action of freedom and of community. The individual finds his well-being dependent upon that of a community. In order to exist at all he must be subject to a government, and thus from the beginning the individual will is seen in opposition to the will of the community expressed in law and in administrative authority. The internal history of the State is

the working out and the reconciliation of this antithesis, the record of a perpetual action and reaction between Government and personal liberty, and in the mature State, ancient or modern, harmony is found by the device which makes the individual a sharer, to some extent, in the work of government. In the ancient State the individual was himself a member of the governing body; in the modern State he is content to have a voice in choosing the body by which authority is exercised. Only in a well-ordered community and through perfect obedience to law is the freedom of the individual attainable, and authority is tolerable only when those who exercise it regard it as a trust for the benefit of the community of which they are, at least in that sense, the representatives.

The power of choice or free will, which in the individual can be fully developed only in obedience to the authority of the community, is exerted on a larger scale and in a wider sphere by the Government on behalf of the community which it represents. Here, again, there are limitations. The spontaneous action of one State is liable to be restrained by the actions of the other States its neighbours. To the power of choice exercised by a State we give the name of independence, and the independence of a State is the highest manifestation which we know of the power of self-determination, will, or freedom that has been described as the characteristic of humanity.

In its largest sense the process of history consists in

the effort to reconcile the independence of States with the welfare of the universal human community of which they are the members. We can already dimly see the first goal towards which mankind progresses, in the shape of a community embracing all nations and recognising a law which every State must obey. We can perceive that that condition once attained will be the starting-point of a further progress, swifter, surer, and more beneficent than any that has gone before. This ideal may be expressed in other terms—the perfection of human life must consist in a condition which renders possible the growth of every individual to the utmost attainable realisation of all his best faculties. This is conceivable only through the universal reign of law, and in an order embracing all mankind. The ideal just described supplies a touchstone for the value of a nation's work, for we can see that in the future, when one peace and one order will prevail from pole to pole, mankind will recognise, as their greatest benefactors, those who have most contributed to bring them together to one law and to one life. It is worth while inquiring what share England has had in this work, how she has been led to take part in it, and how far she may expect her present and future exertions to contribute towards the consummation of the community of mankind.

There have been great soldiers and great sea-captains in almost every age, but it has been reserved for the nineteenth century to ascertain the principles

by which their conduct has been guided and to trace the laws by which the application of force between nation and nation produces its effects. The study of war has, however, been for the most part left to soldiers, who have naturally sought rather to learn from the great masters the rules of their trade than to ascertain how the laws of international dynamics apply to the explanation of history and to the conduct of national policy. Yet it will be seen that the two subjects are intimately connected.

The thinkers who formulated the general lessons to be derived from the wars of Frederick the Great and of Napoleon laid down as a fundamental maxim that the first object of either side in a war is necessarily and always to disarm the adversary, that is, to destroy or disperse his organised and trained combatant forces. 'Defeat and drive away the enemy's army,' they tell us, 'and you may afterwards dispose at your pleasure of his territory and his government.' Three generations were to pass away before this doctrine was applied in the analysis of naval history. But in our own time this application has been made, and it is now well understood that the fundamental maxim of naval war is identical with that which has just been set forth. The first object in naval war is the destruction of the enemy's fighting fleets, and, that accomplished, the victor will find that he may do pretty much as he likes in the theatre of war—that is, on the sea.

This principle embodies the substance of the naval history of Great Britain. When British independence was assailed by Spain, at that time not only the first naval, but also the first military power, it was well understood by Drake and Raleigh that the true defence of England was on the sea, and that the military forces of the enemy must never be allowed to gain foothold upon British soil. From that day to this the practice has been, in conflict with each and every enemy, to fight out the quarrel at sea until at sea the enemy has been disarmed. In this way the British fleet has made itself supreme upon the waters constituting the theatre of war. The true defence of an island consists in naval victory, and naval victory pushed to its utmost limits is the most perfect defence that can be devised. In this sense the independence of England rests upon the command of the sea, won and maintained by the bravery and skill of her sea-captains.

The matter wears another aspect when we consider England not by herself but as one of the States of Europe. In every one of her great wars since the close of the sixteenth century, with a single unfortunate exception, England fought in partnership with other States, and though her allies have not in all cases contributed directly to the defeat of the hostile navy they have always borne the brunt of the military contest. In this way the energies of the enemy have been divided between a number of foes, while England as

one of the number has been able to concentrate her efforts upon the sea.

In the eighteenth century this constant element of alliance in the wars in which England was engaged was expressed in the phrase 'the balance of power,' which denoted the conception of an equality between contending parties on the Continent, rendering it possible for England to turn the scale, or, perhaps it would be more accurate to say, to prevent the scale from turning very decidedly in favour of either combination. The belief was that it would be dangerous for England to allow any Power or group of Powers upon the Continent to acquire a preponderance so great as to endanger the independence of the rest.

Thus, although England was usually fighting either for the preservation of her own independence, the assertion of her own rights, or the furtherance of interests which she believed to be vital to herself, her action had, as a general rule, the effect of preventing or restricting any domination upon the European continent, and of preserving to the nations of Europe that independence of which we have already considered the significance. It would be a complete mistake to claim for her that she has been a voluntary crusader in the cause of humanity. The peculiarity of her history is that her insular situation has hitherto caused her self-defence to operate as a powerful contributory agency in the

establishment of the right of nations to determine their own welfare in their own way. We may say that the first dynamical law of Great Britain's history is that as an insular State her independence rests upon the command of the sea, and that the moral justification of the possession of the naval power which that implies consists in its having been contributory to the general cause of human freedom.

In the later stage of each of the great conflicts we find England, after securing her command of the sea, taking part in the Continental war, and landing her armies at different points on the coast of Europe for the assistance of her allies and the attack upon her enemies. Marlborough and Wellington represent the second part of a process of which the first part was ended in the one case by the loss of the French fleet at La Hogue, and in the other case by the Battle of Trafalgar. The dynamical law in this case is that a fleet which has destroyed the enemy's fleet, and which therefore cannot be effectively resisted, controls the sea for all purposes, and that therefore the Power whose fleet has been fully victorious can move its armies by sea without fear of disturbance. This is a consequence of naval victory of which it is difficult to exhaust the import. It has enabled Great Britain to assist her European allies by landing military forces at any point on the coast of Europe convenient to herself between Copenhagen and Gibraltar, and between Gibraltar and the Crimea. The armies so

landed, however, have never been large enough to be more than auxiliaries to the armies of her allies, for their size has been limited not so much by her inability to raise a considerable military force—an inability which has never existed except in the imagination of those who neglect the facts—as by the difficulty of providing transport for a large army. If the community of her efforts with those of some of the Continental Powers has been a justification of her acquisition of the control of the sea, the fact that her insular position made it impracticable for her to invade any State with a very large army has rendered her naval preponderance less dangerous to the independence of her neighbours than would be the same power in any other hands.

Thus the command of the sea has conferred upon England a peculiar *rôle* in the economy of Europe. In any conflict between the European Powers she has been able to intervene, first by the destruction of the fleets of that side to which she was opposed, and then by the destruction of the maritime trade of her enemies, as well as by the landing of a part of her army upon their shores. She has thus actually held in her hands the balance of Europe, and with the power to hold that balance her independence, the essence of her national existence, is identified.

It must be evident to all who believe that there is an order in the universe that a power like this carries with it a corresponding responsibility, and that it

cannot permanently be retained except upon the condition that it shall be put to a good use. Our belief that the right must in the end prevail compels us to assume that if Great Britain should use her power in behalf, not of right, but of wrong, or even if she should fail to use it in behalf of right, the power itself must inevitably be lost. But the loss of the command of the sea involves the downfall of British independence, and we are therefore led to the inevitable conclusion that the existence of a British nation is inseparably bound up with the exertion of its power in behalf of those causes which tend to the general good of mankind. In short, England's geographical position imposes upon her government the obligation to be the champion in Europe of those causes which will commend themselves as just to the impartial judgment of posterity.

This implies, in a country where the Government is appointed by the choice of the people, an incessant effort of national self-education. An ignorant British nation will produce an ignorant Government. A nation entirely absorbed in trade, legislation, and administration will produce a Government indifferent to the affairs of Europe; a nation in which the sense of duty is relaxed will produce a Government unready to fulfil its function as a member of the European community. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Great Britain was governed by an aristocracy—that is, by a

class whose wealth and leisure rendered possible a free play of intelligence, and whose devotion to the service of the State developed a force of character which had a healthy root in the religious convictions that had evinced their tremendous power during the struggles of the middle of the seventeenth century. It was under the guidance of this class, which followed, with a consistency far from perfect, and therefore with a success that fell short of what might have been attained, the lead of one or two great statesmen—of William III: and of Chatham—that Great Britain chose her side in the divisions of Europe, and thereby gained an independence more perfect than any other State has yet possessed, and an influence in the world which has never been rivalled. In the nineteenth century political power is no longer confined to a class, but is distributed among the whole people. If in the twentieth century the policy of Great Britain is to be rightly directed; if she is to maintain her independence and to preserve her influence in the world, the nation must develop an intelligence and a character as much broader and stronger than that of the old aristocracy, as the task of the twentieth century will embrace a wider field and require greater efforts and a firmer purpose than that of the eighteenth.

II

THE MEANING OF EMPIRE

In the last chapter I have traced the connection between Great Britain's European position and that command of the sea which is the essence of her self-defence. It remains to consider the most momentous consequence of England's insular position. The control of the sea gained by a victorious navy is without limit, for a navy can be restrained only by a force of like kind with itself. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Great Britain's naval rivals were to be found only in Europe. Her victory over them left her in control of every sea, and able, from the sea, to command every shore. This is the dynamical law of the British Empire.

Geographers are not weary of depicting on the map the extent of British possessions, and the patches of red which are in this way scattered over the continents indicate with approximate accuracy the regions where British law and British administration prevail. But the ordinary map leaves out the essence of the whole matter. A map which is to explain the British Empire must paint the whole sea red.

It is from a British ocean that the British Colonies have been settled, and that the British Government has been transplanted into India. At first sight it may seem a prodigious usurpation to claim as a British possession the ocean that encompasses and connects all lands. If it is an usurpation, it is one that her insular position has thrust upon Great Britain. Naval supremacy is the only sure defence which an island State can obtain, and the attacks made upon her independence compelled Great Britain to win the ocean for herself. The justification of the possession of any special power lies in the use which is made of it, and Great Britain need fear no challenge made upon this ground to her maritime supremacy. The British navy in peace has introduced and maintained law and order upon every sea, has destroyed the slave-trade, and made an end of piracy until, under the protection of British power, the trade of every nation has been rendered secure all round the world. Not the slightest advantage for British, as distinct from any other trade, has ever been sought during the whole period in which the British supremacy has been uncontested. Not the most jealous hater of the British power has ever suggested that any other nation could have used the command of the sea with greater fairness, with more even-handed justice, than Great Britain. Moreover, the sea is used by British ships incomparably more than by the ships of all other nations taken together, so

that it is impossible on any ground of justice to dispute the right of Great Britain to its control.

Passing from the sea to the land, we may consider the nature of the work in which Great Britain is there engaged. In North America and Canada she is repeating that process of creating new nations, of which a beginning was made in the formation of those settlements that have grown into the United States. At the bar of history England will be able to plead that her work of colonisation has been a good one. The United States, in spite of their having received a considerable proportion of immigrants from other European lands, have preserved their English character, and it is only necessary to observe the contrast in point of energy, government, and progress between the United States and the colonies of Spanish and Portuguese origin in South America to silence all doubts as to the value of the work of British settlement.

To Canada and to Australia a British future is secured, and one of the pressing duties of the British Government is to ensure the British future of South Africa. This cannot mean that the settlers of Dutch extraction are to be unfairly treated, but only that the British Government shall not permit its reluctance to assert the cause of justice against the weak, its dread of being misunderstood abroad or at home when acting on behalf of its own people, to paralyse its hands in dealing with existing difficulties. The

Transvaal has, in South Africa, a position analogous to that of a protected state in India. The Indian Prince is allowed to govern his own dominions so long as he abstains from gross abuse, oppression, or injustice; if he palpably and scandalously fails to hold an even balance the British Government steps in; and this ought to be the model for the action of the British Government in regulating the status of the Transvaal in the South African Empire. This, and no more, is probably meant by the recent declaration of the Government that they will abide by the Convention of 1884.

The British Colonies proper and the South African Empire are the homes of British or of British and other European settlers. Those countries could, in case of need, work out their own destiny, though it is to be hoped that the theory of their manifest destiny to secede from the British Empire is dead, and that no egregious failure of British Governments to fulfil their duties will ever cause it to revive. In India Great Britain has undertaken a different task. Here were a multitude of nations utterly unable to govern themselves, the victims of superstition, of corruption, and of anarchy. Great Britain's mission in these countries is to govern, that is, to establish peace, law, and equity.

The modern Englishman can understand the task upon which the nation is engaged in India only in one sense. It is the task of a trustee or

guardian. The net result of European civilisation, of two thousand years of continuous effort, religious, social, and political in Europe, is that there is implanted in us a sense of right and wrong, of truth and honour, of self-respect and of respect for others, and an impulse to learn and to work, which taken together constitute our spiritual inheritance. This is the possession which we aim at imparting to our Indian fellow-subjects. With their creeds we have nothing to do. We do not molest the Hindoo as he cherishes the sacred cow amid the filth of his temple, or daubs his forehead with the paint taken from a repulsive image. We protect the devout ascetic who fancies that by mortifying the flesh he is practising the wisdom of Buddha and finding the path of salvation in the renunciation of the desire of life. We forbid no man to submit to the faith of the Arabian Prophet, provided only that he does not attempt to propagate its doctrines by the sword. But we impose upon all alike the fulfilment of the elementary human duties. Those duties are conveyed in a body of English law simplified and codified and better adapted by each succeeding generation of British administrators to the peculiar conditions of the East. Obedience to this law and the obligation to preserve the Queen's peace is all that we impose. Taxation is simplified because, except in Bengal, the State in India has always maintained its right of ultimate ownership of the

soil, and the burden of taxation is kept as light as may be—not more per head of the population than one-tenth of the amount generally paid in Europe.

The ruling conception is that government is for the benefit of the governed. In a region divided as India is by a hundred divisions of race, language, religion, and tradition, and where society is moulded in the rigid forms of caste, this conception can be maintained only by a paramount and irresistible power. If it can be consistently enforced from generation to generation it cannot but penetrate into and possess the minds of all that live under its sway, so that in time the conscience of the natives must come to be the reflection of the law which is administered among them. In proportion as that result is attained, the natives of India will become helpers of the government under which they live. In this sense the mission of Great Britain in India is one of education, and we are justified in seeing as the far-off goal of our labours an India united by a common idea of social and political obligation, and governing itself in the same way and with the same connection with Great Britain as one of the British Colonies. This result must take centuries for its achievement, and meantime the duty of Great Britain is to maintain the Government of India unshaken either from within or from without.

The army in India has to serve a twofold purpose. It represents the power of the Government against

internal disturbance, and is at the same time the weapon against attack from beyond the border. The advance of Russia towards the North-west Frontier has much increased the demands to which the army is liable for external defence, and the greatest danger to the prosperity of the Indian Empire lies in the additions to taxation caused by necessary preparations to repel an attack. In order to avert this danger it is desirable, by action elsewhere than on the Indian border, to counteract the aggressive policy of Russia, and the proposal made in a previous chapter for co-operation with Japan and with China has this object in view.

The word Empire has a peculiar history. To the early Roman it meant the authority of a military commander; when the Roman dominions embraced the greater part of the then known world it meant the authority of government concentrated in a single hand; in the Middle Ages it was the symbol of the political unity of Christendom, typified in the authority claimed over the Western World by Charles the Great and his would-be successors. The title of Emperor was adopted by Napoleon because he, too, in his turn sought to establish an authority co-extensive with Europe. The founders of the federal Government which embraces all the German States chose the title of Emperor, partly because that of King was thought unsuitable for the head of a group of united States some of which are themselves mon-

archies. In our own time the word Empire is commonly applied to the unity which comprises all the subjects of the Queen. It was probably a true instinct which caused the Queen to adopt the title of Empress to denote the peculiar relation that subsists between India and the British race which she personifies. It implies a sacred pledge to which the British, whether of the United Kingdom, of Canada, or of Australia, are irrevocably committed, to deal justly and equitably with the population of India, and to create in the spontaneous loyalty of a future self-governing Indian community the monument of the sincerity of their labours.

The title of Empire and the quality of a British possession or dependency give to the work of Great Britain in India a certain amount of ambiguity. There is about a government of this kind a tinge of vainglory which lends itself to the unamiable pride of a ruling race. The perfect type of the kind of work which is carried on in India is to be seen in Egypt, where a similar task has been undertaken without any outward show. The British administrators in Egypt are true rulers because they are truly the servants of the Egyptians. Englishmen, whose pride in their country consists in the pleasure which they derive from the excellence of the work done by the nation care little for names and titles. They do not want to call Egypt a British possession or even a British protectorate, and are content that the work

done for that country should be such as commands the approval of impartial judges. But the better their reason for believing the work well done, the greater must be their determination to prevent its being broken off and left unfinished in consequence of political rivalry or jealousy. The Egyptians, like the Indians, are to be brought up to the full stature of social and political maturity and independence; this cannot be the work of one generation or of two. Even if its accomplishment should involve the continuous effort of five hundred years, no English Government ought for a moment to contemplate its cessation before it is completed. Lord Cromer and his assistants are the representatives of the noblest work that has ever been undertaken by any nation, and in carrying on that work they personify the spirit of the British Empire.

The work of empire which has fallen to Great Britain is not peculiar to her alone. In general terms it consists in the introduction of European law and European peace into regions where human life has been degraded by the want of peace and the absence of law. We can foresee during a long future what must needs be the general course of the world. The European nations must undertake for the whole of Asia and Africa a task analogous to that which England is carrying on in India and in Egypt. The beginnings of such a work exist. England is but the pioneer upon a road along which others are following. France in Northern and in Central Africa, in Mada-

gascar and in Tonkin, Germany in parts of Central and Southern Africa, and Russia in Central Asia have made a beginning of these labours. We may think that the standard which they set up for themselves is not in all respects as high as our own, but we cannot be blind to the fact that these other nations also are doing a good work and that from each of them we have something to learn.

The conception which we have formed of empire, that it consists in services rendered to the races over whom it is extended, is inconsistent with the desire for a monopoly. England may justly insist, as far as her opportunities offer, that no European nation shall found an Empire for the exclusive benefit of its own subjects. We may be content that France in her colonies shall spread the spirit of French institutions; that Russia shall Russify the inhabitants of the Steppes of Central Asia, and that the German colonies in Africa shall be administered according to German traditions and in accordance with German ideas. But we may fairly demand the general recognition of the canon which we have set up for ourselves, that a community capable of self-government shall regulate its affairs without restriction according to its own judgment, but that where we are acting as trustees for a race subject to our rule we have no right to exclude the trade or the intercourse of other nations. It was lately reported that the French Government had

announced with regard to Madagascar the intention to place French trade upon a footing of peculiar privilege, and that the treaties which give England the right in Madagascar to the treatment accorded to the most favoured nation are to be interpreted so as to make a distinction favourable to French traders between them and the traders of all other nations whatever. This is an interpretation which, if it were admitted, would intensify the rivalry between the various Empires, and would justify Great Britain in the attempt to prevent the extension of any other influence than her own.

My readers will now see why I attach so much importance to some kind of an understanding with a group of Continental Powers, aiming at the prevention during a number of years of any great European war. So soon as the peace of Europe is for a time assured it will become possible for the Great Powers to distribute between themselves those tasks of colonisation which I have described as Imperial, and to find scope for their superabundant energies in the introduction of their peace, their system of law, and their civilisation over those extensive regions of the Old World where government is either effete or unknown. Treated by a discordant Europe, the Eastern Question, the Far Eastern Question, and the African Question are big with future calamities, but treated by a Europe in which the majority of the Powers are determined that peace shall be preserved, and to which, therefore,

a series of compromises can be rendered acceptable, all these problems admit of effective solution. The insular situation of Great Britain renders it easier for her Government than for any other to take the initiative in thus securing for a time at least the peace of Europe and the advance of order in the world, and this is the duty which would now be undertaken by a British statesman possessed with a sincere faith in the nation and in the Empire and supported, as such a statesman would certainly be, by the confidence and the devotion of the British race.

The theory of the British nation and of the British Empire, which has been given in this and the preceding chapter, may be summed up as a system of laws bound together by an intimate causal connection. An island State can maintain its independence only by means of the command of the sea; this is the law of insularity. Great Britain was enabled to acquire in the face of the Great Powers of the Continent the naval supremacy thus indispensable for her, because in every great crisis, some of them fought upon her side. The principle here involved is that of the balance of power. The command of the sea carries with it, as its necessary accompaniment, a peculiar influence upon all the coasts of the world. This is the law of Empire in so far as it is the dynamical explanation of the spread of British influence and authority. The moral condition of this peculiar influence, of this the

true imperial power of Great Britain, is that it should be exercised as a trust for humanity in some sense which the rest of the world can appreciate. This proposition I call the law of service.

These four laws embody, in general terms, the whole tradition of the national policy as it has been reflected in the general consciousness of the nation. The Elizabethan age implanted in English minds the law of insularity, which finds accurate scientific expression in the pages of the analytical thinkers of that time and poetical utterance in any number of passages that might be quoted from Shakespeare and his contemporaries. The conception of the balance of power, familiar from very early times to British statesmen, was most powerfully impressed upon the public mind by the policy of William III. The identity between British sea power and the British Empire was perfectly understood by the author of 'Rule Britannia.'

It is not a little remarkable that in the third quarter of the nineteenth century each of these great national traditions should have almost dropped out of the public consciousness. The neglect of the navy was perfect evidence that the Cabinets of both parties were for many years quite unconscious of the real nature of British national defence. The treatment of Colonial questions during the whole period of which Mr. Gladstone was the representative statesman implied an entire non-recognition of the

nature of the British Empire, and the principle of the balance of power was, during the same period, not only completely forgotten, but deliberately rejected. The very words were omitted in 1867 from the preamble to the Army Act, and even at the present time politicians of both parties are never tired of giving the lie to the whole history of England by the assertion that the national tradition does not countenance the policy of alliances. The obvious truth is that Great Britain has depended upon alliances almost as much as upon the action of her own forces in every great crisis of her history and in every great war except that of American Independence.

The principle which I have called the law of service rests on a broader basis and is of universal application. It seems to me necessary in any review of the conditions of national policy, which always means national self-assertion, to remind ourselves that there are moral laws as well as material or dynamical laws of national action. This is an overruling condition of all human life, and I think no review of the nature of policy should fail to take note that the laws of moral existence are as inexorable and as universal as any sequences of cause and effect known to the physical world.

III

THE EDUCATION OF THE BRITISH RACE

THE analysis which I have attempted of the origin and growth of the British Empire leads to a view of the natural and necessary conditions which have shaped, and must continue to shape, the character of the nation to which we belong.

The burden of Empire is inexorably laid upon us, for it is inseparable from that command of the sea without which the safety of our home cannot be secure. But the condition upon which the command of the sea has been acquired has throughout been that British action should be defensive and not aggressive, that our warfare should be, not for the overthrow of the rights of others, but for the maintenance of our own, and upon this condition it has always been found possible to obtain the co-operation of allies, which has been not less necessary than the exertion of our own naval strength. The Empire thus created rests as much upon just and wise government as upon force, and every one is aware that, though good government alone will not protect it against encroachments from without, no amount of force exerted for

its maintenance can long preserve it unless it continue to be administered in the spirit of justice, equity, and humanity. During the rise and growth of the Empire, the Government of Great Britain was compelled to be tenacious of its rights and resolute in their defence, to take a clear and comprehensive view of the action and policy of the European Powers, and to maintain, in its dealings with its own subjects and with other nations, a high standard of integrity.

It is not given to us to see in advance the future course of the world, but its condition to-day clearly reveals that the old tasks have to be continued in circumstances more difficult than ever. If Great Britain is to continue free and independent, her naval supremacy must be assured in a world in which every Great Power has become deeply interested in maritime enterprise and is armed for its protection. The Empire, the heritage of naval victories, is exposed to jealousy and to covetousness as fierce as were known in any previous age, while the growth of society and the perfection of its industry have made the use of force more destructive, and the recourse to war therefore more hazardous than at any former time. Naval victory to-day requires incomparably greater exertions than ever for its attainment, while to preserve the balance among the Great Powers of the world, that is, to secure the co-operation of powerful allies, involves a knowledge of other nations and their policy based upon studies

more extensive and more profound than were necessary for Chatham or for Pitt, and a moral choice between conflicting causes such as implies a high degree of sincerity and firmness of purpose.

In the England of our day the Government is, in every sense, representative of the nation. Every nation, however instructed and determined, is helpless without a competent exponent of its purpose at the head of affairs; but a British statesman, however strong and wise, cannot act effectively and continuously unless his judgment meets with a response in the thought and the conscience of the people. The electorate cannot possibly lead the Government, at any rate in the conduct of foreign policy, for the Government's decision must frequently be taken far in advance, and action should always be swift, and must sometimes be quickly determined upon. Representative institutions, unless they are to paralyse the national action in relation to the large affairs of the world, require that the public, upon whose support the statesman has to rely, should be imbued at least with such a general appreciation of the state of the world and of the tenor of the nation's mission as to enable it to appreciate and to support action rightly chosen, and, when necessary, clearly explained. A statesman who has once shown that he deserves the public confidence will not find support fail him even should it become necessary to withhold explanations that might disclose too much to foreign Powers.

A representative statesman is always the creation of his time, the exponent of ideas and of aims which find a response in the minds and hearts of the best among his contemporaries. If therefore we are to look for a great man who shall personify in his own endeavours the hopes and aspirations of the British race in the present generation, we must expect him to be the outcome of a widespread movement of British thought directed towards the strengthening and uplifting of the national policy.

The work done during the long peace of the Queen's reign has well prepared the ground for such a higher development of our national life. Our material prosperity has been placed upon an entirely new basis; the invention of the steam-engine and the development of machinery multiplied a thousand-fold the products of our industry, at the same time that the growth of steam navigation brought the whole world to our doors, and that the abolition of the old restrictive tariffs made our own market the most open, and therefore the most crowded, in the world. Side by side with this industrial revolution, of which, though the consequences have been in the main beneficial, the concomitant disadvantages have created many problems as yet unsolved, we have broken down the political barriers of privilege and the social barriers of caste. Our population, while it has immensely increased in numbers, has made hardly less remarkable moral and intellectual pro-

gress; crime has become comparatively rare, and for more than a generation order has been maintained by a police force of which the peculiar distinction has been to be unarmed. The spontaneous movement of public opinion has brought about a system of universal compulsory schooling, and in every direction and in every department of life and society there have been efforts uncalled for by authority towards self-improvement or self-education. Scientific societies, literary societies, discussion societies are innumerable. Benevolent institutions have multiplied and prospered. The book market has been almost flooded with series upon series of popular text-books, to the composition of which the ablest men in every department have given much of their best work. Our religious associations, while they have diminished the old sectarian asperity and perhaps with it something of the fervour of their devotion, have seriously laboured for the moral and spiritual edification of those who come under their influence. The old tradition of outdoor exercise and healthy sports, so far from having abated might be thought to have been exaggerated in our time, and the growth and persistence of the Volunteer movement prove at least that the sentiment of national defence and the taste for military discipline are the reverse of extinct.

Nowhere has the spontaneous action of British society been more marked than in the political field.

The movement of protest against the reaction of the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic time, taking the two-fold form of a demand for the extension of the suffrage and for the repeal of the tariff, created the great organisation of the reforming party and the counter-organisation of the Conservatives, both of which became so complete that for two generations they dominated our public life, until the rivalry between them tended to obscure in the popular mind the conception that we are one body, the notion of the State as representing and acting in behalf of the whole community. The two parties inherited something of the fanaticism and fervour of the religious disputants of the seventeenth century, Liberals and Conservatives having been half-conscious continuers of the strife between Puritans and Cavaliers. This peculiar division has had some unfortunate consequences. Political education has meant education to be a member of one party, and has consisted too much in the inheritance of a bias and the instilling of a prejudice. Each side has learned to consider the important point to be the one about which they differed from the other side; every political question has been a question of opinion, that is, one with regard to which it was equally legitimate to hold either of two contrary views. Happily, in recent years, the rise of new problems, the growth of the Empire, and the division of opinion in regard to the government of Ireland,

creating a fissure which did not correspond to the traditional limits of the parties, have had the effect of weakening the party tie and of opening the eyes of very many to the existence of national interests and national duties which have been too long ignored.

I have touched upon these diverse forms and aspects of our national life, which seems to me on the whole to have been swiftly progressive and to reveal an undiminished energy, in order to bring out its most remarkable phenomenon, the entire absence of unity. During the period when our whole political theory was summed up in the belief that Government should do as little as possible, and was expressed in the term interference applied to the action of Government, the various efforts made in different departments of public and social life were disconnected from one another. Every man lived a series of parallel but unrelated lives; his choice of a sect, of a political party, of a profession, of the literary occupations of his leisure, of his social club, and of his outdoor exercise, were all independent of one another. Seldom was the whole man co-ordinated and brought into complete harmony with himself by one great overruling purpose. In political life, that is, in his relations with Government, it was not uncommon for a man to have three distinct standpoints—one for his vote in a Parliamentary election, a second for his vote in the election of town-councillors, and a third for his vote at the School Board election. Nowhere perhaps

was the want of connection between the various departments of life more remarkable than in the arrangements for education. The present generation had its schooling in compartments. History, geography, languages, and the sciences were taught by so many different teachers, each of them acting as though the other subjects and the other teachers had no existence. The pupil received a quantity of information in each of a number of disconnected branches, and was thus prepared for the series of disconnected activities already described.

The great need of our lives and of the education which leads us into them is harmony, or oneness. The multitude of sporadic efforts, made at present either on a large scale by the nation in its various aspects or on a smaller scale by the schoolmaster in his divers compartments, require to be brought together, co-ordinated, and organised. The secret of harmony is unity of purpose. The meaning of organisation is the combination of efforts to one end. What, then, is the one end to which all our efforts in every branch of action and in every part of education should tend, what is the common purpose which should inspire the citizens of the British Empire? The conception of a common welfare is too vague and indeterminate; it must take more definite shape from the perception that the whole community, the nation, has its specific mission to fulfil, its purpose and object in the world. That

purpose is given us by the Empire, of which the vital force is maritime, and which represents an immeasurable influence upon the future of mankind.

Every great position in the world, every place of power and trust, has been acquired by services, and can be maintained only by their faithful performance. The moment that the work corresponding to the position ceases to be carried on, the moment that the position becomes ornamental, its tenure becomes uncertain. The parable of the talents perfectly conveys the essential law of the rise and fall of nations. If, therefore, Great Britain is to keep her place she must fulfil her duties. Her Empire, which is the government of no inconsiderable portion of the human race, must be in truth a government distinguished above others by justice and equity. Her naval power must be actively used in the defence of right. In holding, as she must, the balance of Europe, and probably in future of the world, she must take care that her interests are identified with just causes, and that her action shall be for the prevention of wrong, never the outcome of the lust for power or the thirst for glory. No fear of any combination ought to induce her to wander from the path of right. The overthrow of a nation united in behalf of a good cause is a catastrophe not recorded in history, and a first-rate nation fighting in behalf of right is much more likely to conquer the world than to be defeated.

Great Britain's position imposes upon her the choice

between the first place and the last among the nations, and in the present democratic age the responsibility for the exercise of this choice is shared by every citizen. The sense of this responsibility, in proportion as it comes home to us, will uplift our lives and counteract the self-exaltation that is the concomitant vice of power. As fast as we perceive that England has a work to do in the world, and that her policy, the function of her government, is to carry on, to watch over, and to protect that work, we shall find that each of us has a purpose in life, giving it a deeper meaning and a higher value. Our party strife will become emulation for the great end, our various efforts in public and social life will insensibly fall into harmony, and education will receive a new unity from the object which will be set before it. Teachers who realise that they are training British citizens will see a new connection between all their subjects, which are but so many guides to the purport of the nation's work. Geography will become the study of the sphere of human action, history the interpreter of the march of the race towards a common life, English history the clue to the way in which England has served and has yet to serve that progress, the history of other nations the key to the nature of their work as our rivals in a common cause. The sciences will ever remind us of the bond that links the effect to its cause, and this lesson we shall apply to the working of government by choosing administrators for

their special knowledge of the field in which they are to labour.

In this life-giving conception of a national purpose will be found the solution of the great problem of our time—the unity of the Empire and the community of the British race. When we are once awakened to the fact that the nation, as a great community, has its work to do in the world, we shall readily find the statesmen who are to lead us; they will be those whose intelligence has been expanded by the study of that work and whose character has been steeled by efforts towards its furtherance. For patriotism, the virtue alike of citizen and of statesman, consists as little in a theoretical admiration of abstract justice divorced from sacrifices for its realisation, as in that spirit of bluster and pride which has received the nickname of Jingoism. It consists in a life of effort and sacrifice inspired by the idea of the nation. In this spirit Englishmen may hope that their country will fulfil the ultimate purpose of all national existence by creating in each succeeding generation a higher type of British character, and thus, in her own practice as well as by her example, contribute to the education of the human race.

The Great Alternative

A PLEA FOR A NATIONAL POLICY

BY

SPENSER WILKINSON

Small Demy 8vo, 7s. 6d.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION:—I. NATIONAL PARALYSIS. II. THE REMEDY.

I. THE STERN QUESTION.
II. THE UNION OF GERMANY.
III. THE PARTITION OF TURKEY AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.
IV. THE USE OF ARMIES.
V. THE SECRET OF THE SEA.
VI. EGYPT.
VII. A WARNING FROM GERMANY.
VIII. THE EXPANSION OF FRANCE.
IX. INDIA.
X. THE GREAT ALTERNATIVE.
XI. THE REVIVAL OF DUTY.

'The two chapters of chief interest are those wherein the writer develops the thesis which gives its title to his book by laying *The Great Alternative* before his readers and pleading for that "Revival of Duty" which alone can enable them to choose aright. The lucidity with which the present European situation is reviewed in these pages, and the power and acumen with which all its issues are examined, deserve unqualified praise.'—*Saturday Review.*

'Mr. Spenser Wilkinson's book is quite full of excellent things. Historically it is, as a rule, exceedingly strong, and one or two of the chapters can only be described as masterly. Particularly good is the *résumé* of Egyptian affairs. "The Secret of the Sea" is again a perfect masterpiece of suggestive writing. . . . The striking thing about the details of the book is their fulness and accuracy, and the perception everywhere displayed of the realities which underlie the seeming facts of a situation. We gladly acknowledge the work to be a real contribution to political science.'—*Spectator.*

'One need not accept either Mr. Wilkinson's view of our statesmen, or his general conclusions, to feel that his book is a valuable one. . . . What the country appears to us to need is a serious and deliberate realisation of the extent and nature of our Imperial interests and responsibilities. Those interests and responsibilities must be faced as a whole, if at all, and a book like *The Great Alternative* is helpful as bringing home to the reader what politics on a large scale really mean.'—*Literary World.*

SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO.

THE

Brain of an Army

A POPULAR ACCOUNT OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF

By SPENSER WILKINSON

New Edition, with Letters from COUNT MOLTKE *and* LORD ROBERTS

With Three Plans. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d.

'A model of clearness in exposition. There is not a dull page in the book.'—*Pall Mall Gazette.*

'The best manual that exists of the functions of a general staff.'—*Athenæum.*

'We should like to call the attention of our readers to the important preface which Mr. Spenser Wilkinson has added to the new edition of his fascinating and most valuable little book, *The Brain of an Army.* Mr. Wilkinson's competence to speak on these matters has been vouched for by Moltke himself, and needs no words from us.'—*From an article on the 'Reorganization of the War Office' in the Spectator.*

'Not only a popular, but a thorough account of the nature of the German General Staff, . . . Its author has entered into the spirit of the German Army in a manner we should hardly have believed to be possible for a foreigner.'—*Deutsche Rundschau.*

'He has not only mastered all its material by careful study, but has acquired such a living knowledge of his subject as a foreigner rarely attains.'—*Kölnische Zeitung.*

'A book full of thought. . . . The author shows that he is very intimate with our military institutions as regards the training of the army to be a manageable instrument of war, and the education of officers for the higher commands.'—*Jahrbücher für die Deutsche Armee und Marine.*

'That he most perfectly commands his subject is shown by the opening pages, and the light which he throws upon the German General Staff (which he calls *The Brain of an Army*) loses none of its strength until he has successfully accomplished in brief and convincing style the task which he has undertaken.'—*Internationale Revue über die Gesammten Armeen und Flotten.*

'Deserves to be better known among us than it is, for it presents the essence of that organ, the German General Staff, with rare clearness and accuracy, and with an understanding and a technical knowledge which in a foreigner, and one who according to our notions is not a professional soldier, are in a high degree surprising.'—*From an article on Spenser Wilkinson's works in the 'Militär Wochenblatt.'*

THE

Brain of the Navy

BY

SPENSER WILKINSON

Crown 8vo, 1s.

'It is an attempt to suggest a better organisation for the Admiralty, and to devise an organisation which shall act as a brain to the Navy. It is throughout a most useful and suggestive piece of work.'—*Spectator.*

'The question of the day is, how the navy is to be made ready for use. The author of "The Brain of the Navy" has endeavoured to answer this question in a very able and clearly written work.'—*Civil Service Gazette.*

'We strongly recommend our leaders to study this book, and so obtain valuable information as to the causes that led to our naval supremacy, and the possibility of its being challenged before long.'—*Western Morning News.*

'It is not for us to sing the praises of "The Brain of the Navy," by Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, for in doing so we should sing our own, who originally published it. However, we did publish it, and that shows that we were willing to back our good opinion by an appeal to our readers. It appears to us to be a most valuable elucidation of what just now is certainly the most vital need of the navy, and therefore of the country at large.'—*Pall Mall Gazette.*

'It examines, with the same force and clearness as have attracted so much attention to that former book, the present administrative economy of the navy; and will interest and instruct any one who believes that Great Britain's power as a nation depends on her naval supremacy, and desires to see that supremacy maintained.'—*Scotsman.*

THE Command of the Sea

By SPENSER WILKINSON

Crown 8vo, Coloured Wrapper, 1s.

CONTENTS

Sea Power and Land Power.	The Secret of Success.
National Policy.	Readiness in the Right Place.
The Mediterranean.	The Actual Situation.
Defence by a Navy.	A Specific Proposal.

'What is Unionism to an Empire shaken, or Home Rule to four impoverished nations, or an eight hours' day to working classes thrown out of employment, or Socialism to a people fighting for its life? . . . There are still some thousands of Englishmen to whom the security of the Empire is dearer than the most highly advertised party nostrums.'

'Mr. Wilkinson expounds with great force and felicity of illustration the true meaning of the strategical expression, "The Command of the Sea."'—*The Times.*

'Mr. Wilkinson treats the subject with a clearness and grasp almost above praise; within 100 brief pages he condenses all that the average citizen requires to enable him to form a reasonable judgment on the needs of our navy to maintain that command of the sea on which, as he clearly shows, our very existence now depends. More than this, he comes forward with a distinct and practical suggestion, which, if adopted by the nation, will ensure the provision of a fleet and army competent to fulfil the duties for which they exist.'—*The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.*

'Very able essays.'—*The United Service Gazette.*

'Good sense at last.'—*The Realm.*

The Volunteers and the National Defence

By SPENSER WILKINSON

FORMERLY CAPTAIN 20TH LANCASHIRE R.V.

Author of 'The Brain of an Army'

Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d.

'Mr. Wilkinson's preface is dated only a few weeks ago, and in it he lays great stress upon arming the Volunteers with the same weapon as that used by the army, upon the introduction of a system of selection among the officers, with special care in the appointment of commanding officers, and the acquisition of sufficient spaces for musketry practice and for manœuvres. The present Government have in the course of this month of March pledged themselves to these very changes; and no doubt Mr. Wilkinson's influence as a military writer, now universally recognised, has had weight in bringing about the proposed reforms.'—*Athenæum.*

'In Mr. Wilkinson the Volunteers have an advocate who is a thorough master of the subject with which he deals; and if he may, perhaps, be for infusing more of the military character into the force than even some of the Volunteers themselves might be inclined to favour, he advances cogent reasons for all that he advocates.'—*Scotsman.*

'Mr. Wilkinson writes with a view to giving those unaccustomed to study the subject closely, some general idea of the processes of modern war, and his name and known ability are sufficient to give assurance that his explanations will be well thought out and clearly expressed. Also, the opinion of one who has served with the Volunteers and sympathises with their difficulties, and has given many years to the study of the methods of foreign armies, is well worthy of attention.'—*Saturday Review.*

'The book should be read by every one, soldier or civilian, who has any stake in the country, or desire for its security. A perusal of Mr. Wilkinson's pages can scarcely fail to help towards effecting the purpose the author has in view—namely, "to raise the estimation in which the officers of the force are held by their fellow-citizens, and to encourage some among their number by placing in a clear light the nobility of their mission."'—*Admiralty and Horse Guards Gazette.*

Now Publishing—at all Booksellers':

CONSTABLE'S REPRINT

OF THE

AUTHOR'S FAVOURITE EDITION

OF

The Waverley Novels

WITH ALL THE ORIGINAL PLATES AND VIGNETTES
RE-ENGRAVED

Red cloth, paper back title	*price* 1*s.* 6*d.*	*per vol., net.*
Cloth gilt, gilt top	,, 2*s.* 0*d.*	,, ,,
Quarter Leather, gilt top	,, 2*s.* 6*d.*	,, ,,

A FEW OPINIONS OF THE PRESS

'A delightful reprint. The price is lower than that of many inferior editions.'—*Athenæum.*

'The excellence of the print, and the convenient size of the volumes, and the association of this edition with Sir Walter Scott himself, should combine, with so moderate a price, to secure for this reprint a popularity as great as that which the original edition long and justly enjoyed with former generations of readers.'—*The Times.*

'The illustrations have been re-engraved in a fashion which appears from the first specimens to be perfectly successful. This is one of the most charming editions of the Waverley Novels that we know, as well as one of the cheapest in the market.'—*Glasgow Herald.*

'Fulfilling in every way the promise of the publishers' design, and appealing to the instincts of scholarship, taste, and convenience.'—*Birmingham Post.*

'A remarkably cheap and well-printed reissue.'—*Leeds Mercury.*

'An exquisite reprint.'—*Black and White.*

'Wonderfully cheap, and the reissue could not have been presented more perfectly than it is now done.'—*Sheffield Telegraph.*

'These charming volumes.'—*Literary World.*

'After many disappointments we now have a cheap Waverley on what has always been the best model.'—A. T. Q. C. in *The Speaker.*

A. CONSTABLE & CO., WESTMINSTER.

00027741

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Mr. Sangi
on 12 April, 2019